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Introduction 
1. Short Overview* 
Since 2011, due to the Syrian civil war, Libya’s institutional breakdown, and Eritrea’s political unrest, 
record numbers of migrants have been arriving irregularly at the EU’s south-eastern external borders, 
publicly known as “Europe’s refugee crisis.”1 This thesis aims to analytically study the protection of 
refugee rights by applying an economic analysis to international refugee law and to European asylum 
law, after highlighting the HRs approach to positive law through case-law study. Its main part offers 
a L&E model constructed on the assumption that refugees, as well as national States, might aim to 
maximize their net benefits. This research focuses on the most important variables that impact refugee 
decision-making and the main “push” factors that impact lawmakers in enacting and modifying 
refugee laws (e.g. the protection of national security and the safeguarding of the national job market). 
Furthermore, this thesis examines the economic advantages and disadvantages of a centralized 
supernational asylum law [within acquis communautaire] that might result in the elimination of 
competition between legal orders in asylum law and the removal of negative externalities caused by 
“asylum shopping.” In summary, the “Refugee Crisis” is critically analyzed through a 
multidisciplinary approach since there is the application of HRs approach as well as L&E methods 
by also considering case-law study and the positive law. 
 
2. Relevance of the Research 
This thesis focuses on a L&E approach to the refugee crisis. Although during 2018, the number of 
irregular migrants has decreased significantly when compared to the years 2016-2017, the arrival of 
irregular migrants in the Mediterranean Sea remains a controversial political issue,2 both at the 
national and EU levels. For instance, Italy and Greece, as border EU countries, are two of the 
representative countries, having the highest number of asylum applications.3 In the summer of 2019, 
the Italian Parliament voted for a “new,” more restrictive, and controversial immigration policy. This 
policy might not be aligned with international HRs law or constitutional interpretations4 since Italy 
should rescue refugees, but the “new” policy classifies it as an administrative offense (new modified 
 
* Part of the academic materials of this chapter have been also used for the scientific paper Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. 
"Irregular Migration by Sea: Interception and Rescue Interventions in Light of International Law and the EU Sea Borders Regulation." 
European Journal of Migration and Law 21.1 (2019): 26-52 and Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. "Illicit Return Practices of 
Irregular Migrants from Greece to Turkey." International Journal of Law and Political Sciences 14.1: 45-51. 
1 Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. "Irregular Migration by Sea: Interception and Rescue Interventions in Light of International Law 
and the EU Sea Borders Regulation." European Journal of Migration and Law 21.1 (2019): 26-52. 
2 Ibrid. 
3 Eurostat. 2019. Asylum statistics, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 
accessed in April 30th, 2020. 
4 Italian Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, Section III, No. 05479/2019 of 14 August 2019. 
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Article 6-bis Legislative Decree 286/1998). Moreover, on July 17, 2019, Germany5 and the 
Netherlands6 suspended the application of the “Dublin transfer” (Dublin III Regulation 604/2013) to 
Greece due to the risk of chain refoulment to Turkey.7 These events show that the refugee crisis is 
still a “hot” political and legal issue, not only because the number of asylum seekers during 2019 has 
increased, 8 but also due to the economic impact of Covid-19 on the economic growth in Europe.9 In 
other words, Covid-19 will impact the unemployment rate in the EUMS, which might bring negative 
effects for asylum seekers or refugees already present. As a result, to protect refugee interests, the 
role of the UNHCR is still considered fundamental. This is why from a small office of some 30 staff 
based mostly in Europe in the early 1950s, the UNHCR has now grown into a global organization 
with a staff of more than 9,300 people working in 123 countries. The principal goal is to explore the 
“demand” and “supply” of the “refugee market” through the lenses of the field of L&E coupled with 
the context of the HRs approach. This inquiry aims to suggest a comprehensive model of refugee law, 
which can be applied in future contexts of new migration flows (e.g. environmental migration). Thus, 
its importance goes beyond the current ongoing refugee crisis and could be helpful for different target 
groups, including academia and policymakers. 
 
2. Research Question 
The central research question is the following: which policy can simultaneously consider the 
protection of refugee HRs without needlessly damaging the interests of national States? After 
reviewing the historical development of the UNHCR and examining the 1951 Convention through an 
HRs perspective and a case-law study, the central question is divided into the following sub-
questions: First, why do national States ratify and comply with the 1951 Convention? And, why have 
States not built a WTO model for refugee movement? Second, what are the main variables that affect 
refugees’ decision-making processes? Third, under the hypothesis that national States strive to protect 
the interests of their citizens (via national security, job market, etc.) and in asylum law, where a 
“market failure” is still present, what are the most important “push” factors that influence lawmakers 
when enacting and modifying refugee laws? And, which authority shall rule over asylum law, national 
Parliaments or the EU institutions?  
 
 
5 Administrative Court of Munich, 17 July 2019, M 11 S 19.50722, M 11 S 19.50759. 
6 Dutch Council of State, 17 July 2019, 201902302/1/V3. 
7 Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. "Illicit Return Practices of Irregular Migrants from Greece to Turkey." International Journal of 
Law and Political Sciences 14.1: 45-51. 
8 Eurostat, note 3. 
9 OECD. 2020. Interim Economic Assessment Coronavirus: The world economy at risk https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/7969896b-
n.pdf?expires=1587161779&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=520E2A11ABFDEB27BA7CE084FAF38B8E accessed on April 
30th, 2020. 
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3. Methodology 
The methods applied here vary according to the questions to be answered. On the “demand” side, i.e. 
the “rationale” of refugees, after highlighting the HRs approach to positive law, one of the most 
important novelties of this study is in the incorporation of a L&E model based on the idea that 
refugees might also seek to maximize their net benefits.10 This model shall also include the 
information costs because the level of information increases either during the passage through secure 
transit countries11 or through continued communication with agents of smuggling.12 While some 
groups of refugees do make a clear choice (e.g. resettled refugees, anticipatory refugees, and bogus 
refugees), for others, speaking about “choice” is a contentious term13 since persecution, sometimes 
prompt and unexpected, is the main factor that impacts their decision to flee. On the “supply” side, 
the protection of domestic interests by national parliaments, this study systematically reviews 
empirical data while also incorporating the new research conducted on the current “European Refugee 
Crisis,” which peaked in 2015 and 2016.14 Regarding the third sub-research question, this study 
examines the legal, political, and economic advantages and disadvantages of a centralized 
supranational asylum law [acquis communautaire] that might result in the decrease of competition 
between legal orders in refugee law15 due to the individual State’s choice entails positive or negative 
externalities for third countries because it directly affects the flow of migration.16  
 A multidisciplinary approach is applied to refugee law by combining L&E concepts with the 
ideals of HRs. Chapter I gives a L&E interpretation of historical events, while Chapter II reviews the 
development of the protection of refugee rights through case-law study. Chapter III explores various 
explanations for the ratification of and compliance with the 1951 Convention, by incorporating not 
only the reasons dealing with the interests of the States but also the importance of the protection of 
refugees’ rights. In addition, in the case of the WTO proposal for refugee movement, the thesis 
clarifies that this part applies only to an L&E approach. This clearly avoids the criticism of this 
proposal based on moral objections. While Chapter IV presents a micro-model of migration without 
assuming that refugees are rational agents, Chapter V focuses on the impact that refugees have on 
host countries without asserting that all refugees bring negative effects or that national States should 
 
10 Neumayer, Eric. "Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe." International studies quarterly 49.3 
(2005): 389-410.   
11 Havinga, Tetty, and Anita Böcker. "Country of asylum by decision making or by chance: Asylum‐seekers in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK." Journal of ethnic and migration studies 25.1 (1999): 43-61; 
12 Day, Kate, and Paul White. "Decision making or circumstance: The UK as the location of asylum applications by Bosnian and 
Somali refugees." GeoJournal 56.1 (2002): 15-26. 
13 Crawley, Heaven. Chance or choice? Understanding why asylum seekers come to the UK. Refugee Council, 2011. 
14 Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. "Irregular Migration by Sea: Interception and Rescue Interventions in Light of International 
Law and the EU Sea Borders Regulation." European Journal of Migration and Law 21.1 (2019): 26-52. 
15 des Places, Ségolène Barbou, and Bruno Deffains. "Cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition: the case of asylum 
legislation in Europe." International Review of Law and Economics 23.4 (2003): 345-364. 
16 Bubb, Ryan, Michael Kremer, and David I. Levine. "The economics of international refugee law." The Journal of Legal Studies 40.2 
(2011): 367-404. 
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not protect refugees HRs. Finally, Chapter VI, by applying an economic approach, investigates 
Article 5 TEU in asylum law, by considering the protection of human rights.  
 The protection of refugee rights is brought into focus by incorporating the main lessons found 
in the L&E literature. This necessitates a model that optimizes refugee protection without negatively 
impacting the main interests of the host countries. This method has pros and cons. It is criticized in 
HRs literature since it considers persecuted individuals as agents able to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis; according to HRs theory, asylum seekers have little to no information regarding the final 
destination country.17 Since information is fundamental in calculating a cost-benefit ratio, persecuted 
individuals cannot be considered as rational agents. On the other hand, the L&E literature argues that 
the impact that refugees have on the host countries is not considered by the HRs’ scholars. According 
to them, the impact of migration levels on property crime is higher in cases of low attachment of 
migrants to the local community.18 In addition, the L&E literature has concluded that a 10% increase 
in the population share of new migrants is associated with up to a 0.5% reduction in the employment 
rate (USA)19 or would reduce native employment rates by 0.2–0.7% (EU).20 However, the “right” 
balance between these two different approaches has the opportunity to give a comprehensive view of 
the topic, which would yield better policy decisions. Thus, this thesis applies L&E methods without 
rejecting the HRs approach. 
 
4. The Original Contribution  
Bringing a multidisciplinary perspective to refugee law, this thesis provides an economic analysis of 
refugee law. The current debate is updated with a new approach to the refugee crisis by also utilizing 
a case-law study, HRs literature, and critical reasoning. While the classical literature has applied a 
HRs approach21 based on the main case-law of the ECtHR22 and the CJEU,23 a comprehensive model 
of refugee law is suggested here, updated with the most recent economic, political and legal events 
which can be applied in future contexts of new migration flows (e.g. environmental migration). Thus, 
 
17 Koser and Pinkerton. The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum. Home 
Office, 2002; Robinson, Vaughan, and Jeremy Segrott. Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers. Home Office, 2002. 
18 Bell, Brian, Francesco Fasani, and Stephen Machin. "Crime and immigration: Evidence from large immigrant waves." Review of 
Economics and Statistics 21.3 (2013): 1278-1290. 
19 Card, David. "Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labor market impacts of higher immigration. “Journal of Labor 
Economics 19.1 (2001):22-64. 
20 Angrist, Joshua D., and Adriana D. Kugler. "Protective or counter‐productive? Labour market institutions and the effect of 
immigration on EU natives." The Economic Journal 113.488 (2003): F302-F331; Venturini, Alessandra. "Do immigrants working 
illegally reduce the natives' legal employment? Evidence from Italy." Journal of population economics 12.1 (1999): 135-154. 
21 Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, Tillmann Löhr, and Timo Tohidipur. "Border controls at sea: Requirements under international human 
rights and refugee law." International Journal of Refugee Law 21.2 (2009): 256-296; Hathaway, James C. The rights of refugees under 
international law. Cambridge University Press, 2005; Roberts, Anthea. "Righting wrongs or wronging rights? The United States and 
human rights post-September 11." European Journal of International Law 15.4 (2004): 721-749; Bailliet, Cecilia. "The Tampa Case 
and its Impact on Burden Sharing at Sea." Human Rights Quarterly 25.3 (2003): 741-774. 
22 ECtHR, Application nos.  3394/03, 55721/07, and also confirmed by the no. 27765/09. 
23 CJEU, Judgment in Joined Cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17. 
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this research can be useful not only to academia but also to judges, NGOs, and public civil servants 
charged with the protection and the promotion of refugee rights as well as to design impact 
assessments of refugee policies. 
 This original research brings fresh perspectives on refugee law. It gives a L&E interpretation 
of the historical events by emphasizing the codification of national interests in the international 
refugee law. Moreover, after uncovering some of the reasons for the “refugee market failure” and 
discussing the cases of State intervention to reach a quasi-stable outcome, the thesis offers a possible 
solution by considering the refugee burden-sharing as a scheme that can also avoid the Coasean 
bargaining between countries. According to the Coase Theorem, negotiations between States may 
lead to efficient outcomes under three conditions: 24 1. if an externality affects only a limited number 
of countries; 2. the property rights have been previously assigned; and, 3. the risk of strategic behavior 
is mitigated. Unfortunately, in the current refugee crisis, none of these conditions is fulfilled. First, 
the refugee flow has affected a high number of countries (see Chap. I and II). Second, according to 
the main L&E literature, the protection of refugees is considered to be an international public good 
(see Chap. III).25 In this case, property rights have not been previously assigned. Third, in case of a 
refugee crisis, the risk of strategic behavior is not mitigated since a State cannot take into account the 
actions and reactions of neither persecuted individuals nor other States. In other words, as the 
UNHCR underlines,26 refugees flee after a calculated consideration of a combination of political, and 
other reasons (see Chap. II, Sec. 2.1.), which may also include economic reasons (see Chap. IV). 
Moreover, the mitigation of strategic behavior has been used as one of the main arguments facing the 
refugee crisis through a regionally-structured system rather than global (see Chap. II, Sect. 5) or 
individual (see Chap. VI) approaches. 
 In addition, this scientific contribution draws on new empirical studies of the on-going 
“Refugee Crisis.” Although refugees might strive to maximize their net benefits, this research is novel 
to explore the possibility of “choices” made by refugees at some point in their journey as to their final 
destination country. This study reveals the importance of information costs on the refugee decision 
process as well as its role during the trip to the final destination countries by adapting a micro-model 
of migration to refugees. Although refugees are deemed to be a vulnerable group, internationally 
protected under Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 Convention, this does not mean that they cannot opt 
between different options, although their range of possibilities is (very) limited. Within the category 
 
24 Van den Bergh, Roger. "Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe." Kyklos 53.4 (2000): 
435-466. 
25 Bubb, Ryan, Michael Kremer, and David I. Levine. "The economics of international refugee law." The Journal of Legal Studies 40.2 
(2011): 367-404; Betts, Alexander. "Public goods theory and the provision of refugee protection: The role of the joint‐product model 
in burden‐sharing theory." Journal of Refugee Studies 16.3 (2003): 274-296. 
26 UNHCR. 2000. The State of the World’s Refugees 2000FFifty Years of Humanitarian Action. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. 
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of refugees, a clear choice can be observed in the case of bogus refugees (individuals that by 
considering the political crisis in the origin country, although are not persecuted, leave their own 
country and ask for international protection), resettlement refugees (persecuted individuals who have 
been declared as refugees and are considered for transfer to other destination countries), and in the 
case of anticipatory refugees,27 who are persecuted individuals who generally have a high level of 
education and skills and can anticipate future events that are going to lead to their persecution. In 
these cases, they behave similarly to economic migrants, where “pull” factors are important.28  
 Furthermore, it is original to clarify the States’ public choice to ratify and comply with the 
1951 Convention, under the concept of the “veil of ignorance,”29 which explains that in the case of 
future uncertainty, a State chooses international cooperation rather than the maximization of its own 
net benefits. Concerning the 1951 Convention, the literature on international L&E does not provide 
concrete reasons for the ratification and compliance with the 1951 Convention. However, these 
questions may find an answer from various scholars who have critically examined these aspects from 
an economic30 and HRs31 perspective. The 1951 Convention shares similarities with HRs treaties, but 
at the same time it differs from them since it creates externalities within the immigration laws of a 
State.32 Additionally, the thesis considers – through a L&E approach –  the proposal of a WTO model 
for the international refugee movement by comparing the differences between the liberalization of 
trade movement and the restriction of refugee law. 
 Moreover, based on information costs, this scientific contribution makes a distinction between 
refugees that make a clear choice (eg. bogus refugees, anticipatory refugees, and resettled refugees) 
and the others. Based on this distinction, the impact on host countries is different. While resettled or 
anticipatory refugees do not affect host countries, the others, according to their particular skillsets 
and the socio-economic conditions of host countries, impact negatively on national security or labor 
market of host countries. Therefore, policy suggestions should also take into account the variety of 
these effects without considering all types of refugees identical. These policies are even more 
 
27 Johansson, Ruhe. "The refugee experience in Europe after World War II: some theoretical and empirical considerations." The 
Uprooted: Forced migration as international problem in the post-war era (1990): 227-269. 
28 Ibrid. 
29 Rawls, John. A theory of justice. Harvard university press, 2009. 
30 Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold K. Jacobson. Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Accords. MIT 
Press, 1998; Koh, Harold Hongju. "The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. By Chayes Abram 
and Chayes Antonia Handler. Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1995. Pp. xii, 404. $49.95." American Journal of 
International Law 91.2 (1997): 389-391; Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. "Is the good news about 
compliance good news about cooperation?." International Organization 50.3 (1996): 379-406; Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter. 
"International law and international relations theory: a dual agenda." American Journal of International Law 87.2 (1993): 205-239. 
31 Hathaway, Oona A. "Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.4 (2007): 588-621; 
Neumayer, Eric. "Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?." Journal of conflict resolution 49.6 (2005): 
925-953; Hathaway, Oona A. "Do human rights treaties make a difference?." The Yale Law Journal 111.8 (2002): 1935-2042; Henkin, 
Louis. "International law: politics and values." Developments in International Law 18 (1995). 
32 Salehyan, Idean. "The externalities of civil strife: Refugees as a source of international conflict." American Journal of Political 
Science 52.4 (2008): 787-801. 
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important now due to the economic impact of Covid-19 on the job market of host countries, which 
will lead to unemployment that might increase (property) crime, according to the Becker33 model and 
the composition of the current refugees accepted in the EU. 
 With this intention, this thesis goes beyond the latest research by exploring the advantages 
and disadvantages of an EU competence in asylum law through economic methods. Although other 
scientific contributions have investigated the advantages and disadvantages of an EU asylum policy 
by using economic methods,34 by also including the public choice theories of federalism such as the 
Swiss and Canadian models, this thesis synthesizes, reviews, and analyzes some of the most important 
economic theories such as the “race to the bottom,” the Tiebout argument (especially the evolutionary 
efficiency and the importance of information costs), the Coasean bargaining, the risk of strategic 
behavior, the “free-riding” incentive, and transaction costs in regard to asylum law. These theories 
are commonly used in cases with a transboundary nature of a specific issue, which produces 
international (negative) externalities.35 It should be emphasized that this paper deals with the optimal 
level of the EU centralization of asylum policy in general and does not focus solely on the current 
refugee crisis. Therefore, this contribution can also be used in the case of future migration crises (i.e. 
climate refugees). 
 
5. Structure 
In brief, the chapters are structured as follows: Chapter I offers a short overview of some of the most 
important international organizations protecting refugee rights during the twentieth century by giving 
an innovative L&E interpretation to these events. In particular, it focuses on the UNHCR by applying 
a historical approach as well as some input from the L&E perspective. Chapter II examines the main 
articles of the 1951 Convention through the application of a case-law study and a HRs approach in 
the context of the L&E literature. Concrete examples are included as well from national constitutions 
of EUMS. The chapter further demonstrates that facing the refugee crisis through a regionally-
structured system is closer to Pareto optimality as compared to the global one. Chapter III explores 
the reasons to ratify and to comply with the 1951 Convention. In other words, given the economic 
impact of the national law of refugee protection, the following two questions are addressed: 1) why 
do States sign the 1951 Convention? and 2) why do States comply with it? By asserting the 
importance of the WTO model for trade liberalization, the chapter questions if it is possible to build 
 
33 Becker, Gary S. "Crime and punishment: An economic approach." The Economic Dimensions of Crime. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1968. 13-68. 
34 Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús, and Hillel Rapoport. "Tradable refugee-admission quotas and EU asylum policy." CESifo 
Economic Studies 61.3-4 (2015): 638-672; Monheim-Helstroffer, Jenny, and Marie Obidzinski. "Optimal discretion in asylum 
lawmaking." International Review of Law and Economics 30.1 (2010): 86-97; des Places and Deffains, note 15. 
35 Faure, Michael. “Regulatory Competition vs Harmonization in EU Environmental Law” in Esty, Daniel C., and Damien Geradin. 
Regulatory competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
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a WTO model for international refugees. Chapter IV analyzes the empirical studies regarding 
refugees’ decision processes and  the main variables that affect them by further dividing refugees into 
several groups such as anticipatory refugees, bogus refugees, and resettled refugees on one side and 
genuine refugees on the other. Hence, Chapter V demonstrates the impact which refugees have on 
host countries (ie. the labor market, property or violent crimes, and terrorist activities) and proposes 
different policy recommendations, while also considering Covid-19’s impact on the economy of the 
host countries. The final chapter, Chapter VI, discusses the principle of subsidiarity in asylum law. 
More specifically, by applying an economic approach, it examines the need for the incorporation of 
asylum standards to attain the goal established in Article 5 of the TEU.  
 
6. Gender and Sex Dimensions 
This investigation includes and discusses both dimensions of gender and sex. For instance, one of the 
protections of persecuted individuals is the “membership of a particular social group” (Article 1A(2) 
1951 Convention), which has been interpreted to include the protection of the LGBTQI community36 
(ie. the gender dimension) as well as to protect women who are not treated equally in some countries 
with a totalitarian regime or patriarchal system (ie. the sex dimension). Concretely, by applying a 
HRs approach and legal ontology, Chapter II discusses different case law dealing with the protection 
of vulnerable groups such as pregnant women or members of the LGBTQI community. Moreover, 
the effect that migrants have on national security does depend on an individual’s gender since there 
is a general belief that men are more criminally inclined than women.37 To illustrate, Chapter IV 
shows the division between different types of crimes and the share of foreigners in the national prisons 
of the host countries by also distinguishing between male and female migrants. This thesis includes 
the results of different empirical studies that take into account the gender/sex dimension as well as 
all the cases of protection of persecuted individuals based on gender/sex discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 La Violette, Nicole. "‘UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’: a Critical 
Commentary." International Journal of Refugee Law 22.2 (2010): 173-208. 
37 Barber, Nigel. "The sex ratio as a predictor of cross-national variation in violent crime." Cross-Cultural Research 34.3 (2000): 264-
282. 
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Chapter I 
 The Recent History of The Legal and Institutional Treatment of 
Refugees and the Creation of the UNHCR 
This chapter offers a short overview of some of the most important international organizations that 
protect refugee rights during the twentieth century. In particular, it focuses on international 
organizations, such as the Allies who created the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, the International Refugee Organization, and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In addition, insights are given by applying an 
historical approach as well as some inputs through the law and economics perspective. By briefly 
examining some of the most important UNHCR Executive Committee’s Conclusions of the 1980s, this 
chapter demonstrates the codification of the States’ interests on the background of the protection of 
refugees’ human rights. Thus, the law and economics insights could better explain the interpretation 
of the historical events in the second part of the twentieth century since it underlines the shift towards 
sustainable refugee solution.   
 
Key words: League of Nations, mass displacement, refugees, restrictive asylum policies, UNHCR. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As long as there have been wars, there have been refugees.1 Yet it wasn’t until the twentieth century, 
after several wars that finally refugee movements became an international political issue2 since these 
movements changed the previous balances and shares between different nationalities by creating 
externalities. As a result, the protection of these vulnerable groups required international protection 
and different treaties codified the fundamental HRs of refugees.   
Before delving into the analysis of refugee law and its development from an L&E point of 
view, some background is merited of the main events of this part of history in the twentieth century 
surrounding the creation of an international permanent organization for the protection of refugee 
rights. This chapter provides a short overview of some of the most important events without analyzing 
in detail the entire history of the evolution of refugee rights. The focus here is only on the creation of 
the most significant international organization of the last century. In particular, Section II briefly 
examines the events from the creation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees by the 
 
1 Cushman, Thomas. Handbook of Human Rights. Routledge, 2012.  
2 Joly, Danièle, Lynette Kelly, and Clive Nettleton. Refugees in Europe: The hostile new agenda. Minority Rights Group, 1997. 
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western governments and the League of Nations to the formation of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, Section III explores the work of the UNHCR in 
the second part of the twentieth century by applying some critical thinking about the cold war and the 
protection of refugees after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In the conclusions, the expansion of 
the UNHCR’s work is underlined.  
The innovative part of this chapter stands in the L&E interpretation of some of the most 
important historical events of the twentieth century by giving an alternative view of them. While the 
classical literature has applied a HRs approach,3 this chapter aims to also consider some L&E insights. 
There are three types of durable solutions for refugees: voluntary return or repatriation, settlement in 
the country of asylum, and resettlement.4 The settlement in the country of asylum and resettlement – 
which are the two types of ‘exilic’ bias5 – underline the refugee’s right to seek asylum.6 On the 
contrary, voluntary repatriation points out the protection of the national interests of host countries, 
although it is internationally justified to consider the refugee’s right to return back at his/her origin 
country. This shift has been emphasized in different documents published by the UNHCR during the 
1980s, such as the Executive Committee’s Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) published in 1981, Conclusion 
No. 40 (XXXVI) published in 1985, and Conclusion No. 58 (XL) published in 1989 as well as the 
Agenda for Protection of 2002.      
To sum up, although the protection of refugee rights has been a concern for several centuries, 
the history of international protection of persecuted individuals de facto starts only with the creation 
of the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees by the western governments and the League of 
Nations in 1921. In addition, this historical overview helps the reader to better understand the shift of 
the approach towards the massive influx of refugees: from an ‘exilic’ bias, aimed at protecting the 
refugee’s right to seek asylum, to an international approach that also protects the national interest of 
host countries. In other words, the historical overview is relevant for L&E because it can further 
explain the criticism done to the 1951 Convention in the second half of the twentieth century and in 
the new millennium (see Chap. II; in particular, Sect. 5), the reasons for the ratification of or 
compliance with the 1951 Convention (see Chap. III), the current approach that national Governments 
 
3 Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, Tillmann Löhr, and Timo Tohidipur. "Border controls at sea: Requirements under international human 
rights and refugee law." International Journal of Refugee Law 21.2 (2009): 256-296; Hathaway, James C. The rights of refugees under 
international law. Cambridge University Press, 2005; Roberts, Anthea. "Righting wrongs or wronging rights? The United States and 
human rights post-September 11." European Journal of International Law 15.4 (2004): 721-749; Bailliet, Cecilia. "The Tampa Case 
and its Impact on Burden Sharing at Sea." Human Rights Quarterly 25.3 (2003): 741-774. 
4 Aleinikoff, T. Alexander. "State-centered refugee law: From resettlement to containment." Immigration & Nationality Law Review 
14 (1992): 186. 
5 Coles, G. The human rights approach to the solution of the refugee problem: a theoretical and practical enquiry. Nova Scotia: 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988. 
6 Aleinikoff, note 4. 
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have towards refugees (see Chap. V), as well as understanding the advantages and disadvantages of 
the common supranational (or international) asylum law (see Chap. VI). 
 
 
 
2. The Recent History of The Legal and Institutional Treatment of Refugees and the Creation 
of the UNHCR:  the First Half of the Twentieth Century 
Refugee protection has a long history, dating back centuries. However, the history of international 
protection starts with the League of Nations.7 In 1921, Western governments and the League of 
Nations created the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. This was the first multilateral 
coordinating mechanism for dealing with refugees.8 International cooperation brings several benefits. 
First, from a political science standpoint, collective action is slightly positive9 because national 
governments can justify their oftentimes unpopular actions of accepting refugees as a consequence 
of international agreements.10 Second, from an economic perspective, international cooperation in the 
management of the influx of refugees avoids peak costs for individual countries because, 
theoretically, the burden is distributed among many countries.11 Third, the L&E literature suggests 
that in the case of international cooperation, externalities for third countries  (countries which are not 
part of that public choice) decrease (see Chaps. III and VI). 12 
In 1933, after eleven years of work, the League of Nations adopted the Convention Relating 
to the International Status of Refugees, where the principle of non-refoulement was recognized 
(Article 33).13 Its goal was to deal with the refugee flow coming from Russia. Later, its scope was 
broadened to include the protection of persecuted individuals coming from Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
and Armenia. The withdrawal of Germany, Japan, and Italy from the League of Nations and the 
 
7 Jaeger, Gilbert. "On the history of the international protection of refugees." International Review of the Red Cross 83.843 (2001): 
727-738. 
8 Loescher, Gil, Alexander Betts, and James Milner Seymour, Claudia. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the Twenty-first Century. Routledge, 2008. 
9 des Places, Ségolène Barbou, and Bruno Deffains. "Cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition: the case of asylum 
legislation in Europe." International Review of Law and Economics 23.4 (2003): 345-364. 
10 Vink, Maarten. “The limited Europeanization of Domestic Asylum Policy: EU Governments and Two-Level Games.” Paper 
presented at the first YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation, Workshop IV ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Policies’, 2-3 November 
2001, Siena. 
11 Noll, Gregor. Negotiating asylum: the EU acquis, extraterritorial protection and the common market of deflection. Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2000. 
12 des Places, et al, note 9. 
13 Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees states “Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not 
to remove or keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier 
(refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national 
security or public order. It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontier of their countries of origin. It reserves 
the right to apply such internal measures as it may deem necessary to refugees who, having been expelled for reasons of national 
security or public order, are unable to leave its territory because they have not received, at their request or through the intervention of 
institutions dealing with them, the necessary authorizations and visas permitting them to proceed to another country.”   
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failure to resolve the Manchurian and Ethiopian conflicts during the 1930s were considered the main 
“push” factors for the collapse of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.14  
Towards the end of WWII, the Allies created the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF).15 Its aim was to facilitate the return of people to Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. The repatriation of refugees to Eastern Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) continued until 1946, when it became apparent that repatriated citizens were persecuted in 
their home countries.16 During the first period of the Cold War, the management of the influx of 
refugees was used as an argument against Communist ideology.17 While Western countries 
underlined the refugees’ personal freedom to choose according to their individual values, the Eastern 
Bloc countries considered them a potential threat to the reputation of their newly established regime. 
According to the leaders of the Eastern Bloc countries, there were no valid reasons for opposing 
return; those who resisted repatriation were war criminals or traitors.18 
After the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 following the aftermath of WWII, 
SHAEF was replaced by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA).19 The US 
government was its main contributor, financing more than 70% of its budget. Nevertheless, the US 
decided to formally terminate its funds. As a result, in 1946, the UNRRA was replaced by the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO). Again, the main funder was the US government, financing 
around two-thirds of the IRO’s budget.20 Its scope was limited to the management of refugees coming 
from Eastern Europe. 
 The IRO enhanced refugee rights in several ways.21 First, the international community 
emphasized the right not to be repatriated against one’s personal will. Second, the fear of political 
persecution was recognized. Third, and most importantly, there was a shift in the nature of refugee 
rights. Before 1946, refugee rights were protected as group rights. The Refugee Status Determination 
(RSD) was based on the fact that a person was member of a group persecuted in the country of origin. 
During the Cold war, the membership of a political group was highlighted. With the establishment of 
 
14 Loescher, et al., note 8. 
15 Proudfoot, Malcolm Jarvis. European refugees: 1939-52: a study in forced population movement. Northwestern University Press, 
1956. 
16 Loescher, et al., note 8. 
17 Ibrid.  
18 Fassmann, Heinz, and Rainer Münz. "European east-west migration, 1945–1992." International migration review 28.3 (1994): 520-
538. 
19 Do not confound UNRRA with UNRWA, (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) focused on the 
Palestine refugees.   
20 Klemme, Marvin. The inside story of UNRRA: an experience in internationalism; a first hand report on the displaced people of 
Europe. Lifetime Editions, 1949. 
21 Holborn, Louise Wilhelmine. The international refugee organization, A specialized agency of the United Nations: Its history and 
work, 1946-1952. Oxford University Press, 1956. 
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the IRO, refugee rights were considered individual rights. In addition, the RSD was to be determined 
individually. In 1948, this was codified in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22  
In the late 1940s, the UN started to consider the possibility of replacing the IRO with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This was formalized in 1952. While 
other international organizations, such as the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees, SHAEF, 
UNRRA, and IRO, each had a different focus to deal with refugee flows in a certain area at a certain 
time, the UN decided to build a permanent international organization. The continued refugee flows 
created difficulties for political agendas of different Western governments. The individual State 
choice entails positive or negative externalities for third countries because it directly affects the flow 
of migration (see Chap. III). The principal theory of L&E is that externalities are a market failure.23 
Since the “refugee market” could not be regulated by itself, a permanent solution was needed. This 
strategy also considers the advantages and disentanglements of a higher authority than the national 
State to govern the protection of refugees (see Chap. VI). 
 The 1951 Convention recognizes the temporal restriction established first in the Statute of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees,24 in addition to an added geographical restriction: the 
signatory countries had the option to choose to deal only with refugees “owning to events in Europe” 
or “owing to events in Europe and elsewhere” (Article 1(B) of the United Nations Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees; the 1951 Convention).25 While Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights established a right to asylum, the 1951 Convention imposes only a principle on non-
refoulement: the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where they risk persecution.  
 In 1956, the Hungarian crisis refugee crisis broke out. The USSR invaded Hungary and 
refugees from Hungary fled to Austria and Yugoslavia.26 With the goal to bypass the temporal 
restriction, 27 the new High Commissioner of that time (1956– 1960), Mr. Auguste Lindt, stated that 
the causes of the flight of Hungarians could be found in the events before 1951. Since it was an 
emergency, in the first phase, the UNHCR considered them temporarily as refugees by leaving the 
individual RSD to a later stage. The Hungarian crisis was managed successfully.  
 
22 Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’. 
23 Cooter, Robert, and Thomas Ulen. Introduction to Law and Economics. Pearson Education, 2007. 
24 Jackson, Ivor C. "1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis for Protection, The." International Journal 
of Refugee Law 3 (1991): 403. 
25 It is really interesting to highlight that a member state has the opportunity to choose between “owning to events in Europe” or “owing 
to events in Europe and elsewhere”. Although the majority of the member state have ratified the 1951 Convention with the absence of 
the geographical limitation, some exceptions can be found. These are Congo, Madagascar, Monaco, and Turkey. UNHCR. 2011. 
Reservations and Declarations to the 1951 Refugee Convention.   
26 Mócsy, István I. The Uprooted: Hungarian Refugees and Their Impact on Hungary's Domestic Politics, 1918-1921. East European 
Monographs, 1983. 
27 Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention states ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951’ by establishing a temporal 
restriction. 
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 With the process of decolonization, the work of the UNHCR became more difficult. While 
Western countries were the major donors of the UNHCR, the organization did not always protect the 
interests of Western powers. For instance, in contrast to their interests, the new members of the UN 
demanded that the UNHCR deal with refugees coming as a consequence of decolonization and 
succeeded. According to the political science literature, international peace organizations are “a 
significant forum for establishing the limits of donor influence”.28  
 Between 1955-1957, more than 85.000 Algerian refugees flew to Tunisia. While the French 
government considered Algeria as an integral part of the State of France and denied the UNHCR’s 
intervention, in May 1957, the Tunisian government formally asked the UNHCR to intervene. The 
UNHCR decided to intervene by relying on the 1956 precedent. While in the case of Hungary the 
temporal restriction was avoided through a broad legal interpretation, the Tunisian case was the first 
case outside Europe (bypassing the geographical restriction).29 The geographical restriction was 
formally abrogated with the signature of the 1967 Protocol.   
 Several authors – such as Bem, Jackson, and Goodwin-Gill – have considered this abrogation 
legally unnecessary for several reasons. First, the 1951 Convention already gives countries the 
possibility to reject the geographic limitation.30 Indeed, within the signatory countries, only Congo, 
Madagascar, Monaco, and Turkey have chosen the geographic limitation. 31 Second, European States 
were willing to protect refugee rights regardless of the geographic limitation.32 Third, the UN 
members were invited to send representatives for drafting the 1951 Convention33 since – from an 
L&E standpoint – the management of refugees entails negative (or positive) externalities for other 
countries (see Chaps. III and VI).34 However, according to the UNHCR, this amendment was 
necessary in order to overcome the dominant interpretation of the 1951 Convention by newly 
decolonized States that considered the Convention as Eurocentric.35 
 To sum up, this section analyses some of the most important events surrounding the creation 
of the UNHCR by also briefly considering the political justification for the derogation from the 
geographic and temporal limitation established in the 1951 Convention. 
 
28 Jenkins, Rob. The UN Peace-building Commission and the Dissemination of International Norms. Crisis States Research Centre, 
2008. 
29 Article 1B(1) of the 1951 Convention states ‘For the purposes of this Convention, the words “events occurring before 1 January 
1951” in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either: (a) “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951”; or (b) “events 
occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951”, by establishing a geographical restriction. 
30 Bem, Kazimierz. "The Coming of a ‘Blank Cheque’—Europe, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol." International Journal 
of Refugee Law 16.4 (2004): 609-627; Jackson, Ivor C. The refugee concept in group situations. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999. 
31 UNHCR, note 20. 
32 Bem, note 30. 
33 Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., and Jane McAdam. The refugee in international law. Oxford University Press, 2007. 
34 Rotte, Ralph, Michael Vogler, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Asylum migration and Policy coordination in Europe. 
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1996. 
35 UNHCR, High Commissioner Schnyder to Mr Stavropoulos, Memorandum by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
on the Report of the Colloquium on Legal Aspects of Refugee Problems held in April 1965 in Bellagio (Como), Italy, 6 Aug. 1965, 
Folio 136, 16/1/3 AMEND, Series 1, Fonds 11. 
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3. The Work of the UNHCR in the Second Part of the Twentieth Century 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the UNHCR expanded its mandate. However, the 1980s ushered in a 
new era of restrictions. This can be deduced by analying the differences between the UNHCR 
Executive Committee’s Conclusion 22 (XXXII) published in 1981, Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI) 
published in 1985, and especially Conclusion No. 58 (XL) published in 198936 as well as the Agenda 
for Protection of 2002.  
 Large-scale migration influxes frequently create serious problems for host countries (Chapter 
I.2 Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) – 1981) since, in the grand majority of the cases, irregular migrants 
enter the host countries “without the prior consent of the national authorities or without an entry visa, 
or without sufficient documentation normally required for travel purposes, or with false or fraudulent 
documentation” (Point A Conclusion No. 58 (XL) – 1989). Burden-sharing and international co-
operation should be directed towards facilitating voluntary repatriation (Chapter IV Conclusion No. 
22 (XXXII) – 1981), which should be promoted by the international community (Point B Conclusion 
No. 40 (XXXVI) – 1985). Voluntary repatriation should be the preferred solution compared to the 
settlement in the country of asylum and resettlement (Point D.ii Conclusion No. 58 (XL) – 1989) 
since within the group of asylum seekers, a large majority is comprised of persons who have left their 
home country for reasons other than persecutions (Point B Conclusion No. 58 (XL) – 1989); reasons 
that are identical to economic migrants (see Chap. II). The increase of “bogus” refugees could be 
proved also by the “fraudulent documentation and their practice of willfully destroying or disposing 
of travel and/or other documents in order to mislead the authorities in the country of arrival” (Point 
H Conclusion No. 58 (XL) – 1989). The burden-sharing (in the form of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements) and repatriation have also been underlined by the Agenda for Protection of 2002, which 
also considered the interest of States as well as the previous Executive Committee’s Conclusions. 
Thus, there is a clear shift towards refugees’ durable solution: from an ‘exilic’ bias, aiming to protect 
refugee’s right to seek asylum, to an international approach that also underlines the national interest 
of host countries.  
 There are two main possible explanations for this shift which might be connected: the 
economic recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the election of right-wing conservative 
governments in many Western States that led to restrictive asylum policies in many countries. 
Economic recessions usually bring large-scale unemployment, where foreigners are often seen as 
 
36 Sztucki, Jerzy. "The conclusions on the international protection of refugees adopted by the executive committee of the unhcr 
programme." International Journal of Refugee Law 1.3 (1989): 285-318. 
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competitors on the labor market in the public’s opinion.37 This adverse attitude towards foreigners 
can have an impact on the refugee recognition rate (refugee status according to the 1951 Convention 
plus humanitarian status recognized by national policies), as it was empirically tested in 
Switzerland.38 Studies have also demonstrated that a high unemployment rate exerts an adverse effect 
on the number of asylum seekers.39  
In addition, border control and restrictive asylum policies increase migration costs, especially 
in the case of persecuted individuals that enter the final destination country illegally and ask for 
international protection there. However, there is disagreement in the economic literature regarding 
the nature of this impact (positive or negative) as well as the significance of these policies (see Chap. 
IV).40 The ideological orientation of governments is thought to impact refugee policy, whereby right-
wing governments have more restrictive policies. However, some academic literature questions the 
significance of the right-left government dichotomy for national migration policy (see Chap. IV).41  
In accordance with these restrictive policies, some countries, led by France,42 considered some 
parts of airports to be international zones.43 This policy is based on the theory that the international 
rule of law, which also includes the prohibition on refoulement, is suspended in international zones.44 
This practice has been criticized by international legal scholars since “no international norm permits 
these zones to be considered as non-territorial spaces where the rule of law would not be 
implemented”.45  
Furthermore, some Western European Countries (such as Denmark in 1983; Germany, the 
UK, and Belgium in 1987; and then in the Schengen Convention in 1990) established penalties for 
agents who smuggle individuals into the country and for carriers by land, sea, and air of 
 
37 In contrast, the empirical study conducted in 2010 stated that immigrants were not viewed as competitors or as source that decrease 
national wage. This study covered the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands 
with approximately 1,000 adults interviewed in each country. Amelie, F. Constant and Klaus F. Zimmermann. International Handbook 
on the Economics of Migration. Edward Elgar, 2013. 
38 Holzer, Thomas, Gerald Schneider, and Thomas Widmer. "Discriminating Decentralization Federalism and the Handling of Asylum 
Applications in Switzerland, 1988-1996." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44.2 (2000): 250-276. 
39 Thielemann, Eiko R., Does Policy Matter? On Governments' Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration (November 2003). IIIS 
Discussion Paper No. 9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=495631 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.495631; Neumayer, 
Eric. "Asylum Destination Choice What Makes Some West European Countries More Attractive Than Others?." European Union 
Politics 5.2 (2004): 155-180. 
40Hatton, Timothy J. "The rise and fall of asylum: What happened and why?." The Economic Journal 119.535 (2009): F183-F213; 
Monheim, Jenny. "Human trafficking and the effectiveness of asylum policies." German Working Papers in Law and Economics 
2008.1 (2008): 3; Böcker and Havinga, Tetty, Asylum Migration to the European Union: Patterns of Origin and Destination (1997). 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2633536 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2633536 
41Gudbrandsen, Frøy. "Partisan influence on immigration: The case of Norway." Scandinavian Political Studies 33.3 (2010): 248-270; 
Schneider, Gerald, and Thomas Holzer. Asylpolitik auf Abwegen: nationalstaatliche und europäische Reaktionen auf die 
Globalisierung der Flüchtlingsströme. Leske and Budrich, 2002.  
42 The French Constitutional Council limited the possibility to set up transit zones (Constitutional Council, Decision no. 92-307 DC of 
25 February 1992). 
43 Hatton, note 40. 
44 For instance, this theory has been used by the USA government concerning the ‘extraterritoriality’ of its base at Guantanamo.   
45 des Places, et al, note 9. 
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undocumented arrivals.46 This is essentially decentralization and “privatization” of border control.47 
Private companies dealing with transportation conduct all security checks in order to avoid fines by 
destination States for carrying undocumented persons. Some authors have argued that these rules 
might be in conflict with the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Aviation and with Article 31 
of the 1951 Convention.48 
 These deflecting measures from the mid-80s might be explained through an economic analysis 
of law. Regulatory competition in refugee law began as destination countries aimed to attract the 
lowest possible number of refugees by creating the so-called “race to the top” (see Chap. VI). In 
refugee law, a player (destination country) may earn more (regardless of whether refugees increase 
or decrease the total society welfare) by rejecting refugee claims and thereby pushing refugees to 
choose other destination countries rather than hosting them.49 
 The restrictive asylum procedure might have given some positive results during the 1980s by 
decreasing the number of asylum seekers since during this period the main type of migration was 
south-to-north migration. However, by the late 1980s, asylum migration also included east-to-west 
migration. Some authors50 explain the peaks of refugees as consequences of historical events. For 
instance, the peak of refugees in 1992 came after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. As a result, these eventual positive outcomes vanished and a need for a central body to 
coordinate asylum law was indicated. 51 Based on empirical data, the total recognition rate (the rate 
of successful refugee status claims) decreased from over 50% in 1982 to less than 20% in 1990.52 
According to Hatton, this is the result of two main factors: the increase in numbers of “bogus” 
refugees and tougher asylum policies, especially those that limit access to the territory. 53  
 I would like to suggest additional factors that may explain this decrease. First, the end of the 
first part of the Cold War, which removed the attractiveness of persecution for political reasons,54 
might have impacted the recognition rate. As stated before, during the first period of the Cold War, 
the management of the influx of refugees was used as an argument against Communist ideology.55 
 
46 Borjas, George J., and John Crisp. Poverty, International Migration and Asylum. Studies in Development Economics and Policy. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
47 Cruz, Antonio, Shifting responsibility: carriers' liability in the member states of the European Union and North America. Trentham 
Books and School of Oriental & African Studies, 1995. 
48des Places, Segolene. Evolution of asylum legislation in the EU: Insights from regulatory competition theory. Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, 2003. 
49Suhrke, Astri. "Burden-sharing during refugee emergencies: The logic of collective versus national action." Journal of refugee studies 
11.4 (1998): 396-415. 
50 Hatton, note 40; Monheim, note 40. 
51 Deakin, Simon. "Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?." European Law Journal 12.4 (2006): 440-
454. 
52 Hatton, note 40. 
53 Hatton, note 40. 
54 Martin, David A., ed. The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s: The Ninth Sokol Colloquium on International Law. 
Vol. 10. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988. 
55 Loescher, et al., note 8. 
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Second, the economic recession, as well as the election of right wing conservative parties leads to a 
portrayal of migrants as competitors for the job market or as individuals that might increase 
criminality (see Chap. V). Third, the new approach to a durable solution that stresses repatriation 
rather than an ‘exilic’ bias56 might also explain this data. This could imply that refugees who do not 
have objective proof of persecution (see Chap. II) may decide to not leave their own home country 
since migration is costly and includes several costs (see Chap. IV). 
 With the end of the Cold War in 1989, international cooperation between the two blocs 
became much easier. Early on in the post-cold war period, the UNHCR took steps to expand the scope 
of its mandate in response to the evolving needs of refugees and returnees. By applying the concept 
of humanitarian relief, governments began to address the root causes of mass displacement.57  
 While the 1980s was a decade of restrictive asylum policies, the 1990s was a decade of 
voluntary repatriation and further direct and indirect restrictive policies. Western countries gradually 
increased adaptation costs by restricting the right to work permits58 and by decreasing social welfare 
for refugees.59 In addition, they introduced the notion of “manifestly unfounded claims”. 60  
Nevertheless, this approach did not have a significant effect on the number of asylum seekers since 
in order to avoid the application of the notion of “manifestly unfounded claims” persecuted 
individuals lied about their countries of origin.61 Furthermore, in order to increase repatriation, the 
conditions in the home country did not have to improve “substantially” but only “appreciably.”62 
Moreover, repatriation no longer had to be a strictly voluntary decision by refugees.63 
 In the latter half of the 1990s, due to the fact that refugees were seen as creating negative 
externalities for international security, the UNHCR expanded its mandate by intervening in cases of 
migration caused by internal conflicts within countries.64 The scientific literature demonstrates that 
internally displaced persons react to similar circumstances that make a person classify as a refugee.65 
Fundamentally, refugees are people who leave their home countries to avoid persecution. In addition, 
 
56 Aleinikoff, note 4. 
57 Beamon, Benita M., and Stephen A. Kotleba. "Inventory modelling for complex emergencies in humanitarian relief operations." 
International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications 9.1 (2006): 1-18. 
58 For instance, UK withdrew the permission to work for asylum seekers in 2002. The UK government followed the German law of 
1997 and the French law of 1991. Barthel, Fabian, and Eric Neumayer. "Spatial dependence in asylum migration." Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 41.7 (2015): 1131-1151. 
59 van Ours, J. C., and Milan Vodopivec. Shortening the potential duration of unemployment benefits does not affect the quality of post-
unemployed jobs: Evidence from a natural experiment. IZA Discussion Papers, No. 2171. 
60 Byrne, Rosemary, Gregor Noll, and Jens Vedsted-Hansen. "Understanding refugee law in an enlarged European Union." European 
Journal of International Law 15.2 (2004): 355-379. 
61 Hatton, Timothy J. "Seeking asylum in Europe." Economic Policy 19.38 (2004): 6-62; Böcker and Havinga, note 40. 
62 Chimni, Bhupinder Singh. "The meaning of words and the role of UNHCR in voluntary repatriation." International Journal of 
Refugee Law 5.3 (1993): 442-460. 
63 Ibrid.  
64 Lucas, Robert EB. Internal migration in developing countries: handbook of population and family economics. Boston University, 
1994. 
65 Richmond, Anthony H. "Reactive migration: Sociological perspectives on refugee movements." Journal of refugee Studies 6.1 
(1993): 7-24. 
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several variables impact on the refugee’s choice to leave his origin country. Similarly, internally 
displaced persons leave their residences to escape from persecution and might become refugees. 
 During this period, the concept of human security was developed.66 This concept was first 
introduced by the United Nations Development Programme in 1994 and was later incorporated into 
the foreign policy agendas of States such as Canada, Sweden, and Norway. The focus of the protection 
of displaced people rights was on the individual human being rather than the nation-state, and, thus, 
providing a basis for action under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.67 As a result of the expansion of the 
UNHCR’s mission, in 1996, refugees constituted only about 50 percent of the population dealt with 
by the UNHCR. 
 During the first decade of the new millennium, host countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan, 
did not receive a high amount of financial support from the international community. 68 The UNHCR 
tried to convince the Western European countries to increase their donations launching the Global 
Consultations on International Protection and the “Convention Plus”.69 However, these initiatives 
failed. The failure might be the result of the fact that in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
refugees were often victims of violence or natural disasters, rather than ideological persecution,70 
which was one of the main aims of the 1951 Convention.  
  In recent years, a new refugee crisis has unfolded. The term “European refugee crisis” 
emerged in 2015 when increasing numbers of irregular migrants from North Africa and the Middle 
East made the journey to the European Union (EU) to seek asylum, traveling across the Mediterranean 
Sea or through South-Eastern Europe. In order to face this crisis, the UNHCR is strongly cooperating 
with the EU and with national governments.   
 In summary, this section shows the evolution of UNHCR’s in the second part of the twentieth 
century. While the 1960s and 1970s were the decades of the expansion of the UNHCR’s mandate, 
the 1980s was a decade of restrictive asylum policies, and the 1990s was a decade of (voluntary) 
repatriation and further direct and indirect restrictive policies. In the last decade, a new refugee crisis 
has started and the UNHCR is strongly cooperating with the EU institutions as well as with the 
national governments.   
 
 
 
66 Alkire, Sabina. A conceptual framework for human security. University of Oxford, 2003. 
67 Loescher, et al., note 8. 
68 Ibrid.  
69 Ibrid.  
70 Mertus, Julie. "The state and the post-Cold War refugee regime: new models, new questions." International Journal of Refugee Law 
10.3 (1998): 321-348.  
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4. Conclusions 
Although the protection of refugee rights has been a concern for centuries, the history of international 
protection of persecuted individuals started in 1921 with the creation of the Office of High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  
 Early in the twentieth century, several international organizations protecting refugee rights 
were created such as the SHAEF, the UNRRA, the IRO, the UNHCR, each evolving into the other. 
While the IRO codified a shift in the nature of refugee rights, from a group right to an individual 
right, the UNHCR is the first international permanent organization conceived for the protection of 
Refugee rights. In addition, international refugee rights were established for the first time in 1933 in 
the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, and then in 1948 reinforced in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1951, the 1951 Convention established geographical and 
temporal restrictions. Only due to the thoughtful work of high commissioners were these limitations 
abrogated de facto in addition to the de jure abolishment of the geographical restriction with the 
signature of the 1967 Protocol.   
 During the second half of the twentieth century, UNHCR’s work faced several refugee 
movements. As a result, from a phase of expansion during the 1950s and 1960s, the 1980s and the 
1990s were characterized as a phase of migration restrictions as well as repatriation. This could be 
explained by examining the policies that national governments apply toward refugees and the 
economic impact refugees have on the national labor market and national security of the host 
countries (see Chap. V). Some L&E insights might help to interpret the shift toward a durable refugee 
solution, which was also internationally codified by the different UNHCR Executive Committee’s 
Conclusions of the 1980s. Moreover, the historical analysis can better explain the “new” L&E 
proposals of refugee-burden sharing suggested by different scholars and more recently by EU 
institutions (see Chap. II). 
 Over the past decades, the nature and scope of the UNHCR’s work has expanded from an 
international organization dealing with the legal assistance of refugees to that of material aid 
operating in the countries of origin where refugees are just one group within the broader mission of 
the UNHCR. From a small office of some 30 staff based mostly in Europe in the early 1950s, the 
UNHCR is now a global organization with a staff of more than 9.300 people working in 123 countries. 
This increase could also be explained by taking into account the advantages that a common 
supranational or international policy towards refugees has compared to the individual State behavior 
(see Chap. VI). 
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words, although the 1951 Convention applies a HR approach and protects refugee rights, part of it 
could also be interpreted through some reflection by L&E scholars.   
 
2. The Definition of Refugee in the 1951 Convention  
This section gives a comprehensive legal analysis of the interpretation of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention as well as by briefly avouching the constitutional right to asylum in the EU-27 Member 
States. In addition, Section 2.1. demonstrates the blurry dichotomy between “economic migrants” 
and “refugees” through a case-law study. Moreover, Section 2.2. explicates the interpretation of the 
concept of “safe country” as it is one of the most common concepts used by national policies to 
decrease the number of refugees. 
 The 1951 Convention is considered an authoritative source of international law,22 codifying 
international refugee law.23 It is ratified by 145 out of the 193 UN members (75% of all countries). 
According to international relations theory, States are expected to join international treaties as long 
as the benefits outweigh the costs. 24   
Article 1(A)(2) states that the term “refugee” applies, among others, to any person who:   
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 
  
 The main contribution of the 1951 Convention is this precise definition of a refugee. Other 
international documents have recognized a descriptive and general definition of a refugee.25 The role 
of the judge is to ascertain refugee status, not to attribute it to an individual.26 A refugee is such per 
se, not because a judge or other officials assigned him this status; in other words, the refugee status 
is an ipso jure status.27  
 
22 In September 2019, there were 146 State parties for the 1951 Convention and 145 State parties for the 1967 Protocol. This number 
is much higher compared to the other two most important international documents; the OAU Refugee Convention ratified from 45 
countries and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees ratified from 10 countries. This is a pure legal positivist approach since in 
international law countries must give their consent to apply a certain treaty. It should be remembered that a persecuted individual can 
be a protected migrant based on: refugee status (international law); subsidiary protection (EU law); other protected person (national 
law); or, quota refugee (international treaties). 
23 Jackson, Ivor C. "The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: A universal basis for protection." International Journal 
of Refugee Law 3.3 (1991): 403. 
24 Kelley, Judith G., and Jon CW Pevehouse. "An opportunity cost theory of US treaty behavior." International Studies Quarterly 59.3 
(2015): 531-543; Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. The limits of international law. Oxford University Press, 2005. See also 
Chap. III. 
25 Hathaway, James C. "The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920—1950." International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 33.2 (1984): 348-380. 
26 Wouters, Cornelis Wolfram. International legal standards for the protection from refoulement: A legal analysis of the prohibitions 
on refoulement contained in the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Intersentia, 2009; UNHCR, Handbook, note 2. 
27 Jaeger, Gilbert. "Refugee Asylum: Policy and Legislative Developments." International Migration Review 15.1-2 (1981): 52-68. 
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The treaty does not include an explicit right to asylum. Nevertheless, the right to asylum can 
be understood as presumed by the Convention for several reasons. First, the 1951 Convention 
prohibits refoulement (Article 33). As a result of this prohibition, the international community agrees 
that refugees have the right to temporary residence in the host country until a final decision regarding 
their claims has been made.28 Secondly, as mentioned above, refugee status is an ipso jure status. 
Thirdly, the 1951 Convention cites in its preamble the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
its Article 14 establishes the right to asylum.29  
Therefore, scholars consider the “right to asylum” as an “empty right,” i.e. a right without a 
corresponding duty.30 Since there is no “right to asylum,” it follows that there is no “right to seek 
asylum.” Nonetheless, under international law, States have the duty to not block this right.31 So, States 
cannot reject or expel refugees from their countries before concluding a process of recognition of 
their refugee status.32 
The 1951 Convention recognizes the discretion of States to set up national procedural rules 
governing the determination of refugee status. Thus, although the refugee status is an ipso jure status33 
and the 1951 Convention establishes the general definition of refugee, still, States have the discretion 
to establish specific rules in order to ascertain, not to assign, refugee status. Thus, some scholars have 
argued that the international rule of law34 has been eroded by the implementation at the national level 
of detailed rules governing refugee status.35  
Not all migrants are entitled to recognition as refugees; only people that have “a well-founded 
fear” can be entitled to refugee status. Scholars have debated whether “fear” should be qualified based 
on a personal subjective perspective or whether it should be based only on objective elements. Some 
have pointed out that fear is, by definition, “a subjective condition” or ”a state of mind.”36 This 
approach was expressed by the Israeli representative in the ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and 
 
28 Coleman, Nils. "Non-Refoulement Revised Renewed Review of the Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement as Customary 
International Law." European Journal of Migration and Law 5.1 (2003): 23-68. 
29 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties attributes importance to the ‘object and the purpose’ of the international 
agreement. The traditional method to understand the treaty’s purpose is to rely on the preamble. 
30 Noll, Gregor. "Seeking asylum at embassies: a right to entry under international law?." International Journal of Refugee Law 17.3 
(2005): 542-573. 
31 Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., and Jane McAdam. The refugee in international law. Oxford University Press, 2007. 
32 Lauterpacht, Elihu and Daniel Bethlehe. The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion. Cambridge University 
Press, 2003. 
33 Jaeger, note 27. 
34 In the case of refugee rights, the main documents for the international rule of law are the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  
35 Kneebone, Susan. Refugees, asylum seekers and the rule of law: Comparative perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
36 Robinson, Jacob. "The Status of Refugees in International Law. Volume II: Asylum, Entry and Sojourn. By Atle Grahl-Madsen.” 
American Journal of International Law 67.4 (1973): 823-823. 
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Related Problems on 17 February 1950;37 it is also the position of the UNHCR,38 and of some 
academics.39 
In contrast, the official position of the ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems was that “fear” can be recognized only based on objective circumstances.40 This position 
is supported by a procedural legal theory standpoint, as a refugee’s state of mind is difficult to be 
ascertained. Although criminal law is based on determining the accused state of mind, the 
ascertainment of refugee status, which is an ipso jure status, is eventually done by judges of the civil 
sessions and not by criminal judges. 
In addition, the perception of fear (subjective definition) might be disproportional and unequal 
not only because people react to external events in dissimilar manners but also because of a lack of 
information (information costs) (see Chap. IV). Furthermore, the I suggest that, from an L&E 
perspective, the objective approach regarding fear might be considered more efficient as it gives 
disincentives asking for international protection of asylum seekers who cannot prove it.  
Article 1(A)(2) states that the act of persecution, which is the basis for the refugee status, 
should usually be attributed to a country. This includes not only cases where these acts are conducted 
by public organs (de jure or de facto), or public organs controlled by the State,41 but also cases where 
the persecution has been conducted by individuals acting within sovereign territory of a State,42 or by 
groups acting in a context where there is no longer any State authority (such as Somalia).43 The aim 
of the 1951 Convention is to protect refugees and not to attribute illegal acts to a certain State. 
The protection of victims of non-State actors is also based on Protocol II of 1977 (Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts). However, the threshold for intervention in internal 
conflict is that the “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of a contracting party's territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol” (Article 1(1)). This 
high threshold established in Article 1(1) Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
is explained in international L&E literature. The 1951 Convention is the result of bargains among 
 
37 Mr. Robinson stated that ‘fear’ should include ‘emotional and sentimental reasons’ among the motives why a person might be 
unwilling to return to his or her home country. It entails that refugee status is extended also to Jewish people who did not want to return 
to Germany because of their ‘horrifying memories’, and not because of fears of undergoing ‘future’ persecution.  
38 UNHCR, Handbook, note 2. 
39 Zimmermann, Andreas, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts. The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 
protocol: A commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011. 
40 The Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems 17 February 1950 stated that ‘well-founded fear of being the victim 
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion’ means that a person has either been actually a victim of 
persecution or can show good reasons why he fears persecution’.  
41 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has applied the principle of overall control (for example, ICJ, judgment of 27 June 1986, 
‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua’; ICJ, judgment of 26 February 2007, ‘Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’).  
42 Cherubini, Francesco. Asylum law in the European Union. Routledge, 2014.  
43 Spanish Tribunal Supremo, decision of 6 October 2005, Recurso No. 2098/2002. US Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, decision of 
26 September 2011, Rasa Jonaitiene and Marius Bubenas v. Attorney General, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal 1209185.  
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States. A player (State) would never intervene if the counterparty was able to reciprocate. Thus, this 
provision releases players (States) from any commitment where the insurgent forces are unable to 
reciprocate.  
It should be further mentioned that the US does not grant a status of refugees in cases of 
persecution by non-State actors.44 In contrast, some EU Member States have established some form 
of de facto protection, such as the Duldung in Germany, the F status in Denmark, human rights 
reasons in Italy, etc.45   
 Another requirement for granting the refugee status is that the applicant is “outside the country 
of his former habitual residence” (Article 1(A)(2)). This policy is justified through an economic 
interpretation of the law. It eliminates the costly processes required if persecuted individuals do not 
successfully enter the destination countries.46 Moreover, this notion has been interpreted as the 
country of citizenship.47 Therefore, in cases of multiple citizenships, persecuted individuals must 
prove that in all these countries they fear future persecutions. Additionally, in cases that citizens have 
moved from their places, but remain within their countries of origin, they are not eligible for 
recognition as refugees.48 Nonetheless, according to the UNHCR this is true only if the zone is 
“secure.”49 Lastly,  stateless individuals have the right to be granted refugee status since Article 
1(A)(2) also includes the phrase “his former habitual residence.” 
 Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 Convention specifies several grounds for the persecution that 
entitles a person to refugee status. These are considered the “push” factors in the countries of origin 
that force their local citizens toward asylum migration. The first type of persecution is on the grounds 
of race, often being considered ethnic persecution.50 However, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) specifies the distinction between “race” and “ethnicity” by stating that “race is rooted in the 
idea of biological classification” and “ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups.”51 The 
second type of persecution is on the grounds of religion. A clear example is when an individual is 
 
44 Izrailev, Mikhail. "A New Normative Approach for the Grant of Asylum in Cases of Non-State Actor Persecution." Cardozo Journal 
of International & Comparative Law 19 (2011): 171. For instance: in the USA, Lleshanaku v. Ashcroft, 100 Fed. Appx. 546, 549 (7th 
Cir. 2004) 
45 des Places, Segolene. Evolution of asylum legislation in the EU: Insights from regulatory competition theory. Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, 2003. 
46  Alien          Migrant          Interdiction, United States Coast Guard, available on line 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
47 Goodwin-Gill, et al., note 31.  
48 In the famous English case of R v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, ex parte European Roma Rights Centre (European Roma 
Rights Centre). It should be noted that if the screening is conducted at the refugee own State of origin, this is not a violation of article 
33(1). Nevertheless, the host country might be partly responsible for violation of article 40(1) if the State has ratified that the Refugee 
Convention is applied to all the territories of international relation.  
49 UNHCR. 2003. Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: ‘Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative’ Within the Context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. For instance, an Albanian citizen cannot 
claim his refugee status while he is still in Albania. However, according to UNHCR, a Syrian citizen can claim his refugee status in 
Syria if he is in a zone that is declared as not secure.        
50 Cherubini, note 42. 
51 ECtHR, applications nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00.  
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prohibited from becoming a member of a religious group.52 The third type of persecution is on the 
grounds of nationality; under a textual interpretation of the 1951 Convention, “nationality” was 
understood as “citizenship.” The UNHCR53 and case-law54 have adopted a broader approach by 
overlapping “nationality” with “race.” For instance, the US Court of Appeals has granted the refugee 
status to a Guatemalan citizen based on “the grounds of race persecution,” although he actually “was 
persecuted on account of his “ethnicity,” a category which falls somewhere between and within the 
protected grounds of “race” and “nationality.”55 
 The fourth type of persecution is when someone is a member of a group holding a particular 
political opinion; this notion originally aimed to grant refugee rights to people coming from the 
communist bloc. Actually, this was the main goal of the 1951 Convention, and indeed its definition 
is broad.56 However, refugees must prove their membership of a political party.57 However, States 
can refuse refugee status if applicants have committed political crimes, as established by Article 1F 
(see Chap. V, Sec. 4.1).   
 The last type of persecution is on the grounds of membership of a specific social group. This 
is a residual notion applied to grant refugee protection to individuals that have been persecuted for 
reasons other than race, religion, nationality, or political affiliation. Examples of such cases include 
homosexual persons in totalitarian regimes;58 people with HIV-positive status in paternalistic or 
conservative societies;59 a Chinese family that had more than one child when China had a one-child 
policy;60 a woman who “voluntarily” agreed to be smuggled into a foreign country as part of a 
prostitution trafficking operation since it is the only option for her survival.61  
 A review of the EU-27 national constitutions reveals the different applications of Article 
1(A)2 of the 1951 Convention, even in the framework of such a close community of States. Thirteen 
out of the EU-27 make no mention of the right to asylum in their national constitutions. In Austria, 
 
52 UNHCR. 2004. Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
53 UNHCR, Handbook, note 2. 
54 US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, decision of 8 June 1999, Mildred Yesenia Duarte de Guinac and Mauro Josè Guinac Quiej v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
55 Ibrid. 
56 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, note 31. 
57 Federal Court of Canada, decision of 17 July 1998, Makala v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. 
58 New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand, decision of 7 July 2004, Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, RSAA; 
UK: Vraciu Immigration Appeal Tribunal (11559) (1994, unreported). In contrast: Belgium: Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 31 
March 2010, X tegen de Commissaris-generaal voor de vluchtelingen en de staatlozen; Australia: Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Appellant S396/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; UK: Golchin 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (7623) (1991,unreported). 
59 Canada OPK (Re), No. U95-04575 [1996] CRDD No 88, 24 May 1996 
60 Alston, Philip. "Conjuring up new human rights: A proposal for quality control." American Journal of International Law 78.3 (1984): 
607-621. Australia: Chen Shi Hai, note 21. In contrast: Canada: Cheung [1993] 2 FC 314; 153 NR 145; 19 Imm LR (2d) 81 (FCA), at 
325. 
61 Canada: PYM (Re), No. U98-01933 [1999] Convention Refugee Determination Division (Canada) (CRDD) No. 163, 3 June 1999, 
at para. 24; HDO (Re), T98-17677 [1999] CRDD No. 116, 26 May 1999, at para. 24; and NWX (Re), T99-01434 [1999] CRDD No. 
183, 25 August 1999.  
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the “right to asylum” has been recognized as one that needs a decision of a special court – the Asylum 
Court. The other countries have acknowledged the “right to asylum” as a constitutional right.62 Some 
argue that these countries are conveying the image of a State highly protective of HRs in order to 
increase their status in the international political arena.63    
However, protections differ from the lowest form of protection to the highest. For example, 
in Poland, Spain, and Romania, the national constitutions delegate to the legislature the task of laying 
down the terms under which citizens from other countries and stateless persons may enjoy the right 
to asylum. In contrast, Italy’s constitution includes the right to asylum, which is recognized not only 
on political grounds but also on the actual exercise of democratic constitutional freedoms. In addition, 
there are differences among the countries in levels of protection according to different criteria and/or 
different grounds of persecution.  
 While not all EU-27 national constitutions establish persecution on the grounds of race 
(23/27), nationality (22/27), or membership of a specific social group (23/27), all EU-27 national 
constitutions recognize the right to non-discrimination based on religious or political grounds.   
A possible reason of why all the EU-27 national constitutions recognize the right to non-
discrimination based on religion might be understood through the study of refugee protection through 
a historical approach. It is thought that the first modern recognition of the right to asylum occurred in 
1648, with the Peace of Westphalia.64 It included several agreements that ended several wars, such 
as the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years’ War (1568–
1648) between Spain and the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands. Refugees were recognized 
as a minority group who share the same religious affiliation, which differs from that of their local 
monarchs. Nevertheless, in contrast with today, refugee rights were group rights and not individual 
rights. A similar argument might be applied in the case of recognition by all the 27 (central written 
constitutions) of the EU Member States of the persecution based on political grounds since, as 
 
62While in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which is no longer part of the EU, in Belgium, in Cyprus, in 
Denmark, in Estonia, in Finland, in Ireland, in the Netherlands, in Malta, in Latvia, in Lithuania, Luxemburg, in Slovakia, in Sweden, 
the constitutional right to asylum is absent. In Austria, detail rulings have been established for Asylum Court, but nothing has been 
established regarding the ‘right to asylum’. In Poland (article 56), in Spain (article 13) and in Romania (article 18) the law shall lay 
down the terms under which citizens from other countries and stateless persons may enjoy the right to asylum. The right to asylum has 
been recognized only to ‘persons persecuted on political grounds’ in Germany (article 16a, section 1); ‘to foreigners persecuted for 
their convictions or activities in defense of internationally recognized rights and freedoms’ in Bulgaria (article 28); to people 
‘prosecuted for non-political crimes and activities contrary to the fundamental principles of international law’ in Croatia (article 33); 
to stateless people ‘being persecuted for the assertion of their political rights and freedoms’ in Check Republic (article 43); to people 
‘who are subject to persecution for their commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms’ in Slovenia (article 48); to person 
who is ‘persecuted for his action in pursuit of freedom or who seeks the protection of France on other grounds’ in France (article 53-
1); to foreigners and stateless persons ‘who are the object, or are under grave threat, of persecution as a result of their activities in favor 
of democracy, social and national liberation, peace among peoples, freedom or rights of the human person’ in Portugal (article 33, 
section 8); ‘being persecuted .. due to their racial or national identities, affiliation to a particular social group, or to their religious or 
political persuasions’ in Hungary (article 15); to foreigner that in his home country ‘the actual exercise of the democratic freedoms 
guaranteed by the Italian constitution’ are denied in Italy (article 10).  
63 Sugden, Robert. "On the economics of philanthropy." The Economic Journal 92.366 (1982): 341-350. 
64 Betts, Alexander, Gil Loescher, and James Milner. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The politics 
and practice of refugee protection. Routledge, 2013. 
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mentioned above, the goal of the 1951 Convention was the protection of persecuted individuals from 
the Communist Bloc. 
 The diversity among EU Member States’ constitutions might be related to the economic 
effects deriving from the acceptance of refugees. Applicants who are recognized as refugees in EU 
host countries are entitled to several rights. National lawmakers have the competence to establish 
detailed rules in order to implement these rights, which entail high costs for national budgets. In 
recent years, there has been an increase of public funds allocated for refugees.65 For instance, the EU 
budgets for refugees during 2015 and 2016 have increased by more than 200%.66 In 2015, Germany 
spent 0.46% of its national GDP for reception and procedural costs, in addition to €359 per refugee 
for the monthly financial allowances/vouchers.67 A narrow interpretation of international norms 
ruling refugee status and of the principle of non-refoulement decreases the number of foreign 
applicants recognized as refugees. It follows that States spend less for temporary protection or for the 
protection of refugee rights in short and medium terms or for their integration.    
In fact, some potential positive economic effects of accepting refugees might become visible 
in the long run. Refugees could also be a significant economic factor for an increase in national 
GDP.68 In general, refugees have a young average age, which might positively affect the labor market 
of non-qualified jobs69 since their employability is closely linked to their exploitability.70 In recent 
decades, Europe has begun to age. In 2019, the top-three origin countries were: Syria, Afghanistan, 
and Venezuela, while the top-three asylum countries were: Spain, Germany, and France.71 One of the 
main factors impacting age is the total fertility rate. According to the CIA,72 the total fertility rate in 
these origin countries [Afghanistan (4.82), Syria (2.9), and Venezuela (2.26)] is (much) higher than 
the EU average (1.59) or than in the main destination countries [France (2.06), Spain (1.51) or 
Germany (1.47)]. This may affect national law-makers if they think in long terms: for instance, in 
2015, Germany opened its borders for Syrian refugees. 
 
65 OECD. 2017. Migration Policy Debates, available on-line https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf accessed 
on April 30th, 2020. Kancs, d'Artis, and Patrizio Lecca. "Long‐term social, economic and fiscal effects of immigration into the EU: 
The role of the integration policy." The World Economy 41.10 (2018): 2599-2630. 
66European Commission. 2016. Eu budged for the Refugee Crisis, available on-line http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/eu_budget_for_the_refugee_crisis_20160210_en.pdf accessed 
on April 30th, 2020. 
67 Massa, Isabella. Untangling the data–Assessing the accuracy of official refugee-related costs in Europe. Overseas Development 
Institute, 2016. 
68 International Monetary Fund. 2016. The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges.  
69 Legomsky, Stephen H. "Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State." UCLA Law Review 42 (1994): 1453. 
70 Neuman, Gerald L. Strangers to the Constitution: immigrants, borders, and fundamental law. Princeton University Press, 2010. 
71 Eurostat. 2020. Asylum statistics, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics, 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
72 Central Intelligence Agency. 2020. The world Factbook, available on-line: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/356.html, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
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 Moreover, several economic studies have demonstrated that after a few years of residence in 
the host countries, refugees earn more than “economic migrants.” 73 Other empirical research has 
shown that while refugees have escaped from their home countries and will invest their human and 
economic capital in the host countries, economic immigrants will eventually invest their earnings in 
their countries of origin.74 Chap. V shows the effect that migration has on the national labor market 
by concluding that the highest impact is registered in agriculture, food-processing, construction, and 
textile industries.75 The literature agrees that consumers pay attention to the country-of-origin, which 
strongly impacts on their behaviours.76 By considering that the migrant workforce has become a de 
facto component of many States’ policies,77 especially those in the low-skilled workforce, 78  EU 
legislators may also consider this variable when they decide first instance decisions. For example, in 
2019, among the EU Member States, Spain (66.2%) had the highest share of positive first instance 
decisions out of the total number of first instance decisions.79 Spain produces more than 12% of the 
EU-28 total agricultural output,80 is one of the top-five largest EU food and drink producers by 
turnover,81 and is one of the main suppliers in the textile industry.82  
These long-term positive economic effects that might explain, through an L&E approach, the 
crystallization of the right to asylum in some national basic laws. In fact, politicians are more 
concerned about short and medium terms since this has a direct impact on future elections.83 To avoid 
 
73 Cortes, Kalena E. "Are refugees different from economic immigrants? Some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant 
groups in the United States." Review of Economics and Statistics 86.2 (2004): 465-480; Dustmann, Christian. "Differences in the labor 
market behavior between temporary and permanent migrant women." Labor Economics 4.1 (1997): 29-46; Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 
"English language proficiency and the economic progress of immigrants." Economics Letters 34.3 (1990): 295-300. 
74 Borjas, George J. "Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of immigrants." Journal of labor Economics 3.4 (1985): 
463-489; Carliner, Geoffrey. "Wages, earnings and hours of first, second, and third generation American males." Economic Inquiry 
18.1 (1980): 87-102. 
75 Taran, Patrick A., and Eduardo Geronimi. Globalization, Labor and Migration: Protection is Paramount. International Labor 
Office, 2003. 
76 Balabanis, George, and Adamantios Diamantopoulos. "Domestic Country Bias, Country-of-Origin Effects, and Consumer 
Ethnocentrism: a Multidimensional Unfolding Approach." Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 32.1 (2004): 80-95; Verlegh, 
Peeter WJ. Country-of-Origin Effects on Consumer Product Evaluations. 2001; Al‐Sulaiti, Khalid I., and Michael J. Baker. "Country 
of Origin Effects: a Literature Review." Marketing Intelligence & Planning (1998); Maheswaran, Durairaj. "Country of Origin as a 
Stereotype: Effects of Consumer Expertise and Attribute Strength on Product Evaluations." Journal of Consumer Research 21.2 
(1994): 354-365; Schaefer, Anja. "Consumer Knowledge and Country of Origin Effects." European Journal of Marketing (1997); 
Chao, Paul. "Partitioning Country of Origin Effects: Consumer Evaluations of a Hybrid Product." Journal of International Business 
Studies 24.2 (1993): 291-306. 
77 Legomsky, note 69. 
78 Neuman, note 70.  
79 Eurostat. 2020. First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications , available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Decisions_on_asylum_applications, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
80 Eurostat. 2019. Statistical Factsheet, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-farming-
fisheries/farming/documents/agri-statistical-factsheet-eu_en.pdf , accessed on April 30th, 2020. Please notice that during 2019, there 
were 28 EUMS. 
81 Eurostat. 2018. Data & Trends, EU Food & Drink Industry, available on-line: 
https://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/uploads/publications_documents/FoodDrinkEurope_Data_and_Trends_2018_FINAL.pdf, accessed 
on April 30th, 2020. 
82 European Commission. 2018. Trade Report Comparison Per Year, available on-line: https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/8ac98104-0aae-
46a8-acea-396c9a36bfd2/EDW%20-%20ITI%20TEX%20-
%20Trade%20YTD%20Report%20NC%20Product%203rd%20Level%20Groups%20-%2009%20September%20-%20Textiles.pdf, 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
83 Biglaiser, Gary, and Claudio Mezzetti. "Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns." Journal of Public Economics 66.3 
(1997): 425-447. In contrast: Sears, David O., et al. "Self-interest vs. symbolic politics in policy attitudes and presidential voting." 
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asylum policies that focus on the short term by fulfilling the politicians’ interests, the right to asylum 
has been established in national (rigid) constitutions. As a result, the constitutional norms will affect 
the asylum rules (Kelsen pyramid of norms). In other words, rules established by law receive their 
validity from a higher standard, which is established in norms codified in basic laws. Thus, a 
hierarchical order is formed84 between laws and constitutions.  
To summarize, different EU-27 basic laws have applied a dissimilar approach to the right to 
asylum. However, all of the EU-27 national constitutions recognize the right to non-discrimination based on 
religion or persecution based on political grounds, since this is the direct result of past lessons. Additionally, 
the majority of them establishes the right to non-discrimination for other cases. The absence of a uniform 
constitutional approach in all the EU-27 Member States could also be explained through the economic impact 
that refugees have on the host countries (see Chap. V). 
 
2.1. The Difference between “Economic Migrant” and “‘Refugee”  
The main characteristic of economic migrants is the fact that they leave their homes voluntarily.85 
Their main driving incentive is the regional or international wage differentials.86 As a result, in 
contrast with refugees, they are not entitled to receive international protection. The dichotomy of 
traditional literature on migrants is between “voluntary economic migrants” and “involuntary 
political refugees.”87 However, nowadays, this distinction is not so clear because many fraudulent 
economic migrants have tried to be classified as refugees.88 Moreover, some authors have also 
proposed other notions, such as “forced migrants” or “economic refugees.”89  
 The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration defines “forced migration” 
as “the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well 
as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or 
development projects.”90 This definition of “forced migration”  includes people who are entitled to 
recognition as a refugee.  
Sometimes, the difference between forced migrant and non-migrant is challenging. For 
instance, when the displacement is mandated by the government for purely military strategy 
 
American Political Science Review 74.3 (1980): 670-684. According to this paper, in voting behavior, longstanding symbolic attitudes 
(such as ideology, party identification, and racial prejudice) have major effects than short-term self-interest. 
84 Kelsen, Hans. Pure Theory of Law. Univ of California Press, 1967. 
85 Jackson, note 23. 
86 Czaika, Mathias. The Political Economy of Refugee Migration and Foreign Aid. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009.  
87 Martin, Susan F. Global migration trends and asylum. UNHCR, 2001; Menjívar, Cecilia. "History, economy and politics: Macro 
and micro-level factors in recent Salvadorean migration to the US." Journal of Refugee Studies 6.4 (1993): 350-371.  
88 Tuitt, Patricia. False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee. Pluto Press, 1996. 
89 Helton, Arthur C., and Eliana Jacobs. "What is Forced Migration." Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 13 (1998): 521. 
90 International Association for the study of Forced Migration, Mission of the IASFM, available on-line http://iasfm.org accessed on 
April 30th, 2020. 
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Chapter VI* 
EU Regulatory Competition in Asylum Law 
 
 
Abstract: 
This chapter deals with the principle of subsidiarity in asylum law. More specifically, by applying an 
economic approach, this contribution examines the need for incorporation of asylum standards to 
attain the goal established in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. In other words, this 
research utilises an economic methodology to investigate the application of the subsidiarity principle 
to asylum law by considering economic criteria for both centralisation and decentralisation. This 
chapter does not execute a comprehensive normative analysis but rather aims to uncover the 
advantages of regulating asylum policy at the EU level. In addition, the contribution presents two 
different types of harmonisation. In conclusion, the chapter discusses the advantages of a centralised 
EU policy that allows for competition between Member States. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea of regulatory competition is not new.1 If a law can be considered as a “product,” economists 
will, in general, accept the advantages of the competition between legal orders,2 and many legal 
scholars have criticised this for two main reasons. Firstly, legal rules also influence other parties that 
stand outside the strict, narrow, contractual relationship.3 Secondly, legal scholars argue that the 
concept of “competition” is opposed to the concept of “sovereignty.”4  
From a L&E standpoint, the competition between legal systems should be examined against 
its benefits and costs according to some constitutional benchmarks, namely: freedom, equality, 
 
*The academic materials of this chapter have also been used for the scientific paper Veshi, Denard. "The EU Regulatory Competition 
in Asylum Law." Central European Journal of Public Policy 1.ahead-of-print (2020). 
1 Already in the nineteenth-century there were debates about competition between jurisdictions in the matter of company law. See: 
Saville, John. "Sleeping Partnership And Limited Liability, 1850–18561." The Economic History Review 8.3 (1956): 418-433. 
2Some economists dispute the benefits coming from competition between legal order. Werner Sinn has stated that competition between 
legal orders constitutes a duplication of market failure. See, for example: Sinn, Hans-Werner. The new systems competition. John Wiley 
& Sons, 2008.In addition, Paul R. Krugman suggests that competition applied to national economies is a ‘dangerous obsession’. 
Krugman, Paul. "Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession." Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 28-44. 
3Peters, Anne. "The competition between legal orders." International Law Research 3.1 (2014): 45-65. 
4Schaefer, Jan Philipp. Die Umgestaltung des Verwaltungsrechts: Kontroversen reformorientierter Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft. 
Mohr Siebeck, 2016; Kirchhof, Paul. "Freiheitlicher Wettbewerb und staatliche Autonomie-Solidarität." ORDO: Jahrbuch für die 
Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 56 (2005): 39-45. However, it must be noted that national parliaments are not the only law-
makers. In other words, national parliaments do not have an exclusive legislative power. Within the EU Member States, all countries 
shall apply EU law. In addition, States take part in international agreements. When they ratify them – or in case of a monist system 
like e.g. the Netherlands there is no need either for ratification – international law is part of national law. Moreover, in order to give 
more power to sub-units, legislative decentralization has been established. Furthermore, the role of Constitutional Courts that – 
generally – have the power to declare unconstitutionality or abrogative referendums should be underlined.  
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democracy, social principle, and the public interest.5 According to some of the literature, competition 
between legal orders enhances freedom,6 fosters democracy,7 and may also indirectly generate 
wealth.8 However, other studies argue that legal competition challenges the concepts of equal 
protection and also hurts the public (general) interest.9  
This chapter does not aim to examine the literature regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of competition between legal orders in general. Instead, it focusses on the principle of 
subsidiarity in asylum law, which was formally introduced in the Single European Act of 1992. In 
particular, this contribution studies the need for the harmonisation of asylum laws to attain the goal 
established in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) through the application of an 
economic approach. This chapter focuses on the European region for two main reasons. First, a 
regionally-structured system is closer to the Pareto optimality as compared to the global approach 
(see Chap. II, Sect. 5). Second, the European refugee crisis of 2015-2016 is the most recent in the 
shock supply of foreigners (see Chap. I, Sect. 3), which affects the labor demand or crime rate in the 
host countries (see Chap. V).  
In other words, this contribution utilizes an economic methodology to investigate the 
application of the subsidiarity principle in asylum law. It examines the current literature regarding 
the application of this principle in public law in addition to applying the theories of public law 
scholars dealing with the optimal level of regulation within the federal systems of Switzerland and 
Canada. The research centres on the example of environmental law for two main reasons. Firstly, 
environmental law is part of public law, as is asylum law. Secondly, in the case of cross-border 
pollution within environmental law, the choices of a Member State impacting the others resemble 
similar considerations of asylum law. In asylum law, the restrictive policy of a State might influence 
the flow of migration through the same argument of externalities.10  
This scientific contribution has the following structure. Section 2 elaborates on the three main 
“push” factors that have been employed by the EU as arguments for the centralisation of asylum law. 
Section 3 considers the criteria for centralisation and decentralisation again with regard to asylum 
issues. In particular, section 3 discusses the Tiebout model and the transboundary externalities, the 
problem of the “race to the bottom,” the reduction of transaction costs, and the importance of the 
protection of human rights. Section 4 compares the two different types of integration of asylum law, 
 
5Peters, note 3. 
6Weber, Max, Siegmund Hellmann, and Melchior Palyi. Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Abriss Der Universalen Sozial-und Wirtschafts-
Geschichte. 1923. 
7Olson, Mancur. "The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, second printing with new preface and appendix 
(Harvard Economic Studies)." (1971). 
8Peters, note 3. 
9Kirchhof, Paul. Gemeinwohl und Wettbewerb. Gedruckt, 2005. 
10 Bubb, Ryan, Michael Kremer, and David I. Levine. "The economics of international refugee law." The Journal of Legal Studies 40.2 
(2011): 367-404. 
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by highlighting the benefits of the common European asylum policy that establishes a minimum 
standard for harmonisation. In the conclusion, the chapter reviews the main literature which suggests 
there are advantages of a centralised European Union (EU) policy that also allows for competition 
between Member States. 
The novelty of this Chapter rests in synthesizing, reviewing, and analyzing some of the most 
important economic theories in the context of refugees – such as the ‘race to the bottom’, the Tiebout 
argument (especially, the evolutionary efficiency and the importance of information costs), the 
Coasean bargaining, the risk of strategic behaviour, the ‘free-riding’ incentive, and transaction costs 
– in regard to asylum law. These theories are commonly used in the cases of transboundary nature of 
a specific issue, which produces international (negative) externalities. Furthermore, it should be 
emphasized that this Chapter deals with the optimal level of the EU centralization of asylum policy 
in general and does not focus solely on the current refugee crisis. Therefore, this contribution can also 
be used in the case of future migration crisis (i.e., climate refugees). 
 
 
 
2. EU Asylum Policy: Harmonization of Common Standards 
Until now, the EU has been active with respect to asylum law by enacting different regulations and 
directives, in addition to rethinking EU asylum law in light of the current refugee crisis.11 The EU 
has established not only common EU asylum standards but has also integrated the procedural asylum 
rules. Clear examples of common European law defining asylum standards are the Reception 
Conditions Directive12 and the Qualification Directive.13 In addition, procedural harmonisation is set 
out in the Asylum Procedures Directive14 and in the Dublin Regulation,15 which prescribe fairer, 
quicker and higher quality asylum decisions, determined by the responsible EU Member State.  
 The EU has laid out different reasons for legislative action at the EU level with respect to 
asylum law. This section analyses the three main “push” factors that have been considered by the EU 
through the application of economic methodology and legal reasoning. While the first two “push” 
 
11 Price, Matthew E. Rethinking asylum: History, purpose, and limits. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
12 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of 
applicants for international protection 
13 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted 
14 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection 
15 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) 
 158 
factors are directly connected with the economic interpretation of the subsidiarity principle, the third 
one takes a human rights approach. 
First, the nature of the refugee crisis is that it transcends borders. This is closely connected 
with the problem of (negative) externalities (see Chap. III). According to core L&E literature, the 
protection of refugees is considered an international public good,16 since it produces non-excludable 
and indivisible benefits.17 More concretely, the individual State’s choice entails positive or negative 
externalities for third countries because it directly affects the flow of migration.18 Analogous 
application of the current literature19 suggests that when significant international (negative) 
externalities exist, there will be some convergence of national laws towards restricting refugee 
policies. For example, the French asylum reform of 1991 resulted in an increase of asylum seekers 
moving to Germany.20 The EU has tried to tackle this problem with the Dublin regulation, which 
defines the State responsible for examining the application and clarifies the rules governing relations 
between states.21  
The second factor is the creation of equal conditions of competition. While this argument has 
been highly used in competition law,22 this target has also been advocated for in recent decades in 
other fields of law, advancing a higher level of compatibility for various kinds of legislation within 
the EU.23 For instance, Article 9 of the Asylum Procedures Directive recognises the “Right to remain 
in the Member State pending the examination of the application,” or Article 46 establishes “The right 
to an effective remedy” for all asylum seekers within Europe. It may be argued that disparity in the 
recognition of these rights can create unequal conditions for competition between the EU Member 
States, and may directly or indirectly impact the functioning of the common market negatively. 
The third factor is the role of the EU as a sui generis organisation protecting HRs.24 With 
regard to the protection of HRs, the international system has moved beyond State values towards 
 
16 Bubb, et al. note 10; Betts, Alexander. "Public goods theory and the provision of refugee protection: The role of the joint‐product 
model in burden‐sharing theory." Journal of Refugee Studies 16.3 (2003): 274-296.  
17 Thielemann, Eiko. "Why Refugee Burden‐Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, Free‐Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in the 
EU." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 56.1 (2018): 63-82. 
18 Bubb, et al. note 10. 
19 Stewart, Richard B. "Pyramids of sacrifice? Problems of federalism in mandating state implementation of national environmental 
policy." The Yale Law Journal 86.6 (1977): 1196-1272. 
20 Rotte, Ralph, Michael Vogler, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Asylum migration and Policy coordination in Europe. Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität München, 1996. 
21 In hierarchical order, the criteria are: from family considerations, to recent possession of visa or residence permit in a Member State, 
to whether the applicant has entered the EU irregularly, or regularly. However, in practice, the most used rule is the first country of 
entry. 
22 Doleys, Thomas J. "Promoting competition policy abroad: European Union efforts in the developing world." The Antitrust Bulletin 
57.2 (2012): 337-366; Brittan, Leon, and Karel Van Miert. "Towards an international framework of competition rules." International 
Business Law 24 (1996): 454. 
23Faure, Michael. “Regulatory Competition vs Harmonization in EU Environmental Law” in Esty, Daniel C., and Damien Geradin. 
Regulatory competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
24 Von Bogdandy, Armin. "European Union as a Human Rights Organization-Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, 
The." Common Market Law Review 37.6 (2000): 1307-1338. 
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respecting and protecting human values.25 In other words, this argument deals with HRs reasons. 
Several EU policies safeguard the protection of HRs. A clear example of this is the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000, which became legally binding when the Lisbon 
Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009. 
Although this is a HRs factor, some of its L&E effects should be investigated. International 
HRs affect national policy and norms choice since international HRs treaties impact State behavior. 
This is connected with the different L&E theories related to the so-called smart sanctions (in terms of 
the domestic political economy of the targeted State, the smart sanctions are economic coercions that work 
properly on the main actors of the targeted State). Furthermore, there is a correlation between pro-market 
reforms and the violation of HRs.  
International HRs have become constitutive elements of modern statehood.26 Indeed the world 
would be markedly different without international HRs within international treaties.27 The literature 
suggests that the international impact on national policies is reached through three different models: 
two traditional models consisting of the coercion28 or the persuasion29 models and the “new” model 
of acculturation.30 Although their combination reaps the highest benefits, the traditional models are 
still the ones most commonly applied.31  
In addition, the highest impact on State behaviour exists in those cases where States have 
developed democratic institutions32 since these institutions are important for the actual 
implementation of international HRs. For instance, the ECHR has established the “individual justice” 
 
25 Henkin, Louis. "International law: politics and values." Developments in International Law 18 (1995). 
26 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, et al. The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change. Cambridge University Press, 
1999. However, it should be mentioned that some types of political, economic, or social systems cannot be subjected to international 
human rights treaties. Huntington, Samuel. 1996 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster, 
1996. 
27 Heyns, Christof H., and Frans Viljoen. The impact of the United Nations human rights treaties on the domestic level. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2002. 
28 Guzman, Andrew T. "A compliance-based theory of international law." California Law Review 90 (2002): 1823; Hathaway, Oona 
A. "Do human rights treaties make a difference?." The Yale Law Journal 111.8 (2002): 1935-2042; Goldsmith, Jack Landman, and 
Eric A. Posner. "Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective." U Chicago Law & Economics, 
Olin Working Paper108 (2000). 
29Cleveland, Sarah H. "Norm internalization and US economic sanctions." Yale Journal of International Law 26 (2001): 1; Slaughter, 
Anne-Marie. "Governing the global economy through government networks." The role of law in international politics: essays in 
international relations and international law 177 (2000): 181-204; Franck, Thomas M. Fairness in international law and institutions. 
Oxford University Press, 1998; Franck, Thomas M., and Thomas M. Franck. The power of legitimacy among nations. Oxford 
University Press on Demand, 1990. 
30 This model aims to apply international human rights law as a result of beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture. 
Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. "How to influence states: Socialization and international human rights law." Duke Law Journal 54 
(2004): 621. 
31 Ibrid.  
32 Hathaway, Oona A. "Why do countries commit to HR treaties?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.4 (2007): 588-621; Davenport, 
Christian, and David A. Armstrong. "Democracy and the violation of human rights: A statistical analysis from 1976 to 1996." American 
Journal of Political Science 48.3 (2004): 538-554; Davenport, Christian. "Human rights and the democratic proposition." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 43.1 (1999): 92-116; Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "International law in a world of liberal states." European Journal of 
International Law 6.1 (1995): 503-538; Henderson, Conway W. "Population pressures and political repression." Social Science 
Quarterly 74.2 (1993): 322-33. However, it must be said that established democratic nations are more incline to not ratify international 
HR treaties. Democratic institutions facilitate the right to justice and therefore State will have to compensate victims. Moravcsik, 
Andrew. "The origins of HR regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe." International Organization 54.2 (2000): 217-252. 
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(Article 34). The main goal of Article 34 of the ECHR was to establish an early warning device by 
which a drift towards authoritarianism could be identified in advance and dealt with by an 
independent international public body, the ECtHR.33  
The moment a State violates HRs, after the failure of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions 
become a threat. Only after these threats fail to achieve the goal are economic sanctions deployed to 
the targeted State. Although testing threats for economic sanctions is quite problematic, according to 
game theory models, if the target country intends to comply with the demand, it will likely do so 
during the phase of economic sanction threats.34 On the contrary, if the target country expects future 
conflicts with the requisitioner, no cooperation will be found since the target country does not want 
to ruin its international reputation.35 In general, it should be noted that economic sanction threats are 
often more effective than those that are deployed36 since – in general – economic sanctions affect the 
general population and not the key supporters of the target country. 
Focusing on economic sanctions, their use to violate HRs was common in the world during 
the 1990s with success rates running from 1-2% up to 30%.37 Within economic sanctions, financial 
sanctions (i.e. aid cutoffs, asset freezes, and monetary pressures) are more effective than broad-based 
trade sanctions. This is because financial sanctions are more likely to apply pressure to key supporters 
of the target country rather than the whole population.38 Moreover, trade sanctions result in more 
disproportionate costs on women, who are often the most powerless political actors in the target 
countries.39 Furthermore, the literature agrees that broad-based economic sanctions would have 
minimal effects on authoritarian regimes and more loss for the general population since the target 
government will allocate rent-seeking opportunities only to their supporters.40  
 
33 Greer, Steven. The European Convention on Human Rights: achievements, problems and prospects. Cambridge university press, 
2006.  
34 Lacy, Dean, and Emerson MS Niou. "A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: The roles of preferences, information, and 
threats." The Journal of Politics 66.1 (2004): 25-42; Drezner, Daniel W., and Daniel W. Drezner. The sanctions paradox: Economic 
statecraft and international relations. Cambridge University Press, 1999; Morgan, T. Clifton, and Anne C. Miers. "When threats 
succeed: A formal model of the threat and use of economic sanctions." Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Atlanta 264 (1999); Smith, Alastair. "The success and use of economic sanctions." International Interactions 21.3 (1995): 229-245. 
35 Drezner, Daniel W. "The hidden hand of economic coercion." International Organization 57.3 (2003): 643-659; Drezner, et al. note 
34; Drezner, Daniel W. "Conflict expectations and the paradox of economic coercion." International Studies Quarterly 42.4 (1998): 
709-731; Drezner, Daniel. "Allies, adversaries, and economic coercion: Russian foreign economic policy since 1991." Security 
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On the other hand, violations of HRs increase under partial/selective sanctions although they 
are more effective than extensive sanctions. This is because economic sanctions will bring political 
and economic instability.41 Therefore, the government will employ more repression.42 As a result, the 
requisitioner will seek the “right” economic sanctions that target the elite who support the 
authoritarian regimes while minimizing losses in the rest of the population.  
The effect of international HRs on national policy will also consider the correlation between 
free-market reforms and HRs violations since the limited government policy might have an impact 
on the commitments to secure basic HRs.43 A free market is one of the four freedoms established in 
the Rome Treaty of 1957, which have been strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty (Protocol 27 on the 
Internal Market and Competition). On the other hand, the EU protects HRs (Preamble TEU, article 
218 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Protocol 8 Accession of the Union 
to the European Convention on the Protection of HRs and Fundamental Freedoms). In addition, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
with the EU.44 The correlation between free-market reforms and HRs violations has been investigated 
by several scholars; a study that uses data from a panel of 117 countries for the period from 1981–
2006 shows that pro-market reforms positively impact HRs.45 The different levels of protection of 
rights of vulnerable groups may directly affect the refugees’ decision of their final destination country 
(see Chap. IV) and may create negative externalities for other EU Member States (see Chap. III). 
Lastly, the third factor for an asylum legislative action at an EU level is the protection of HRs 
by the EU. As stated above, although this is a HRs factor, international HRs affect national policy 
and norms choice since international HRs treaties affect the State’s behavior through the so-called 
smart sanctions too. In addition, pro-market reforms do not negatively affect the protection of HRs.   
The EU asylum policy, where the EU has a shared competence, has been stressed through the 
explicit reference to the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and has also been 
recognised in the Lisbon Treaty. According to article 5(3) TEU, “the Union shall act only if and 
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insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”46  
Although the principle of subsidiarity underlines economic efficiency, it has been criticised 
for highlighting its political relevance47 since considerations of “political efficiency” may justify the 
EU competence in the asylum law. For instance, in the case of the refugee crisis, voter preferences 
may differ extensively since decisions often require a trade-off between protection of fundamental 
HRs on the one side and protection of national security or national labour market on the other side. 
In addition, decentralization may lead to a political disintegration of the Member States.48 Indeed, 
judges of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interpret the principle of subsidiarity 
through the willingness to facilitate European integration.49 
This chapter considers the principle of subsidiarity as an economic demarcation principle 
regarding the distribution of competencies,50 examining it as a double-edged concept and considering 
both increased centralisation and the increase of the lower level of governance.51 As is already well-
established, the principle of subsidiarity might lead to gains as well as losses through diverse 
consequences with regards to efficiency.52 Since it is impossible to know ex-ante the economic 
consequences in a particular policy, a logical approach is important.53 In other words, this 
contribution further reflects on the empirical studies done regarding this topic.  
This chapter does not apply a case-law study regarding the application of the subsidiarity 
principle by the CJEU. However, this does not mean that the CJEU has not analysed this principle. 
Indeed, the CJEU has examined this principle with both procedural54 and substantive55 meanings, 
giving more importance to the procedural one.56  
 
 
3. Centralisation or Decentralisation of Asylum Policy 
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The advantages or disadvantages of a common EU asylum law will be analysed while taking into 
consideration the Tiebout argument57 and the problem of the “race to the bottom,” 58 in addition to 
the prisoner dilemma, the reduction of transaction costs, and the importance of the protection of HRs. 
Moreover, it reflects on the protection of refugee rights through the implementation of equal treatment 
within EU Member States. 
 
3.1. The Tiebout Theory and Transboundary Externalities 
The Tiebout argument is used to understand the optimal provision of local public goods.59 His basic 
premise is that citizens have different preferences. However, individuals with the same preferences 
will cluster together in small local communities. This leads to competitive legal systems, leading to 
“allocative efficiency” under certain, restrictive conditions. For instance, if the majority of a group of 
locals prefer to build a stadium and another group of citizens aims to build a theatre, a stadium will 
probably be provided in the first community and the second community may fulfil its preference for 
the arts over sport somewhere else. As a result, well-informed citizens will move from one 
community to another according to their personal preferences.  
In the Tiebout model, information plays an important role since according to information, 
citizens will move from one legal system to another. In addition, to maximise voter utility and 
minimise political costs, the literature suggests that the most efficient solution exists at the time when 
heterogeneous voters’ preferences are so varied that they do not overlap.60 In the case of centralisation 
of rules, political costs increase since it is impossible to fulfil the heterogeneity of preferences.61 Thus, 
the level of the ruling government should be the one “enjoying a comparative advantage in accounting 
for the diversity of preferences in its choice of service delivery.”62 
 Except for the limitation of political costs, decentralisation has three other advantages: 
evolutionary efficiency, the generation of a learning process, and the acceleration of modifying rules 
that are considered inefficient. Firstly, competition between legal systems might bring a sort of 
Darwinian evolution where only the most efficient rules survive.63 Comparative L&E scholars 
highlight the importance of evolutionary efficiency as the main argument for the transplantation of 
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foreign laws into a national system.64 Therefore, the most efficient rules will survive in addition to 
being transplanted into other legal systems. In contrast, if the deciding authority is centralised and 
voters have heterogeneous preferences, the result of the law will be sub-optimal compared to the 
decentralised decision-making model.65 
 Secondly, decentralisation hastens innovation in policy-making since it allows agents to 
choose the legal system that fits their needs.66 Therefore, economic agents send a message to law-
makers67 through their choices, adding a disciplinary effect or enhancing effectiveness to the 
regulatory competition between legal orders68 and pushing the law-maker to discover new rules that 
might be more efficient than the current local rules.69  
Additionally, in the case of asymmetric information, competition between legal orders would 
be even more desirable.70 This is the case where the “supplier” side has more information than the 
others. Thus, the disadvantages of asymmetrical information among policymakers and economic 
agents will somehow be compensated for by regulatory competition between legal orders, since this 
grants hidden information to lawmakers.71 According to the literature, the main costs of designing 
regulations are informational costs.72 In general, the costs for drafting, controlling, and implementing 
different policies is higher at the central government than the aggregate sum of the costs incurred by 
local governments for doing so. This is a direct consequence of the “knowledge problem.”73  
Thirdly, harmonised rules placed by central authorities can be difficult to change since – in 
general – central systems can suffer from “gigantism.” 74 In addition, agreeing on a new decision 
might be even more difficult since there will be costly negotiations and compromises.75 The 
modification becomes harder when the group of members is larger and is characterized by 
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heterogeneity of preferences.76 This might be the reason for the non-adoption of a refugee quota 
system77 by Eastern European countries which do not receive a high number of applications for 
asylum protection and were opposed to its implementation.  
The Tiebout theory favouring competition between legal systems is constructed under the 
assumption that the topic to be regulated is an issue or problem that does not exceed the borders of 
its community. In contrast, when a problem has a cross-border character or the decision of one country 
impacts others, there might be an economies-of-scale argument. In this case, centralised legislation 
may provide better results since it decreases or eliminates horizontal externalities.78 In other words, 
the authority that has jurisdiction to rule corresponds to the type of topic. Thus, if the subject to be 
adjudicated crosses the national borders of the regulatory authority, or when there exists negative 
externalities, the decision should be made at a higher regulatory level.79  
According to the Tiebout theory, the optimal level of ruling is the decentralized level. Some 
historians think that it is due to the competition between legal orders within the “old” continent, which 
was globally dominant in recent centuries.80 Only when there are important factors (e.g. protection 
of HRs, negative externalisation, or a “race to the bottom”) should decision-making be done by a 
higher level (supranational or international level). This is known as “bottom-up federalisation,”81 
which is closely connected with the “economies of scale” argument.82 Therefore, in this case, the 
ruling should shift to an authority that has jurisdiction in all the territories dealing with or affected by 
this issue.  
Decentralisation delivers gains in efficiency unless economic criteria justify centralisation as 
a better alternative.83 In addition, decentralisation should take priority even if centralisation might 
bring benefits in terms of limiting potential free-riding by national lawmakers.84 However, the public 
choice theory suggests that centralisation should be prioritised if social values (i.e. the protection of 
vulnerable groups such as refugees) are involved,85 since the competition between legal systems may 
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result in downgrading protection of HRs standards by leading to an elimination of competitive 
advantages in the longer run.86  
The notion of competition between legal systems also plays an important role in the case of 
asylum law. As stated before, the State’s individual choice entails positive or negative externalities 
for third countries because it directly affects the flow of migration.87 These externalities and the 
supranational character of the refugee crisis is an important factor for justifying EU competence. As 
the literature suggests, the competition between legal orders would be entirely inappropriate in the 
case of cross-border externalities since the costs and benefits of an action fall on different States.88  
A package of EU asylum law, such as the Reception Conditions Directive and the 
Qualification Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Dublin Regulation, fits the 
economic criterion for community action.89 Although the supranational characteristic of the refugee 
crisis is the most important “push” factor for EU competence,90 this argument should not be pushed 
so far that all competencies should be centralized at the EU level.91 Thus, EU-wide cooperation in 
asylum law may yield positive results; but, this does not mean that there should be a complete 
homogeneity of legal rules. Indeed, section 4 of this chapter argues that asylum policies that establish 
minimum standards rather than fixed standards are more beneficial to both refugees as well as host 
countries.  
 Moreover, the absence of an EU comprehensive centralized policy may lead to Coasean 
bargaining between countries that receive a lot of asylum applications and potential relocation 
countries for persecuted individuals.92 Ergo, a comparative institutional approach would also take 
into consideration not only a cost-benefit analysis of alternative legal remedies but, also the feasibility 
of contractual agreements between Member States. In case of externalities, a supranational body can 
choose between 1) doing nothing and leaving the issue to the Member States; 2) stimulating 
agreements between the Member States; and 3) centralization of regulatory powers. 
 While complete decentralization will bring a political disintegration between the Member 
States93 and complete centralization will eliminate the advantages of regulatory competition,94 under 
certain conditions, the stimulation of interstate agreements has some comparative advantages. 
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According to the Coase theorem, if an externality affects only a limited number of countries, 
negotiations between States may lead to efficient outcomes, under the condition that the property 
rights have been previously assigned and the risk of strategic behaviour may be mitigated. 95 In this 
case, a supranational body shall limit itself in organising and supervising the fulfilment of these 
agreements since total centralisation will lead to internalisation of the border externalities without 
bringing any compensative advantages. In addition, uniformity will not lead to the total elimination 
of interstate border externalities or the abolition of the “race to the bottom.” Nevertheless, as will be 
shown in this chapter, minimum harmonization is the most efficient answer to the refugee crisis.  
 From an economic perspective, the two main transfer systems are north-to-south and south-
to-south transfers.96 In the case of north-to-south transfers, refugees are moved from wealthy 
countries to poorer host countries; whereas the case of south-to-south transfers, where refugees are 
moved from poorer countries, requires the cooperation between poorer countries. The south-to-south 
transfer system expands migration options for refugees.97 This approach generates positive 
externalities for third countries, since it eliminates the burden of directly hosting refugees. A complete 
and detailed investigation has recommended that if the costs of hosting refugees are convex, then it 
will be more efficient not to host large concentrations of refugees in neighbouring countries. As a 
result, economic scholars have advocated a south-to-south transfer system since it reduces the total 
social costs of hosting refugees.98  
 Recently, this transfer system has also been proposed by some authors99 in the context of the 
EU relocation system established in 2015100 which establishes a quota-trading among Member States. 
Nevertheless, this might lead to some problems. First, refugees may be seen as commodities in inter-
state transactions.101 Second, non-financial trading (e.g. allowing Member States to make 
resettlement efforts instead of sharing responsibilities) can bring legal and political risks since it 
undermines the efforts to establish a more effective burden-sharing mechanism for asylum seekers.102 
In particular, the absence of burden-sharing might lead to political disintegration of the Member 
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States.103 This will also undermine some of the core principles and achievements of the European 
integration process in the asylum law;104 specifically, Article 3(2) TEU and Chapter 2 TFEU. 
However, EU competence in asylum law would have not been needed in cases where there 
had been a “natural” convergence of laws (i.e. a bottom-up convergence). In these cases, the standard 
would not be formally fixed; it would instead remain flexible and reversible. However, these bottom-
up convergences are frequent only in cases of “neutral norms”105 for instances such as rules on 
formalities and procedures. In the absence of a “natural” convergence, an EU policy might be a good 
solution. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that regulatory competition requires a rule of non-
discrimination. In other words, mutual recognition must be established.106 
The EU’s institutional framework can provide the legal instruments to enforce these types of 
agreements and can offer a better picture of the general number of asylum applications. More 
importantly, the risk of strategic behaviour107 and the “free-riding” incentive108 are decreased, since 
EU Member States are repeat players. Besides, integration becomes the most efficient answer to avoid 
strategic or non-cooperative behaviour among local law-makers,109 which in the case of the refugee 
law, is seen as a shared policy or shared asylum burden.110 In 2007, the European Commission 
affirmed the logic of harmonising EU asylum policy as a burden-sharing instrument.111 
Moreover, the EU approach has achieved better results than all attempts towards bilateral 
agreements between Member States112 since the internalisation of externalities through bargaining is 
unreachable and Pareto optimality cannot be achieved.113 The absence of free choice between 
competing parties may lead to the distortion of competition between legal orders.114 
Lastly, as has already been stated above, according to the Tiebout theory, information plays 
an important role, and there must be no information deficiencies.115 Thus, by applying the Tiebout 
theory, well-informed persecuted individuals will move to the country that provides the local services 
which are best suited to their personal preferences, increasing their net benefits. However, only one 
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empirical study116 shows that refugees have information about economic variables and there is clear 
evidence that economic factors matter in refugee decision making. Another study117 demonstrates 
that refugees are well-informed about national asylum policies. In contrast to these two studies, in 
general, the literature argues that economic variables only partially influence refugee decision 
making for the destination country.118 In addition, the literature highlights chance as the most 
important factor119 since persecuted individuals have limited or no information about refugee 
policies.120 Indeed, the majority of the scientific literature suggests that destinations are determined 
not by personal choices but by the practicalities and demands of the situation that persecuted 
individuals face en route to the destination country.121   
In summary, the presumptions of the Tiebout theory – that citizens are well informed or that 
law-makers are free to choose a legal rule without any type of externalities or spill-over effects – are 
(almost) never met in the real world in the context of asylum law.122 Taking into account more 
realistic conditions may justify further centralisation.  
 
3.2. Race to the Bottom 
There is an economic argument to regulate asylum law at the EU level due to a risk of a “race to the 
bottom.”  
However, the “race to the bottom” argument depends on the magnitude of cross-border 
effects.123 This tendency is higher in the domain of laws where moral and religious norms are not 
involved and between jurisdictions at an equivalent stage of social and economic development.124 
The hypothesis suggests that there is a strong link between the social and economic order and the 
evolution of European legal principles.125 Therefore, socio-economic factors impact on lawmakers. 
In other words, arbiters of legal precepts, such as national parliaments, have a high probability to 
converge when they have a homogenous goal, which, in the case of the refugee crisis, is to decrease 
the number of asylum seekers.126  
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Therefore, to attract less persecuted individuals, Western European countries have introduced 
restrictive asylum policies which have led to a regulatory “race to the bottom”127 or policy 
overspill.128 More precisely, a prisoner dilemma situation could arise, eventually entailing the absence 
of efficient legislation in terms of enactment or enforcement.129 An EU-wide competence, also in 
asylum law, might avoid such a prisoner dilemma.130  
 The competition between legal orders to create advantages for individual States is an argument 
that has been used in different fields of law,131 giving rise to the harmonisation of rules and standards 
under the guise of “leveling the playing field to avoid distortions of competition.”132 Nevertheless, 
public choice scholars of federalism have argued that differentiated legal orders can also bring market 
integration.133 They have taken into consideration the Swiss134 and the Canadian135 models. 
Therefore, it could be possible to have market integration without having a complete harmonisation 
of all legal rules and standards.136 Thus, centralisation is needed when the differences between legal 
systems might create a destructive environment for competition. 
Asylum policies establishing minimum standards rather than fixed standards are more 
beneficial to both refugees and host countries. The different conditions in the “market” of legal orders 
may be the result of other factors as well, such as the need for young generation labourers or the 
ongoing demand for labour force in the market of non-qualified jobs. In general, persecuted 
individuals are young; according to Eurostat, more than four out of five (82 %) first-time asylum 
seekers in the EU-28 in 2017 were less than 35 years old.137 This will decrease the age dependency 
ratio (people younger than 15 or older than 64 years in relation to the working-age population). 
Moreover, their young age might affect the labour market of non-qualified jobs,138 since their 
employability is closely linked to their exploitability.139 Additionally, several economic studies have 
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demonstrated that after a few years of residence in the host countries, refugees earn more than 
“economic migrants.” 140 
 The analogous application of the L&E literature to environmental law141 might suppose that 
the “race to the bottom” poses a problem if it is clear that the total cost of refugees will be different 
between Member States should an EU competence exist. In other words, the “race to the bottom” 
argument constitutes a problem if the competition between countries leads to an inefficient result. 
This is also supported by one empirical study142 which states that the French restrictive asylum 
policy of 1991 led to the amendment of the German constitution of 1993. This resulted in the 
enactment of a stricter asylum policy of Great Britain in 1994. It might be that this competition can 
be repeated with the current refugee crisis since in the recent refugee crisis, statistically, there has 
been an increase of public funds allocated for refugees.143 For instance, EU budgets for refugees 
during 2015 and 2016 have increased by more than 200%.144  
By considering the increase of populism in some European countries such as France,145 
Austria,146 and recently in Italy,147 Europe might face a “race to the bottom” since the recent anti-
immigration attitude in the political spectrum is the result of the European electorates.148  
More precisely, in countries with a low level of immigration, the electorate has a more 
restrictive preference towards migrants, which will be mirrored in the attitudes of the political 
parties.149 Additionally, in countries with a high level of immigration, electorates will demand a more 
restrictive policy if there is a significant increase in the level of asylum applications.150 While the first 
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theory includes the current case of the Visegrad countries,151 the second hypothesis might include 
countries such as Italy (before the “new” Government Conte-bis) and Austria (before the 2019 
elections). 
However, it might be that some countries, by considering the potential long-term positive 
impact of refugees in their population, might eventually establish a liberal policy, although this puts 
extra costs on their national budget. Accordingly, empirical studies have shown that after a few years 
of residence in the host countries, refugees will invest their human and economic capital in the host 
countries, unlike economic immigrants who will eventually invest their earnings in their countries of 
origin.152  
This might have been one of the reasons why, in 2015, Germany opened its borders for Syrian 
refugees and suspended the application of Dublin III.153 However, it should be stated that this strategy 
can also be explained through the public good theory.154 Although international cooperation is 
important, this approach can explain why States with high GDP unilaterally accept a large number of 
asylum seekers into their territories, speeding up the stabilisation of a highly volatile situation. In 
contrast, smaller States have an incentive to free-ride on the protection efforts of larger States. These 
smaller States will use the positive externalities/slip-ins led by the non-excludability of the public 
good (protection of refugee rights).155 This is also called the exploitation hypothesis: since larger 
States eventually have more to lose, it derives that they have fewer incentives to free-ride than smaller 
States. 
In summary, in the case of refugee law, the “race to the bottom” theory is an important 
argument for centralisation. Nevertheless, countries will not always establish a restrictive policy to 
respond to the unfriendly asylum policies of other countries. Germany is a great example of this, 
opening its borders to Syrian refugees in 2015. 
 
3.3. Reduction of Transaction Costs 
EU competence has also been enshrined by the fact that harmonisation reduces transaction costs.156 
This is particularly emphasised in the case of private law since the diversity of laws increases costs 
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for international firms.157 In public law, some authors have also used the idea of transaction costs,158 
which include not only economic activities but also any kind of social activities involving transaction 
costs.159 
The reduction of transaction costs might be considered an important argument by the EU’s 
institutions. According to this model, uniform rules may reduce information costs incurred by their 
legal systems since this knowledge is no longer required. However, this argument is weak for two 
main reasons. First, legal uncertainty might not be reduced even if there are uniform rules because 
EU Member States use different languages. Additionally, judges in different jurisdictions may not 
conduct a uniform interpretation.160 Second, there is no supporting empirical evidence that uniform 
rules decrease transaction costs.161 Important and large economic agents will not consider the 
adaptation costs to the new legal system as an important factor to not enter a new market.162 However, 
transaction costs are an important factor in the case of natural persons (considered as contrary to legal 
persons), who will spend time and energy to better understand the differences between legal orders.163 
The literature of transaction costs does not consider that there are also benefits from the 
diversity of legal systems, since they are in harmony with the preferences of small groups. Therefore, 
the balance between these two counter-arguments will determine whether the transaction costs 
savings of harmonisation are higher than the benefits of differentiated legal rules.164  
 The reduction of transaction costs plays a particular role in the case of the “negative 
harmonisation” (harmonisation without the need for an international instrument).165 In the case of 
asylum law, spontaneous cooperation in international refugee law has been inefficient.166 This is 
because spontaneous convergence has more advantages than formal harmonisation. It should be noted 
that spontaneous convergence occurs only in branches of law where it is economically appropriate; 
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in other words, where the benefits of convergence exceed its costs.167 Nevertheless, in the case of 
refugee law, although the national refugee policies have adopted similar restrictive policies of other 
countries,168 there hasn’t been any spontaneous cooperation. 
In closing, in a field where transaction costs pose substantial problems in integration, 
harmonisation is needed.169 The centralisation of asylum law at an EU level will bring about a 
decrease in transaction costs for two main reasons. First, transaction costs are an important factor in 
the case of natural persons,170 as persecuted individuals are. Second, transaction costs play a particular 
role in the case of the “negative harmonisation,”171 as has happened in the case of asylum law in 
Western European countries in the last few decades.172  
 
3.4. Protection of Human Rights 
This contribution views the role of the EU as a sui generis organisation protecting HRs. Although 
this is a non-economic argument, some considerations should be specified.  
 The creation of the EU aimed to unite European countries economically and politically to 
secure lasting peace.173 In 1957, the six founding countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, created the European Economic Community or the “Common 
Market.” By the late 1960s, the protection of HRs was also part of the European agenda,174 which 
aimed to create a “Europe with a Human Face.” This transformation passed through different 
stages.175 However, during the first decades, the protection of HRs through EU institutions was 
possible only through the application of Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome.176 
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 Focusing on refugee management, the asylum cooperation formally started with the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, which was also a response to the Kosovo refugee crisis.177 Indeed, Article 
73k of the Treaty of Amsterdam directed the Council to adopt, within a period of five years, common 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers, asylum procedures, recognition criteria, and 
temporary protection. The protection of refugee rights has been also part of negotiations with new 
and prospective EU Member States by incorporating it in the SAA.178 Before 1999, the role of EU 
institutions was marginal, and all was done at an intergovernmental level,179 which might have raised 
the level of Coasean bargaining between the countries involved.180  
 The current Article 78 of the TFEU states “the Union shall develop a common policy on 
asylum, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection” by enhancing the EU role in asylum law. 
In accordance, the EU has switched from a non-binding and voluntary mechanism to the binding 
mechanism of recent years.181 Thus, in June 2017, the European Commission launched an 
infringement procedure against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for non-compliance with 
their legal obligations on relocation.182 The relocation refugee programme was based on a formula 
allocating 40 percent on population size, 40 percent on GDP, 10 percent on average asylum 
applications, and 10 percent on the unemployment rate.183  
Still, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have not complied with the relocation scheme 
decided by the Council in 2015,184 which was confirmed by the CJEU in September 2017.185 While 
Hungary has not taken any action at all, Poland and the Czech Republic have not complied with the 
Council Decision respectively since December 2015 and since August 2016. According to the 
literature, anti-immigration attitudes are the result of the electorates.186 In these countries, typically 
with a low level of immigration, the electorate has a more restrictive preference, which will be 
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matched by the political parties.187 Nevertheless, their individual preferences cannot prevail since 
these restrictive policies widely infringe upon the perception of HRs.188 
 In addition to the protections recognised in Article 78 of the TFEU, the role of the EU has not 
stopped at merely the protection of “refugees” or individuals falling under the category of “subsidiary 
protection” but has also considered the possibility of harmonising visa issuance for humanitarian 
reasons. To harmonise this topic, there was a study for the European Commission back in 2002, the 
Green Paper on Asylum in 2006, the Stockholm Programme of 2009, and a Communication on An 
Open and Secure Europe in 2014.189  
 To sum up, although cooperation between Member States was a central aim since the creation 
of a common market, from the late 1960s, the EU institutions aimed to create a “Europe with a Human 
Face”. This has been codified in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 and also in the current Article 78 of 
the TFEU.  
 
 
4. From “Race to the Bottom” to “Cooperation” in the EU Asylum Policy: the Two Different 
Types of Harmonisation 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the election of right-wing parties in some Western countries, 
more restrictive immigration policies were introduced.190 This brought about a legal competition in 
the refugee field.191  
 Destination countries strived to attract the lowest possible number of refugees since costs for 
hosting refugees are high. Indeed, a refugee influx increases competition for scarce resources such as 
health care, housing, education, and employment.192 Migrants and refugees, particularly with cultural 
backgrounds drastically different from the host country, also raise the issue of socio-cultural 
membership.  
This section examines the different types of border control and explores some of the empirical 
studies demonstrating their effectiveness to decrease the number of asylum seekers. Moreover, it 
shows the two different types of harmonisation by highlighting the fact that although individual 
countries benefit from neither fixed nor minimum standards of harmonisation, asylum policies that 
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establish minimum standards rather than fixed standards are more beneficial to both refugees as well 
as to the host countries.  
 
4.1. Border Control and Asylum Policy 
Border control and asylum policy are examples of the variables that might affect refugee decision 
making.193 Different from the other factors that impact on refugee decision making, border control 
and asylum policy are the only variables that are totally controlled by the governments of the 
destination countries (also in cases that a State is part of an international or supranational public body 
– i.e. EU  due to a decision by the national Parliament to give up part of their sovereignty). Therefore, 
the accession in the EU has sovereignty costs since, in the case of the EU competence, national 
lawmakers renounce the establishment of specific rules according to their best interests. 
This is also connected with the decision of Member States to delegate their powers to the EU 
within their constitutional limits.194 Although according to public choice theory, politicians aim to 
maximise their utility,195 they have sometimes chosen not to decide or to delegate their powers. Their 
decisions are based on rational behaviour: national legislators will delegate competences to the EU if 
the costs of the delegation are outweighed by the corresponding benefits to obtain the highest 
expected net gains. 196  
Considering other reasons to delegate legislative powers to EU institutions, uncertainty might 
play an important role. In order not to lose political support, lawmakers will delegate the decision to 
other bodies.197 Since the 1970s were characterised both by this so-called “Europe with a Human 
Face”198 and also with an increase of right-wing parties proposing more restrictive immigration 
policies,199 the issue of asylum law became controversial and caused conflict, leading to its delegation 
by legislators. National governments could subsequently attribute the loss of reputation deriving from 
restrictive policies to international and supranational agreements and institutions, even if their 
national policies would have been similar.200 
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 From 1992 to 1994, different European countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the UK) introduced more 
restrictive asylum procedures. Germany, France, Portugal, and Spain among some others even 
modified their national constitutions.201 These Western countries introduced restrictive policies 
although the costs of these policies are higher compared to liberal asylum policies. The human 
resources involved in the enforcement of restrictive policies raise costs significantly.202 In addition to 
the direct costs of stricter asylum laws, such as border control matters as well as costs of thorough 
asylum examination, there are also higher indirect costs including the training of the administrative 
and juridical sectors among other things. It should be underlined that the high frequency of changes 
in asylum policy leads to even higher indirect costs.203   
 Restrictive policies have costs that are not internalized by the host countries per se. For 
instance, due to a more restrictive USA migration policy, the number of deaths of Mexicans during 
their attempt to illegally enter the USA between 1996 and 2000 increased by 400%.204 As a result, 
rational lawmakers opt for restrictive policies only if the costs which cannot be internalised are lower 
than the socio-economic costs of accepting refugees. In other words, in this case, a rational lawmaker 
will accept refugees if the costs for their protection are lower than the political costs coming from the 
increase of deaths of persecuted individuals trying to enter the nation’s territory. 
 The economic literature is divided over the effects of restrictive asylum procedures. Some 
scholars argue that restrictive asylum laws directly influence the number of applications and the rate 
of asylum grants.205 This was particularly true prior to the introduction of the European asylum policy 
expressed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999.206 On the contrary, other studies argue that restrictive 
asylum policies do not lead to a reduction in the inflow of refugees or a better selection of asylum 
seekers.207 These studies explain the peaks of refugees as consequences of broader historical events 
rather than as the results of specific asylum policies. For example, the peak of (Eastern European) 
refugees in 1992 came after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
peak in 2001 followed the wars in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur.  
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 For a better understanding of the effect of restrictive asylum procedures, it is important to 
differentiate the types of asylum policies. There are four groups of measures: access restrictions, 
reforms of the asylum procedure, living conditions, and expulsions.208 The majority of the literature 
agrees that legislated access restrictions led to a decrease in the number of asylum claims.209 Some 
authors, however, believe that the consequences of such restrictive actions and the results of the 
studies are limited.210 In the last decades, several Western countries have reformed their asylum 
procedures by introducing lists of “safe countries of origin” and “safe countries of transit.” 
Nevertheless, these measures did not have a significant effect on the number of asylum seekers;211 
probably because refugees do not disclose their countries of origin or transit to the authorities.212  
Reducing social benefits (or in other words, reforming living conditions) has an impact on 
asylum seekers;213 however, this is mostly a short-term impact.214 On the other hand, a study of 2013 
demonstrates that policies affecting social benefits exhibit no statistically significant effect.215 
Regarding the last type of restrictive asylum policy, the effect of expulsion is widely discussed in the 
literature because the probability of being expelled by the State is higher for asylum seekers than for 
illegal migrants. For example, in the UK, in 2002, 4.7% of illegal migrants caught by the police were 
expelled while 11% of Iraqis and 55% of Yugoslavs whose asylum claims had been rejected were 
removed. 216 
In summary, during the 1970s and 1980s, Western European countries established different 
restrictive immigration policies. Nevertheless, the literature is divided regarding their impact on the 
reduction of the number of asylum seekers.     
 
4.2. Asylum Law: the “Race to the Bottom” Versus Cooperation  
In recent decades, Western European countries have introduced restrictive asylum policies that have 
led to a regulatory “race to the bottom”217 or policy overspill.218  
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Since the 1980s, and especially after the collapse of the communist regimes and the economic 
crisis of 2008, the main goal of many States has been to have as few refugees as possible. During the 
1990s, national governments decided to restrict asylum rather than to enter into cooperative sharing 
schemes. This dynamic corresponds to the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma:219 the two parties try to save 
themselves through unilateral action rather than accepting the costs that accompany the benefits of 
cooperation.  
This competition between asylum laws of different destination countries (or the so-called 
“asylum shopping”) has been excessively costly for States.220 The human resources involved in the 
enforcement of restrictive policies raise costs significantly.221 Moreover, the high frequency of 
changes in the asylum policy leads to even higher indirect costs.222 
 States were convinced that lowering the asylum recognition rate will decrease the number of 
future applications,223 just like higher recognition rates, conversely, induced more applications.224 An 
empirical study analysing the dynamic relationship between asylum applications and recognition 
rates in Europe between 1987–2010 confirmed this assumption.225  
 The “race to the bottom” has created negative externalities for other countries. As stated 
above, according to the competition theory, the creation of non-internalised negative externalities (for 
instance, political costs at the international level) is a sign of market failure and inefficient 
competition.226 However, in asylum law, spontaneous cooperation has been inefficient.227 This 
problem exists because it is in the interest of an individual country to free ride at the expense of other 
members. Although cooperation produces positive-sum benefits, which individual States cannot 
attain on their own, in the case of higher participants in a number of destination countries, the 
distribution of costs and benefits in any burden-sharing system is skewed.228  
 During the 1990s, several attempts such as the Schengen Implementation Convention and the 
Dublin Convention were made to organise cooperation schemes among EU Member States. This was 
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an attempt to centralise the EU’s asylum policy. This centralisation aims to avoid unilateral violations 
of fundamental benchmarks established in TFEU by single Member States.229   
These policies reflected two main goals: limiting “asylum shopping” and constituting a 
common position regarding refugees. This common policy was seen as an insurance mechanism to 
maintain the protection granted to asylum seekers;230 it avoided peak costs for a single Member State 
by sharing the financial cost with other EU members,231 and it ensures greater fairness for asylum 
seekers.232 One of the first instances when these policies were applied was during the refugee waves 
caused by the Yugoslavian war.233 
Centralised action is a powerful justification for restrictive policies. As stated above, national 
governments can attribute the loss of a good reputation deriving from restrictive policies to 
international agreements, even if their national policies would have been similar.234 This is the case 
in the constitutional reforms in Spain and France of 1993. National parliaments, by highlighting the 
necessity to comply with the Schengen Convention, modified their national constitutions regarding 
asylum rights. However, the Schengen Convention imposed neither the abolition nor even the 
amendment of the constitutional right of asylum. These States have benefited from acting collectively 
to achieve migration-related objectives while maintaining their national competence.235  
Since interests are heterogeneous, the feasibility of cooperation depends on the size of the 
coalition and the external effects of cooperation on non-co-operators. Smaller groups tend to 
cooperate more closely and effectively. The larger the group, the more likely it becomes that 
individual States will prefer all other States to cooperate while they individually prefer to defect and 
to maximise their utility.236 This approach, however, becomes politically and especially financially 
costly for countries that want to defect while the others cooperate. This is further highlighted in cases 
where cooperation in asylum policy is only part of the international cooperation. This is the case with 
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the EU asylum law:237 by cooperating in other fields as well, EU Member States have fewer net 
benefits deriving from EU asylum law.  
 However, restrictive asylum policy is costly.238 The net benefit for each country is greater 
under coordinated as opposed to uncoordinated maximisation239 because in the case of coordination 
the externalities across the countries are internalised.240 This is clear in the case of two countries that 
are very similar in socio-economic and cultural terms. When the countries are sufficiently different 
from each other, coordination is incentive-incompatible for the country with the lower benefit. In 
practice, coordination is difficult to be achieved, and the introduction of cross-border transfers may 
play a role.241  
 A higher degree of cooperation in bigger groups reduces costs. This is why Norway and 
Switzerland (non-EU Member States) are part of the European asylum policy. The centralisation of 
asylum law can occur in two different forms: a fixed-standard regime or a minimum standard regime. 
In the first case, the EU decides the rules and Member States cannot change them. In the second case, 
although the EU decides the principles, national States can compete by not going below the minimum 
standard.  
From a L&E standpoint, individual countries would benefit from neither fixed nor minimum 
standard regimes of asylum policy coordination since each State is interested in setting the refugee 
eligibility standard according to its individual balance between the benefits against the costs of 
hosting refugees. Quite simply, full harmonization takes the State’s individual cost-benefit analysis. 
In addition, the most popular destinations such as countries that offer the highest social benefits would 
suffer more from losing discretion.242 Nevertheless, asylum policies establishing minimum standards 
rather than fixed standards would offer more benefits to both refugees and individual destination 
countries. There are three main reasons for this.  
All three of these reasons underline the importance of State discretion, in asylum law as well. 
Firstly, national governments would still have discretion in regulating asylum rules according to their 
cost-benefit analyses. National governments consider flexibility in asylum policy important.243 
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Secondly, these countries, by maintaining discretion with regard to asylum norms, would increase 
their total welfare. Thirdly, in the case of a minimum-standard regime, each country still has the 
opportunity to maximise the sum of its national net benefits.244 States will still have the chance to 
assert their national preferences (mainly) according to the national absorption capacity for the new 
labour market and national security considerations.245 
Popular countries will often set their standard equal to the common minimum-standard 
regime. They still will lose utility compared to unilateral decision making, but that loss is still lower 
compared to a fixed-standard regime. In addition, unpopular countries will benefit more from a 
minimum-standard regime rather than a fixed-standard regime. 
 The total number of protected refugees is higher in the case of asylum policies establishing 
minimum standards since all countries would accept the same number of refugees, in addition to a 
higher number of accepted refugees in States that have established liberal asylum policies. A flexible 
standard is always better for refugees compared to a fixed standard asylum regime. This leaves a 
margin to increase the highest standard, which leads to flexible asylum law harmonisation.246  
In summary, in recent decades, Western European countries have introduced restrictive 
policies causing a “race to the bottom.” Nevertheless, restrictive national asylum policies in the 1990s 
were highly costly for governments and created negative externalities for other countries, too. 
Therefore, EU Member States (plus Norway and Switzerland) have agreed upon a set of common EU 
asylum regulations. Although the economic analysis of law concludes that individual countries 
benefit from neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonisation, asylum policies that establish 
minimum standards rather than fixed standards give more benefits to both refugees and individual 
countries.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the principle of subsidiarity in asylum law. The intention was to better 
understand the extent of EU power in asylum law in addition to exposing the advantages and the 
disadvantages of decentralised decision making by looking at the criteria of economic efficiency.  
This contribution considers some of the most important legal reasoning, public choice 
literature and the economic analysis of legal harmonisation without being comprehensive of all types 
of economic theories. Its central research question approaches the topic of allocative efficiency 
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through the economic analysis of the Tiebout theory and the dynamic view of competition between 
legal orders. 
The presumptions of the Tiebout argument in favour of competition between legal orders are: 
1) A large number of suppliers of legal rules; 2) No information deficiencies; and 3) No externalities, 
which also brings problems with economies of scale. While the first requirement in asylum law in the 
European context might be considered fulfilled, the other two are not. Neither the refugees nor the 
single States have the information needed to make the decision. In general, the literature argues that 
asylum seekers know nothing or have little information regarding the final destination country.247 In 
addition, States do not perfectly possess all the information about the preferences of all persecuted 
individuals regarding the decision of the final destination country. Moreover, the individual State’s 
choice entails positive or negative externalities for third countries because it directly affects the flow 
of migration.248 
The EU’s competence in refugee law has two other advantages. First, the centralisation of law 
leads to the reduction of transaction costs, which play a particular role in the case of the “negative 
harmonisation.”249 Indeed, in the case of asylum law, spontaneous cooperation in international 
refugee law has been inefficient:250 countries have continuously restricted their national refugee 
policies by adopting similar restrictive policies of other countries. 251 Second, the EU competence in 
asylum law aims to bring about equality of protection of refugee rights within EU Member States. 
This new strategy has been on the EU agenda since the late 1960s.252  
However, total EU competence in asylum law without legal competition between EU Member 
States will increase sovereignty costs. Hence, national competencies are fully pre-empted from taking 
independent action. In addition, given the heterogeneous preferences of different EU Member States, 
full harmonisation should remain an ultimum remedium.253 Moreover, the results of the dynamic 
approach to the competition between legal orders should be considered.254 While the EU institutions 
shall organise competition between the laws of EU Member States, the sovereignty costs should be 
limited as much as possible.  
A strategy that considers both the advantages and disadvantages of the centralisation of 
refugee law is the minimum standard harmonisation. In other words, in asylum law, a mixed system 
where States can still compete but cannot go under a certain level of protection might be a good 
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solution. Thus, the harmonisation of laws and competition between legal rules are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.255  
The minimum standard harmonisation is in accordance with the evolution of EU law and the 
principle of subsidiarity established in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999, which aimed to increase the 
Community’s competence and offer more autonomy to Member States.256 The Treaty of Amsterdam 
codified two important shifts.257 First, the so-called horizontal expansion,258 from a supranational 
organization striving to liberalise trade to one attempting to acquire the power to advance the social 
and economic rights of all European citizens. Second, it strengthens the community powers 
“vertically:”259 from normative uniformity within the EU to harmonisation which also tolerates some 
degree of competition between legal orders.  
The only strategy that includes both these principles, highlighting the principle of subsidiarity, 
is if EU law establishes the minimum provisions for competition between EU Member States and is 
allowed to codify policy to ensure the survival of the best rule.260 Indeed, even the European 
Commission261 has accepted that policy harmonisation can only address imbalances due to 
differences in domestic legislation, but cannot change the main pull-factors (e.g. geography, 
language, history, or migration network) that attract refugees to some countries rather than to 
others.262 
Lastly, when competing with each-other within an EU competence, national States should not 
have a protectionist intent. Therefore, the suitability and necessity tests are already needed to flesh 
out intentionally protectionist rules of the Member State.263 In other words, if the instruments applied 
are not connected to the ends or if there are equally effective but less restrictive alternatives, a national 
measure having a restrictive effect is likely to be, in fact, the product of a protectionist intent. 264 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 Van den Bergh, note 93. 
256 Reich, note 86. 
257 Dougan, Michael. "Minimum harmonization and the internal market." Common Market L. Rev. 37 (2000): 853. 
258 Stuyck, Jules, and Peter Wytinck. "Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Judgment 
of 13 November 1990 (Sixth chamber)." Common Market Law Review 28.1 (1991): 205-223; Case 152/84, at 749, para 48. 
259 C-103/88; C-125/88. 
260 Reich, note 86. 
261 European Commission, note 111. 
262 Thielemann, note 17. 
263 Bieber, Roland, et al. "One European Market: A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy." (1988). 
264 Snell, note 89. 
 186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 199 
Bibliography 
A 
- Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal. "Terrorism and the world economy." European Economic Review 52.1 (2008): 1-
27. 
- Abbring, Jaap H., Gerard J. Berg, and Jan C. Ours. "The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate 
from unemployment to employment." The Economic Journal 115.505 (2005): 602-630. 
- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with 
indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match." American Economic Review 99.5 (2009): 1954-78. 
- Adamson, Fiona B. "Crossing borders: International migration and national security." International Security 31.1 (2006): 
165-199. 
- Aghion, Philippe, et al. "Industrial policy and competition." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7.4 (2015): 1-
32. 
- Aldana, Julio Mario Bonilla. "La armonización del Derecho, concepto y críticas en cuanto a su implementación." Revista e-
mercatoria 12.2 (2013): 80-139. 
- Aleinikoff, T. Alexander. "State-centered refugee law: From resettlement to containment." Immigration & Nationality Law 
Review 14 (1992): 186. 
- Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini. "External debt, capital flight and political risk." Journal of international Economics 
27.3-4 (1989): 199-220.  
- Algan, Yann, et al. "The economic situation of first and second‐generation immigrants in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom." (2010): F4-F30. 
- Alien          Migrant          Interdiction, United States Coast Guard, available on line 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Alkire, Sabina. A conceptual framework for human security. University of Oxford, 2003. 
- Allen, Susan Hannah. "Political institutions and constrained response to economic sanctions." Foreign Policy Analysis 4.3 
(2008): 255-274. 
- Alonso, Sonia, and Sara Claro da Fonseca. "Immigration, left and right." Party Politics 18.6 (2012): 865-884. 
- Alston, Philip. "Conjuring up new human rights: A proposal for quality control." American Journal of International Law 
78.3 (1984): 607-621.  
- Alter, Karen J. "The Evolution of International Law and Courts." International Politics and Institutions in Time (2017): 251. 
- Altonji et al. underline the negative effect for less-skilled natives. Altonji, Joseph G., and David Card. "The effects of 
immigration on the labour market outcomes of less-skilled natives." Immigration, Trade, and the Labour Market (1991): 
201-234. 
- Amelie, F. Constant and Klaus F. Zimmermann. International Handbook on the Economics of Migration. Edward Elgar, 
2013. 
- Amnesty International Secretary General. 2001. Globalisation: AI and Socio-Economic Rights. 
- Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report. 2004. Building an International Human Rights Agenda: Upholding 
the Rights of Refugees and Migrants. 
- Amnesty International. 2016. Refugees Welcome Index shows government refugee policies out of touch with public opinion, 
available on-line: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/refugees-welcome-index-shows-government-refugee-
policies-out-of-touch/ accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, Cynthia Bansak, and Susan Pozo. "Refugee Admissions and Public Safety: Are Refugee 
Settlement Areas More Prone to Crime?." (2018). 
- Andersen, Synøve N., Bjart Holtsmark, and Sigmund B. Mohn. Kriminalitet blant innvandrere og norskfødte med 
innvandrerforeldre. En analyse av registerdata for perioden 1992-2015. Statistics Norway, 2017. 
- Andreoni, James. "Why free ride?: Strategies and learning in public goods experiments." Journal of Public Economics 37.3 
(1988): 291-304.  
- Angrist, Joshua D., and Adriana D. Kugler. "Protective or counter‐productive? Labour market institutions and the effect of 
immigration on EU natives." The Economic Journal 113.488 (2003): F302-F331. 
- Anker, Deborah, Joan Fitzpatrick, and Andrew Shacknove. "Crisis and cure: A reply to Hathaway/Neve and 
Schuck." Harvard Human Rights Journal 11 (1998): 295. 
- Asplund, Eva. A Study of the Development of the Asylum Law and Policy of the European Union with Focus on the Role of 
Burden-Sharing and Temporary Protection. Department of Law, 2003. 
- Aust, Anthony. Modern treaty law and practice. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
- Aycan, Zeynep, and John W. Berry. "Impact of employment-related experiences on immigrants' psychological well-being 
and adaptation to Canada." Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement 28.3 
(1996): 240. 
- Aydemir, Abdurrahman, and Chris Robinson. "Global labour markets, return, and onward migration." Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue Canadienne d'économique 41.4 (2008): 1285-1311. 
- Aydemir, Abdurrahman. "Immigrant selection and short-term labor market outcomes by visa category." Journal of 
Population Economics 24.2 (2011): 451-475. 
- Azam, Jean-Paul, and Véronique Thelen. "The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror." Public Choice 135.3-
4 (2008): 375-397; 
- Azam, Jean‐Paul, and Alexandra Delacroix. "Aid and the delegated fight against terrorism." Review of Development 
Economics 10.2 (2006): 330-344. 
 200 
- Aziz, Haris, et al. "Stability and Pareto optimality in refugee allocation matchings." Proceedings of the 17th International 
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and 
Multiagent Systems, 2018. 
 
B 
- Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. The economics of the world trading system. MIT press, 2004. 
- Baier, Scott L., and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand. "The growth of world trade: tariffs, transport costs, and income 
similarity." Journal of international Economics 53.1 (2001): 1-27. 
- Bailliet, Cecilia. "The Tampa case and its impact on burden sharing at sea." Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): 741. 
- Baker, Scott. "Effects of the 1986 immigration reform and control act on crime." SSRN Electronic Journal (2011) 
- Balabanis, George, and Adamantios Diamantopoulos. "Domestic country bias, country-of-origin effects, and consumer 
ethnocentrism: a multidimensional unfolding approach." Journal of the academy of marketing science 32.1 (2004): 80-95. 
- Bale, Tim. "Turning round the telescope. Centre-right parties and immigration and integration policy in Europe." Journal of 
European Public Policy 15.3 (2008): 315-330. 
- Bansak, K., J. Hainmueller, and D. Hangartner. "Europeans Prefer a Proportional Allocation of Asylum Seekers Over the 
Dublin Status Quo." PNAS 1.7 (2017). 
- Barber, Nigel. "The sex ratio as a predictor of cross-national variation in violent crime." Cross-Cultural Research 34.3 
(2000): 264-282. 
- Barbou des Places, S (2002), Burden Sharing in the field of Asylum. Legal motivations and Implications of a Regional 
Approach, Paper presented for the 3rd Workshop of the UACES Study Group on EU Burden-Sharing ‘Internal and External 
Dimensions of EU Burden- Sharing, 26-27 April 2002, London School of Economics, fothcoming Working Paper, RSC, 
European University Institute, Florence, on file with the authors.  
- Barrett, Scott. "International cooperation and the international commons." Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 10 
(1999): 131-145. 
- Barsky, Robert F. " Why Canada? Why Québec?" Assessing the convention refugee's decision making of Québec and Canada 
as host country in 1992. European Centre for the Study of Argumentation, 1994. 
- Barslund, Mikkel, Mattia Di Salvo, and Nadzeya Laurentsyeva. "The impact of refugees on the labour market: a big splash 
in a small pond? CEPS Working Document No 2018/07, October 2018." (2018). 
- Barth, Fredrik. Ethnic Groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture difference. Waveland Press, 1998. 
- Barthel, Fabian, and Eric Neumayer. "Spatial dependence in asylum migration." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
41.7 (2015): 1131-1151. 
- Barutciski, Michael, and Astri Suhrke. "Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovatons in Protection and Burden‐
sharing." Journal of Refugee Studies 14.2 (2001): 95-134. 
- Başak, K. A. L. E. "The Limits of an International Burden-sharing Approach: The Syrian Refugee Protection Crisis and Its 
Consequences on Turkey’s Refugee Policy." PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs 22.3 (2017): 55-84. 
- Basavarajappa, K. G., and Ravi BP Verma. "l6. Occupational Composition Of Immigrant Women'." Ethnic demography: 
Canadian immigrant, racial and cultural variations157 (1990): 297. 
- Basran, Gurcharn S., and Li Zong. "Devaluation of foreign credentials as perceived by visible minority professional 
immigrants.(1)." Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal 30.3 (1998): 6-26. 
- Basuchoudhary, Atin, and William F. Shughart. "On ethnic conflict and the origins of transnational terrorism." Defence and 
Peace Economics 21.1 (2010): 65-87. 
- Bauböck, Rainer. "Refugee Protection and Burden‐Sharing in the European Union." JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 56.1 (2018): 141-156. 
- Baumol, William J., and Wallace E. Oates. "The Theory of Environmental Policy, 1988." Englewood Cliffs, NJ (1975). 
- Bawn, Kathleen. "Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures." American 
Political Science Review 89.1 (1995): 62-73. 
- Beamon, Benita M., and Stephen A. Kotleba. "Inventory modelling for complex emergencies in humanitarian relief 
operations." International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications 9.1 (2006): 1-18. 
- Bean, Frank D., B. Lindsay Lowell, and Lowell J. Taylor. "Undocumented Mexican immigrants and the earnings of other 
workers in the United States." Demography 25.1 (1988): 35-52.  
- Becker, Gary S. "Crime and punishment: An economic approach." The Economic Dimensions of Crime. Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 1968.  
- Bell, Brian, and Stephen Machin. The Impact of Migration on Crime and Victimisation: A Report for the Migration Advisory 
Committee. London School of Economics, 2011. 
- Bell, Brian, Francesco Fasani, and Stephen Machin. "Crime and immigration: Evidence from large immigrant waves." 
Review of Economics and Statistics 21.3 (2013): 1278-1290. 
- Bem, Kazimierz. "The Coming of a ‘Blank Cheque’—Europe, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol." International 
Journal of Refugee Law 16.4 (2004): 609-627. 
- Bennmarker, Helge, Kenneth Carling, and Bertil Holmlund. "Do benefit hikes damage job finding? Evidence from Swedish 
unemployment insurance reforms." Labour 21.1 (2007): 85-120. 
- Berg, Justin Allen. "White public opinion toward undocumented immigrants: Threat and interpersonal 
environment." Sociological Perspectives 52.1 (2009): 39-58. 
- Bernardo, Antonio E., Eric Talley, and Ivo Welch. "A theory of legal presumptions." Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 16.1 (2000): 1-49. 
- Bernardo, Antonio E., Eric Talley, and Ivo Welch. "A theory of legal presumptions." Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 16.1 (2000): 1-49. 
 201 
- Bernauer, Thomas, et al. "On Commitment Levels and Compliance Mechanisms-Determinants of Participation in Global 
Environmental Agreements." British Journal of Political Science 54.3 (2010): 401 – 419. 
- Berrebi, Claude. "Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among Palestinians." Peace Economics, 
Peace Science and Public Policy 13.1 (2007). 
- Betts, Alexander, Gil Loescher, and James Milner. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The 
politics and practice of refugee protection. Routledge, 2013. 
- Betts, Alexander. "Public goods theory and the provision of refugee protection: The role of the joint‐product model in burden‐
sharing theory." Journal of Refugee Studies 16.3 (2003): 274-296.  
- Betz, Hans-Georg. "Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland." International Journal 56.3 (2001): 393-420. 
- Bianchi, Milo, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti. "Do immigrants cause crime?." Journal of the European Economic 
Association 10.6 (2012): 1318-1347. 
- Bieber, Roland. 1992: One European Market: A Critical Analysis of the Commission's Internal Market Strategy Strategy. 
International Book Import Service, 1988. 
- Biglaiser, Gary, and Claudio Mezzetti. "Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns." Journal of Public Economics 
66.3 (1997): 425-447.  
- Bigo, Didier. "Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease." Alternatives 27.1_suppl 
(2002): 63-92. 
- Biorcio, Roberto. "The rebirth of populism in Italy and France." Telos 1991.90 (1991): 43-56. 
- Bisin, Alberto, et al. "Are Muslim immigrants different in terms of cultural integration?." Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6.2-3 (2008): 445-456. 
- Bjørgo, Tore. Root causes of terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward. Routledge, 2004. 
- Black, Richard. "Refugees and displaced persons: geographical perspectives and research directions." Progress in Human 
Geography 15.3 (1991): 281-298.  
- Black, Richard. Geography and refugees: Patterns and processes of change. Belhaven Press, 1993. 
- Blanchard, Olivier, and Justin Wolfers. "The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European unemployment: the 
aggregate evidence." The economic journal 110.462 (2000): C1-C33. 
- Blau, Francine D., Lawrence M. Kahn, and Kerry L. Papps. "Gender, source country characteristics, and labor market 
assimilation among immigrants." The Review of Economics and Statistics 93.1 (2011): 43-58. 
- Blinder, S., M. Ruhs, and C. Vargas-Silva. "Thinking behind the numbers: Understanding public opinion on immigration in 
Britain." The Migration Observatory (2011). 
- Bloch, Alice, and Liza Schuster. "Asylum and welfare: contemporary debates." Critical Social Policy 22.3 (2002): 393-414. 
- Bloch, Alice. Refugees' opportunities and barriers in employment and training. Corporate Document Services, 2002. 
- Blomberg, S. Brock, and Gregory D. Hess. "From (no) butter to guns? Understanding the economic role in transnational 
terrorism." Terrorism, economic development, and political openness (2008): 83-115. 
- Blomberg, S. Brock, and Gregory D. Hess. The Lexus and the olive branch: Globalization, democratization and terrorism. 
Democratization and Terrorism, 2005. 
- Blumstein, Alfred, Joel Wallman, and David Farrington. The crime drop in America. Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
- Bocker, Anita, Havinga, Tetty. Asylum migration to the European Union: Patterns of origin and destination. Institute for the 
Sociology of Law, 1997. 
- Boeri, Tito, and Pietro Garibaldi. "Are labour markets in the new member states sufficiently flexible for EMU?." Journal of 
Banking & Finance 30.5 (2006): 1393-1407. 
- Boodman, Martin. "The myth of harmonization of laws." The American Journal of Comparative Law 39.4 (1991): 699-724. 
- Bordo, Michael D., and Finn E. Kydland. "The gold standard as a rule: An section in exploration." Explorations in Economic 
History 32.4 (1995): 423-464. 
- Borjas, George J. "Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of immigrants." Journal of Labor Economics 
(1985): 463-489. 
- Borjas, George J. "The economics of immigration." Journal of Economic Literature 32.4 (1994): 1667-1717. 
- Borjas, George J. "The wage impact of the Marielitos: A reappraisal." ILR Review 70.5 (2017): 1077-1110. 
- Borjas, George J. Friends or strangers: The impact of immigrants on the US economy. Basic Books, 1990. 
- Borjas, George J., and Joan Monras. "The labour market consequences of refugee supply shocks." Economic Policy 32.91 
(2017): 361-413. 
- Borjas, George J., and John Crisp. Poverty, International Migration and Asylum. Studies in Development Economics and 
Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
- Bouteillet-Paquet, Daphné. L'Europe et le droit d'asile. Editions L'Harmattan, 2001. 
- Bover, Olympia, Manuel Arellano, and Samuel Bentolila. "Unemployment duration, benefit duration and the business cycle." 
The Economic Journal 112.479 (2002): 223-265. 
- Bown, Chad P. "On the economic success of GATT/WTO dispute settlement." The Review of Economics and Statistics 86.3 
(2004): 811-823.  
- Boyd, Monica. "Family and personal networks in international migration: recent developments and new 
agendas." International migration review 23.3 (1989): 638-670. 
- Boyle, P., Halfacree, K. and Robinson, V. Exploring Contemporary Migration. Wesley Longman Limited, 1998. 
- Braithwaite, Alex, and Quan Li. "Transnational terrorism hot spots: Identification and impact evaluation." Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 24.4 (2007): 281-296. 
- Brandl, Ulrike. "Soft Law as a Source of International and European Refugee Law." Europe and refugees: a Challenge 
(1997): 203-226. 
 202 
- Braun, Sebastian, and Toman Omar Mahmoud. "The employment effects of immigration: evidence from the mass arrival of 
German expellees in postwar Germany." The Journal of Economic History 74.1 (2014): 69-108. 
- Breuss, Fritz, and Markus Eller. "The optimal decentralisation of government activity: normative recommendations for the 
European constitution." Constitutional Political Economy 15.1 (2004): 27-76. 
- Brilmayer, Lea. "From'Contract'to'Pledge': The Structure of International human rights Agreements." The British Year Book 
of International Law 77.1 (2007): 163. 
- Brink, Marjolein, and Mutiara Pasariboe. Asylum seekers in the Netherlands. Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, 1993. 
- Brittan, Leon, and Karel Van Miert. "Towards an international framework of competition rules." International Business Law 
24 (1996): 454. 
- Brochmann, Grete, and Tomas Hammar. Mechanisms of immigration control: A comparative analysis of European 
regulation policies. Bloomsbury Academic, 1999.  
- Brooks, Risa A. "Sanctions and regime type: What works, and when?." Security Studies 11.4 (2002): 1-50. 
- Brouwer, Evelien. "Immigration, asylum and terrorism: A changing dynamic legal and practical developments in the EU in 
response to the terrorist attacks of 11.09." European Journal of Migration and Law 4 (2002): 1-26. 
- Brücker, Herbert, and Philipp JH Schröder. International migration with heterogeneous agents: theory and evidence. Leibniz 
Information Centre for Economics, 2006. 
- Bubb, Ryan, Michael Kremer, and David I. Levine. "The economics of international refugee law." The Journal of Legal 
Studies 40.2 (2011): 367-404. 
- Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. 
- Buck, Lori, Nicole Gallant, and Kim Richard Nossal. "Sanctions as a gendered instrument of statecraft: The case of 
Iraq." Review of International Studies 24.1 (1998): 69-84. 
- Buergenthal, Thomas. "The normative and institutional evolution of international Human Rights." Human Rights 
Quarterly 19.4 (1997): 703-723.  
- Buga, Irina. The Modification of Treaties by Subsequent Practice: The Implications of Practice Going Beyond the Limits of 
Treaty Interpretation. Diss. University Utrecht, 2015. 
- Buhaug, Halvard, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Contagion or confusion? Why conflicts cluster in space." International 
Studies Quarterly 52.2 (2008): 215-233. 
- Bureau, Dominique, and Paul Champsaur. "Fiscal federalism and European economic unification." The American Economic 
Review (1992): 88-92. 
- Burgoon, Brian. "On welfare and terror: Social welfare policies and political-economic roots of terrorism." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 50.2 (2006): 176-203. 
- Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter. "International law and international relations theory: a dual agenda." American Journal of 
International Law 87.2 (1993): 205-239. 
- Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. "Cross‐city evidence on the relationship between immigration and crime." 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management: The Journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 
17.3 (1998): 457-493. 
- Butcher, Kristin F., and David Card. "Immigration and Wages: Evidence from the 1980s." The American Economic 
Review 81.2 (1991): 292-296. 
- Butler, Avril. "A strengths approach to building futures: UK students and refugees together." Community Development 
Journal 40.2 (2005): 147-157. 
- Buxbaum, Richard M., Alain Hirsch, and Klaus J. Hopt, eds. European business law: Legal and Economic analyses on 
integration and harmonization. Walter de Gruyter, 1991. 
- Byrne, Rosemary, Gregor Noll, and Jens Vedsted-Hansen. "Understanding refugee law in an enlarged European Union." 
European Journal of International Law 15.2 (2004): 355-379. 
 
C 
- Calamia, Antonio Marcello. Ammissione ed allontanamento degli stranieri. A. Giuffrè, 1980.  
- Campos, Nauro F., and Martin Gassebner. "International terrorism, domestic political instability, and the escalation effect." 
Economics & Politics 25.1 (2013): 27-47. 
- Caplan, Bryan. "Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model." Public Choice 128.1-2 (2006): 91-107. 
- Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. "The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in 
historical institutionalism." World politics 59.3 (2007): 341-369. 
- Card, David. "Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labour market impacts of higher immigration." Journal of 
Labour Economics 19.1 (2001): 22-64. 
- Card, David. "Is the new immigration really so bad?." The Economic Journal 115.507 (2005): F300-F323. 
- Card, David. "The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labour market." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43.2 
(1990): 245-257. 
- Card, David. Immigration and Inequality. NBER Working Paper No. 14683. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. 
- Carliner, Geoffrey. "Wages, earnings and hours of first, second, and third generation American males." Economic Inquiry 
18.1 (1980): 87-102. 
- Carling, Kenneth, Bertil Holmlund, and Altin Vejsiu. "Do benefit cuts boost job finding? Swedish evidence from the 1990s." 
The Economic Journal 111.474 (2001): 766-790. 
- Carrasco, Raquel, Juan F. Jimeno, and A. Carolina Ortega. "The effect of immigration on the labour market performance of 
native-born workers: some evidence for Spain." Journal of Population Economics 21.3 (2008): 627-648. 
- Cassese, Antonio. "The multifaceted criminal notion of terrorism in international law." Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 4.5 (2006): 933-958. 
 203 
- Castells, Manuel. "Immigrant workers and class struggles in advanced capitalism: the Western European experience." 
Politics & Society 5.1 (1975): 33-66. 
- Castells, Manuel. The informational city: Information technology, economic restructuring, and the urban-regional process. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1989 
- Castles, Stephen, Heaven Crawley, and Sean Loughna. States of conflict: causes and patterns of forced migration to the EU 
and policy responses. IPPR, 2003. 
- Castles, Stephen. "Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation." Sociology 37.1 (2003): 13-34. 
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2020. The world Factbook, available on-line: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/356.html, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Chao, Paul. "Partitioning country of origin effects: consumer evaluations of a hybrid product." Journal of International 
Business Studies 24.2 (1993): 291-306. 
- Charney, Jonathan I. "Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-
Participation, and Non-Performance." The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads 288 (1987). 
- Cherri, Zeinab, Pedro Arcos González, and Rafael Castro Delgado. "The Lebanese–Syrian crisis: impact of influx of Syrian 
refugees to an already weak state." Risk management and healthcare policy 9 (2016): 165. 
- Cherubini, Francesco. Asylum law in the European Union. Routledge, 2014.  
- Chimni, Bhupinder Singh. "The meaning of words and the role of UNHCR in voluntary repatriation." International Journal 
of Refugee Law 5.3 (1993): 442-460. 
- Chimni, Bhupinder Singh. "The meaning of words and the role of UNHCR in voluntary repatriation." International Journal 
of Refugee Law 5.3 (1993): 442-460. 
- Chin, Aimee, and Kalena E. Cortes. "The refugee/asylum seeker." Handbook of the economics of international migration. 
North-Holland, 2015.  
- Chiswick, Barry R., and Paul W. Miller. "The complementarity of language and other human capital: Immigrant earnings in 
Canada." Economics of Education Review 22.5 (2003): 469-480. 
- Chiswick, Barry R., and Paul W. Miller. "The endogeneity between language and earnings: International analyses." Journal 
of Labor Economics (1995): 246-288.  
- Chiswick, Barry, and Paul W. Miller. Handbook of the Economics of International Migration: The Impact. Elsevier, 2014. 
- Choi, Seung-Whan, and Idean Salehyan. "No good deed goes unpunished: refugees, humanitarian aid, and 
terrorism." Conflict Management and Peace Science 30.1 (2013): 53-75.  
- Chunyu, M.D., 2011. Earnings Growth Patterns of Chinese Labor Immigrants in the United States. Chapter presented at the 
2011 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Washington, DC. 
- Clausen, Jens, et al. "The effect of integration policies on the time until regular employment of newly arrived immigrants: 
Evidence from Denmark." Labour Economics 16.4 (2009): 409-417. 
- Clemens, Michael A. "The effect of occupational visas on native employment: evidence from labor supply to farm jobs in 
the Great Recession." (2017). 
- Cleveland, Sarah H. "Norm internalization and US economic sanctions." Yale Journal of International Law 26 (2001): 1. 
- Coase, Ronald H. "The problem of social cost." Journal of law and economics 3.1 (1960): 1-44. 
- Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., and Siew-Ean Khoo. Public policy and immigrant settlement. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006. 
- Cohen-Goldner, Sarit, and Zvi Eckstein. "Estimating the return to training and occupational experience: The case of female 
immigrants." Journal of Econometrics 156.1 (2010): 86-105. 
- Cohen‐Goldner, Sarit, and Zvi Eckstein. "Labor Mobility of Immigrants: Training, Experience, Language, and 
Opportunities." International Economic Review 49.3 (2008): 837-872. 
- Coleman, Nils. "Non-Refoulement Revised Renewed Review of the Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement as 
Customary International Law." European Journal of Migration and Law 5.1 (2003): 23-68. 
- Coles, G. The human rights approach to the solution of the refugee problem: a theoretical and practical enquiry. Nova 
Scotia: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988. 
- Colic-Peisker, Val, and Peter Waxman. Homeland wanted: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the refugee resettlement in the 
West. Nova Science, 2005.  
- Collyer, Michael. "When do social networks fail to explain migration? Accounting for the movement of Algerian asylum-
seekers to the UK." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31.4 (2005): 699-718. 
- Commission on European Contract Law, available on-line: 
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.principles.lando.commission/doc.html accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/48 (2005). 
- Commission on Human Rights. 2000. The Right to Food, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/ 2000/10.  
- Commission on Human Rights. 2005. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right 
to an Adequate Standard of Living, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/48. 
- Committee against Torture, United States, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006. 
- Cooter, Robert, and Thomas Ulen. Introduction to Law and Economics. Pearson Education, 2007. 
- Cooter, Robert, and Thomas Ulen. Law and economics. Addison-Wesley, 2016. 
- Corcoran, Hannah, Deborah Lader, and Kevin Smith. "Hate Crime, England and Wales." Statistical bulletin 5 (2015): 15. 
- Cornell, Svante E. "The war against terrorism and the conflict in Chechnya: a case for distinction." The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs 27 (2003): 167.  
- Cortes, Kalena E. "Are refugees different from economic immigrants? Some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of 
immigrant groups in the United States." Review of Economics and Statistics 86.2 (2004): 465-480. 
 204 
- Cortes, Kalena E. "Are refugees different from economic immigrants? Some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of 
immigrant groups in the United States." Review of Economics and Statistics 86.2 (2004): 465-480.  
- Cousineau, D. F., and Jane E. Veevers. "Incarceration as a response to crime: the utilization of Canadian prisons." Canadian 
Journal Criminology & Corrections 14 (1972): 10. 
- Crain, Nicole V., and W. Mark Crain. "Terrorized economies." Public Choice 128.1-2 (2006): 317-349. 
- Crawley, Heaven. "Evidence on Attitudes to Asylum and Immigration: What we know, don't know and need to know." 
(2005). 
- Crawley, Heaven. "Understanding and changing public attitudes: A review of existing evidence from public information and 
communication campaigns." (2009). 
- Crawley, Heaven. Chance or choice? Understanding why asylum seekers come to the UK. Refugee Council, 2011. 
- Cremer, Jacques, Antonio Estache, and Paul Seabright. The decentralization of public services: lessons from the theory of 
the firm. World Bank Publications, 1994. 
- Crisp, Jeff. "A state of insecurity: The political economy of violence in Kenya's refugee camps." African Affairs 99.397 
(2000): 601-632. 
- Cruz, Antonio. Shifting responsibility: carriers' liability in the member states of the European Union and North America. 
Trentham Books and School of Oriental & African Studies, 1995. 
- Cushman, Thomas. Handbook of Human Rights. Routledge, 2012.  
- Czaika, M. 2009 “Asylum cooperation among asymmetric countries: The case of the European Union”, European Union 
Politics, 10(1): 89–113.  
- Czaika, Mathias. "The political economy of refugee migration." Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 229.6 (2009): 
803-824. 
- Czaika, Mathias. The Political Economy of Refugee Migration and Foreign Aid. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  
 
D 
- Dahlman, Carl J. "The problem of externality." The Journal of Law and Economics 22.1 (1979): 141-162. 
- Damm, Anna Piil. "Ethnic enclaves and immigrant labor market outcomes: Quasi-experimental evidence." Journal of Labor 
Economics 27.2 (2009): 281-314. 
- Danish, Kyle. "Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements." Virginia Journal of International Law 37 (1997): 789-810. 
- Davenport, Christian, and David A. Armstrong. "Democracy and the violation of human rights: A statistical analysis from 
1976 to 1996." American Journal of Political Science 48.3 (2004): 538-554. 
- Davenport, Christian. "Human rights and the democratic proposition." Journal of Conflict Resolution 43.1 (1999): 92-116. 
- Davenport, Christina, Will Moore, and Steven Poe. "Sometimes you just have to leave: Domestic threats and forced 
migration, 1964-1989." International Interactions 29.1 (2003): 27-55. 
- David Shelton “Distribution of life assurance, pensions and investment products” in Ennew, Christine, Trevor Watkins, and 
Mike Wright. Cases in marketing financial services. Butterworth-Heinemann, 2014. 
- Davis, Robert C., Edna Erez, and Nancy Avitabile. "Access to justice for immigrants who are victimized: The perspectives 
of police and prosecutors." Criminal Justice Policy Review 12.3 (2001): 183-196. 
- Day, Kate, and Paul White. "Decision making or circumstance: The UK as the location of asylum applications by Bosnian 
and Somali refugees." GeoJournal 56.1 (2002): 15-26. 
- de Clercy, Cristine. "Uncertainty and the General Interest in the American Constitution: Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” 
Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice." Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. Springer International Publishing, 2015. 85-101. 
- De Silva, Arnold. "Earnings of immigrant classes in the early 1980s in Canada: A re-examination." Canadian Public 
Policy/Analyse de Politiques (1997): 179-202.  
- De Soysa, Indra, and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlammanati. "Do pro-market economic reforms drive human rights violations? 
An empirical assessment, 1981–2006." Public Choice 155.1-2 (2013): 163-187.  
- De Vito, Antonio, and Juan-Pedro Gomez. "Estimating the COVID-19 Cash Crunch: Global Evidence and Policy." Available 
at SSRN 3560612 (2020). 
- Deakin, Simon. "Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?." European Law Journal 12.4 
(2006): 440-454. 
- Deardorff, Alan V. "The general validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem." The American Economic Review 72.4 (1982): 
683-694. 
- Dehos, Fabian T. The refugee wave to Germany and its impact on crime. No. 737. Ruhr Economic Papers, 2017. 
- Deković, Maja, Inge B. Wissink, and Anne Marie Meijer. "The role of family and peer relations in adolescent antisocial 
behaviour: comparison of four ethnic groups." Journal of Adolescence 27.5 (2004): 497-514. 
- Del Carpio, Ximena V., and Mathis Wagner. The impact of Syrians refugees on the Turkish labor market. The World Bank, 
2015. 
- Delacrétaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym. "Refugee resettlement." University of Oxford 
Department of Economics Working Paper (2016). 
- Delle Donne, Marcella. Avenues to integration: refugees in contemporary Europe. Impermedium, 1995. 
- Dempster, Helen, and Karen Hargrave. "Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and migrants." London: Overseas 
Development Institute & Chatham House (2017). 
- des Places, Ségolène Barbou, and Bruno Deffains. "Cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition: the case of asylum 
legislation in Europe." International Review of Law and Economics 23.4 (2003): 345-364. 
- Des Places, Ségolène Barbou. Evolution of asylum legislation in the EU: insights from regulatory competition theory. No. 
16. European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS), 2003. 
 205 
- Diller, Janelle Marie. In search of asylum: Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong. Indochina Resourse Action Center, 1988. 
- Dixit, Avinash K. The making of economic policy: A transaction-cost politics perspective. MIT press, 1998. 
- Djajić, Slobodan, and Ross Milbourne. "A general equilibrium model of guest-worker migration: The source-country 
perspective." Journal of International Economics 25.3 (1988): 335-351. 
- Djajić, Slobodan. "Asylum seeking and irregular migration." International Review of Law and Economics 39 (2014): 83-95. 
- Djajić, Slobodan. "Illegal immigration and resource allocation." International Economic Review (1997): 97-117. 
- Docquier, Frédéric, Olivier Lohest, and Abdeslam Marfouk. "Brain drain in developing countries." The World Bank 
Economic Review 21.2 (2007): 193-218. 
- Dolado, Juan J., Rosa Duce, and Juan F. Jimeno. The effects of migration on the relative demand of skilled versus unskilled 
labour: Evidence from Spain. No. 1476. CEPR Discussion Papers, 1996.  
- Doleys, Thomas J. "Promoting competition policy abroad: European Union efforts in the developing world." The Antitrust 
Bulletin 57.2 (2012): 337-366. 
- Doornheim, L., and N. Dijkhoff. Toevlucht zoeken in Nederland (148). Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-en 
Documentatiecentrum, 1995. 
- Doosje, Bertjan, et al. "Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization." Current Opinion in Psychology 11 (2016): 79-84. 
- Dougan, Michael. "Minimum harmonization and the internal market." Common Market Law Review 37 (2000): 853. 
- Downs, George W. "Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation." Michigan Journal of International Law 19 (1997): 
319. 
- Downs, George W., and Michael A. Jones. "Reputation, compliance, and international law." The Journal of Legal 
Studies 31.S1 (2002): S95-S114 
- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. "Is the good news about compliance good news about 
cooperation?." International Organization 50.3 (1996): 379-406. 
- Drakos, Konstantinos, and Andreas Gofas. "In search of the average transnational terrorist attack venue." Defence and Peace 
Economics 17.02 (2006): 73-93.  
- Drakos, Konstantinos, and Andreas Gofas. "The devil you know but are afraid to face: Underreporting bias and its distorting 
effects on the study of terrorism." Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.5 (2006): 714-735. 
- Dreher, Axel, and Justina AV Fischer. "Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical 
analysis." International Economic Review 51.4 (2010): 981-1002. 
- Dreher, Axel, and Martin Gassebner. "Does political proximity to the US cause terror?." Economics Letters 99.1 (2008): 27-
29. 
- Dreher, Axel, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks. "Hit and (they will) run: The impact of terrorism on migration." 
Economics Letters 113.1 (2011): 42-46. 
- Drezner, Daniel W. "Conflict expectations and the paradox of economic coercion." International Studies Quarterly 42.4 
(1998): 709-731. 
- Drury, A. Cooper, and Yitan Li. "US economic sanction threats against China: Failing to leverage better human 
rights." Foreign Policy Analysis 2.4 (2006): 307-324. 
- Duleep, Harriet Orcutt, and Mark C. Regets. "Immigrants and human-capital investment." American Economic Review 89.2 
(1999): 186-191. 
- Duleep, Harriet Orcutt. "Social security and the emigration of immigrants." Social Security and the Emigration of Immigrants 
57 (1994): 37. 
- Dunoff, Jeffrey L., and Joel P. Trachtman. "Economic analysis of international law." Yale Journal of International Law 24 
(1999):1. 
- Dustmann, Christian, and Francesca Fabbri. "Language proficiency and labour market performance of immigrants in the 
UK." The Economic Journal 113.489 (2003): 695-717. 
- Dustmann, Christian, Francesca Fabbri, and Ian Preston. "The impact of immigration on the British labour market." The 
Economic Journal 115.507 (2005). 
- Dustmann, Christian. "Differences in the labor market behavior between temporary and permanent migrant women." Labour 
Economics 4.1 (1997): 29-46. 
- Dustmann, Christian. "Return migration, wage differentials, and the optimal migration duration." European Economic 
Review 47.2 (2003): 353-369. 
 
E 
- Edin, Per-Anders, Peter Fredriksson, and Olof Åslund. "Ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immigrants—Evidence 
from a natural experiment." The quarterly journal of economics 118.1 (2003): 329-357. 
- Efionayi-M ̈ader, Denise, Chimienti, Milena, Dahinden, Janine, Piguet, Etienne (2001), Asyldes- tination Europa: Eine 
Geographie der Asylbewegungen, Zu ̈rich, Seismo Verlag.  
- Efionayi-Mäder, Denise. Asyldestination Europa: eine Geographie der Asylbewegungen. Seismo-Verlag, 2001. 
- Eggert, Wolfgang, Tim Krieger, and Volker Meier. "Education, unemployment and migration." Journal of Public Economics 
94.5 (2010): 354-362. 
- Ehrlich, Isaac. "Participation in illegitimate activities: A theoretical and empirical investigation." The Journal of Political 
Economy (1973): 521-565. 
- Einfeld, Marcus. "Is there a role for compassion in refugee policy." University of New South Wales Law Journal 23 (2000): 
303. 
- Ekey, Amanda. "The Effect of the Refugee Experience on Terrorist Activity." Journal of Politics & International Affairs 4 
(2008): 13-29. 
 206 
- Ekey, Amanda. The Effect of the Refugee Experience on Terrorist Activity: An Investigation of how the Humanitarian 
Refugee Crisis is Impacting Global Terrorism: Honors Thesis. New York University, 2007. 
- Ekmekci, Perihan Elif. "Syrian refugees, health and migration legislation in Turkey." Journal of Immigrant and Minority 
Health 19.6 (2017): 1434-1441. 
- El-Zoghbi, Mayada, et al. The role of financial services in humanitarian crises. World Bank, 2017. 
- Ellickson, Robert C. Public property rights: Vicarious intergovernmental rights and liabilities as a technique for correcting 
intergovernmental spillovers. 1979. 
- Elliott, Kimberly Ann, and Thomas O. Bayard. Reciprocity and retaliation in US trade policy. Peterson Institute Press: All 
Books, 1994. 
- Elliott, Kimberly Ann. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?." International Security 23.1 (1998): 50-65. 
- Entorf, Horst, and Martin Lange. "Refugees welcome? Understanding the regional heterogeneity of anti-foreigner hate crimes 
in Germany." Understanding the Regional Heterogeneity of Anti-Foreigner Hate Crimes in Germany (January 30, 2019). 
ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper 19-005 (2019). 
- Erdil, Aytek, and Haluk Ergin. "What's the matter with tie-breaking? Improving efficiency in school choice." American 
Economic Review 98.3 (2008): 669-89. 
- Erikson, Robert S. "The relationship between public opinion and state policy: A new look based on some forgotten 
data." American Journal of Political Science (1976): 25-36. 
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
- Estache, Antonio. Decentralizing infrastructure: Advantages and limitations. The World Bank, 1995.  
- Estella de Noriega, Antonio. The EU principle of subsidiarity and its critique. Oxford University Press, 2002 
- Esty, Daniel C., and Damien Geradin. "Market access, competitiveness, and harmonization: Environmental protection in 
regional trade agreements." Harvard Environmental Law Review 21 (1997): 265. 
- Esty, Daniel C., and Damien Geradin. Regulatory competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives. Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
- Esveldt, Ingrid, et al. "Migratiemotieven, migratienetwerken en partnerkeuze van Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland." 
Migration motives, migration networks and partner decision making of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands). The 
Hague, NIDI, 1995.  
- Euronews. 2015. Which European countries the most social benefits to migrant? available on line: 
http://www.euronews.com/2015/09/16/which-european-countries-offer-the-most-social-benefits-to-migrants/ accessed on 
April 30th, 2020. 
- European Commission, Relocation: Commission refers the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Court of Justice, 
available on line: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5002_en.htm accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- European Commission, Safe countries of origin Proposed common EU list, 2015, available on-line 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-569008-Safe-countries-of-origin-FINAL.pdf accessed on April 30th, 
2020. 
- European Commission. 2007. Green Paper on the Future Common Asylum System. 
- European Commission. 2016. An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis: A Macroeconomic Assessment for the EU, available 
on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/ip033_en_2.pdf accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- European Commission. 2016. Eu budged for the Refugee Crisis, available on-line http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/eu_budget_for_the_refugee_crisis_20160210_en.pdf accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- European Commission. 2018. Trade report comparison per year, available on-line: https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/8ac98104-
0aae-46a8-acea-396c9a36bfd2/EDW%20-%20ITI%20TEX%20-
%20Trade%20YTD%20Report%20NC%20Product%203rd%20Level%20Groups%20-%2009%20September%20-
%20Textiles.pdf, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- European Council on Refugees and Exile and Amnesty International: see European Council on Refugees and Exile, Position 
on the Interpretation of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention (2000). 
- European Council on Refugees and Exiles. 2016. The Road out of Dublin: Reform of the Dublin Regulation (Policy Note 
#02), available on-line: https://www.ecre.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/10/Policy-Note-02.pdf, accessed on April 30th, 
2020. 
- European Parliament. 2017. Reform of the Dublin System. Briefing: EU Legislation in Progress, available on-line: 
- European Union. The history of the European Union, available on line: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/history_en accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat, Asylum Statistics. 2019. Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2008–2018 available on line: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Decisions_on_asylum_applications accessed 
on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2017. Asylum statistics, available on line: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Asylum_statistics accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2018. Asylum decisions in the EU: EU Member States granted protection to more than half a million asylum seekers 
in 2017, available on-line: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8817675/3-19042018-AP-EN.pdf/748e8fae-
2cfb-4e75-a388-f06f6ce8ff58 accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2018. Data & Trends, EU Food & Drink Industry, available on-line: 
https://www.fooddrinkeurope.eu/uploads/publications_documents/FoodDrinkEurope_Data_and_Trends_2018_FINAL.pdf, 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2019. Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2008–2018 (thousands), available on-line: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Asylum_applications_(non-EU)_in_the_EU-
28_Member_States,_2008–2018_(thousands)_YB19_3.png accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
 207 
- Eurostat. 2019. Asylum Applications, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Countries_of_destination:_Germany.2C_Italy_and_France_the_main accessed on 
April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2019. Asylum statistics, Age and gender of first-time applicants on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Age_and_gender_of_first-time_applicants accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2019. Asylum statistics, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics accessed in April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2019. Asylum statistics, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2019. Statistical Factsheet, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-farming-
fisheries/farming/documents/agri-statistical-factsheet-eu_en.pdf , accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2020. Asylum statistics, available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Eurostat. 2020. First instance decisions on asylum applications , available on-line: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Decisions_on_asylum_applications, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- EXCOM. 1997. Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum No. 82 (XLVIII). 
 
F 
- Facchini, Giovanni, Oliver Lorz, and Gerald Willmann. "Asylum seekers in Europe: The warm glow of a hot potato." Journal 
of Population Economics 19.2 (2006): 411-430. 
- Farer, Tom J. "How the international system copes with involuntary migration: Norms, institutions and state practice." 
Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995): 72. 
- Fasani, FM, Christian Dustmann, and Biagio Speciale. "Illegal migration and consumption behavior of immigrant 
households." Journal of the European Economic Association (2016). 
- Fassmann, Heinz, and Rainer Münz. "European east-west migration, 1945–1992." International Migration Review 28.3 
(1994): 520-538. 
- Fatire, Michael. "Harmonisation of environmental law and market integration: harmonising for the wrong 
reasons?." European Energy and Environmental Law Review 7.6 (1998): 169-175. 
- Faure, Michael. “Regulatory Competition vs Harmonization in EU Environmental Law” in Esty, Daniel C., and Damien 
Geradin. Regulatory competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
- Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter. "Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social 
norms." Human nature 13.1 (2002): 1-25.  
- Fellner, William. Contemporary Economic Problems. American Enterprise Institute, 1979. 
- Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús, and Hillel Rapoport. "Tradable refugee-admission quotas and EU asylum policy." CESifo 
Economic Studies 61.3-4 (2015): 638-672. 
- Fiala, Nathan. The consequences of forced displacement in Northern Uganda. Households in Conflict Network, 2009. 
- Filer, Randall. "The effect of immigrant arrivals on migratory patterns of native workers." Immigration and the workforce: 
Economic consequences for the United States and source areas. University of Chicago Press, 1992.  
- Findlay, Ronald, and Kevin H. O'rourke. Power and plenty: trade, war, and the world economy in the second millennium. 
Princeton University Press, 2009. 
- Fischer-Lescano, Andreas, Tillmann Löhr, and Timo Tohidipur. "Border controls at sea: Requirements under international 
human rights and refugee law." International Journal of Refugee Law 21.2 (2009): 256-296. 
- Fitzpatrick, Joan. "Temporary protection of refugees: elements of a formalized regime." American Journal of International 
Law 94.2 (2000): 279-306. 
- Foster, Michelle. International refugee law and socio-economic rights: refuge from deprivation. Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
- Franck, Thomas M. Fairness in international law and institutions. Oxford University Press, 1998. 
- Franck, Thomas M., and Thomas M. Franck. The power of legitimacy among nations. Oxford University Press on Demand, 
1990. 
- Francois, Joseph F., Bradley McDonald, and Hakan Nordstrom. "The Uruguay Round: a numerically based qualitative 
assessment." The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries(1996): 253-291. 
- Frey, Bruno S. "Direct democracy: politico-economic lessons from Swiss experience." The American Economic Review 84.2 
(1994): 338-342. 
- Frey, Bruno S., and Heinz Buhofer. "Prisoners and property rights." The Journal of Law and Economics 31.1 (1988): 19-46. 
- Frey, Bruno S., and Reiner Eichenberger. "FOCJ: Creating a single European market for governments." Constitutional Law 
and Economics of the European Union, Aldershot, England (1997): 195-215.  
- Frey, Bruno S., and Simon Luechinger. "Decentralization as a Disincentive for Terror." European Journal of Political 
Economy 20.2 (2004): 509-515. 
- Frey, Bruno S., Simon Luechinger, and Alois Stutzer. "The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of 
terrorism." Public Choice 138.3-4 (2009): 317-345. 
- Frey, Bruno, and Lawrence J. Lau. "Towards a mathematical model of government behaviour." Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie 28.3-4 (1968): 355-380. 
- Freytag, Andreas, et al. "The origins of terrorism: Cross-country estimates of socio-economic determinants of terrorism." 
European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011): S5-S16. 
- Friedberg, Rachel M. "The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116.4 
(2001): 1373-1408. 
 208 
- Frowein, Jochen Abr, and Wolfgang Peukert. Europäische menschenrechtskonvention: EMRK-kommentar. Engel Verlag, 
1996. 
 
G 
- Galston, William A. "What Americans really think about the Syrian refugee crisis." (2016). 
- Gareth T. Davies, Subsidiarityas a Method ofPolicy Centralisation14 (Int'l Law Forum of the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, 
Research Chapter 11-06, 2005), available on-line: http://chapters.ssm.com/sol3/ chapters.cfm?abstractid-921454 accessed 
on April 30th, 2020. 
- Garoupa, Nuno, Jonathan Klick, and Francesco Parisi. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism." Public 
Choice 128.1-2 (2006): 147-168. 
- Gehrsitz, Markus, and Martin Ungerer. "Jobs, crime, and votes: A short-run evaluation of the refugee crisis in Germany." 
(2017). 
- Georgas, James, et al. "Functional relationships in the nuclear and extended family: A 16‐culture study." International 
Journal of Psychology 36.5 (2001): 289-300. 
- Georgas, James. "Family: Variations and changes across cultures." Online readings in psychology and culture 6.3 (2003): 
2307-0919. 
- Getmansky, Anna, Tolga Sınmazdemir, and Thomas Zeitzoff. "Refugees, xenophobia, and domestic conflict: Evidence from 
a survey experiment in Turkey." Journal of Peace Research 55.4 (2018): 491-507. 
- Gibney, Mark, Clair Apodaca, and James McCann. "Refugee Flows, the Internally Displaced, and Political Violence (1980-
1993): An Exploratory Analysis." Whither Refugee (1996): 45-66. 
- Gilbert, Alan, and Khalid Koser. "Coming to the UK: what do asylum-seekers know about the UK before arrival?." Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32.7 (2006): 1209-1225. 
- Gilligan, Michael J. Empowering exporters: reciprocity, delegation, and collective action in American trade policy. No. 8. 
University of Michigan Press, 1997. 
- Global Terrorism Database. 2017. Global Terrorism in 2017, available on-line: 
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_Overview2017_July2018.pdf accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. "Moral and legal rhetoric in international relations: a rational choice perspective." 
The Journal of Legal Studies 31.S1 (2002): S115-S139. 
- Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. The limits of international law. Oxford University Press, 2005. 
- Goldsmith, Jack Landman, and Eric A. Posner. "Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice 
Perspective." U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper108 (2000). 
- Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. "How to influence states: Socialization and international human rights law." Duke Law 
Journal 54 (2004): 621. 
- Goodwin-Gill, G. S. and J. McAdam. The Refugee in International Law. Oxford, 2007. 
- Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., and Jane McAdam. The refugee in international law. Oxford University Press, 2007. 
- Goodwin-Gill, Guy. "Forced migration: Refugees, rights and security." Forced migration, human rights and security (2008): 
1-18. 
- Gowa, Joanne, and Edward D. Mansfield. "Power politics and international trade." American Political Science Review 87.2 
(1993): 408-420. 
- Gowa, Joanne. Allies, adversaries, and international trade. Princeton University Press, 1995. 
- Grahl-Madsen, Atle. Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention (Articles 2-11, 13-37). UNHCR, 1997. 
- Greenaway, David, and Douglas R. Nelson. "The distinct political economies of trade and migration policy: through the 
window of endogenous policy models, with a focus on North America." Labor Mobility and the World Economy. Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006. 295-327. 
- Greenwood, Michael J. "Internal migration in developed countries." Handbook of Population and Family Economics 1 
(1997): 647-720. 
- Greer, Steven. The European Convention on Human Rights: achievements, problems and prospects. Cambridge University 
Press, 2006.  
- Greig, Donald W. "The protection of refugees and customary International Law." The Australian Year Book of International 
Law Online 8.1 (1983): 108-141.  
- Grenier, Gilles. "The effects of language characteristics on the wages of Hispanic-American males." Journal of Human 
Resources (1984): 35-52. 
- Grzeszick B. Hoheitskonzept – Wettbewerbskonzept. In J. Isensee, & P. Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts. C.F. 
Müller, 2003. 
- Gudbrandsen, Frøy. "Partisan influence on immigration: The case of Norway." Scandinavian Political Studies 33.3 (2010): 
248-270. 
- Guild, Elspeth. "The Europeanisation of Europe's asylum policy." International Journal of Refugee Law 18.3-4 (2006): 630-
651. 
- Gunnar, Myrdal. "Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity." (1957). 
- Gurak, Douglas T., and Fee Caces. "Migration networks and the shaping of migration systems." International migration 
systems: A global approach (1992): 150-176. 
- Gurr, Ted Robert. Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century. US Institute of Peace Press, 2000. 
- Guzman, Andrew T. "A compliance-based theory of international law." California Law Review 90 (2002): 1823. 
- Guzman, Andrew T. How international law works: a rational choice theory. Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
 209 
H 
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. "Human rights in a globalizing world: The paradox of empty 
promises." American Journal of Sociology 110.5 (2005): 1373-1411. 
- Hämäläinen, K., and M. Sarvimäki. "Moving Immigrants from Welfare to Work: The Impact of an Integration Program." 
unpublished paper, Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT), Helsinki (2008). 
- Hamburger, Henry. Games as models of social phenomena. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
- Harding, Jeremy. The uninvited: refugees at the rich man's gate. Profile and the London Review of Books, 2000.  
- Harrison, Glenn W., Thomas F. Rutherford, and David G. Tarr. "Quantifying the Uruguay round." The Economic 
Journal 107.444 (1997): 1405-1430. 
- Hartog, Joop, and Aslan Zorlu. "How important is homeland education for refugees’ economic position in The Netherlands?." 
Journal of Population Economics 22.1 (2009): 219-246. 
- Harvey, C. J. "Gender, Refugee law and the Politics of Interpretation." International Journal of Refugee Law 12.4 (2000): 
680-694. 
- Harvey, Philip. "Human rights and economic policy discourse: Taking economic and social rights seriously." Columbian 
Human Rights Law Review 33 (2001): 363. 
- Hassan, Nasra. "Letter from Gaza: An arsenal of believers." The New Yorker 19 (2001). 
- Hathaway, James C. "A reconsideration of the underlying premise of refugee law." International Refugee Law. Routledge, 
2017. 65-119. 
- Hathaway, James C. "The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920—1950." International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 33.2 (1984): 348-380. 
- Hathaway, James C. The law of refugee status. Butterworths, 1991. 
- Hathaway, James C. The rights of refugees under international law. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
- Hathaway, James C., and Colin J. Harvey. "Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder." Immigration and 
Nationality Law Review 22 (2001): 191. 
- Hathaway, James C., and William S. Hicks. "Is There A Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention's Requirement of 
Well-Founded Fear." Michigan Journal of International Law 26 (2004): 505. 
- Hathaway, Oona A. "Do human rights treaties make a difference?." The Yale Law Journal 111.8 (2002): 1935-2042. 
- Hathaway, Oona A. "Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.4 (2007): 588-
621. 
- Hatton, Timothy J. "Seeking asylum in Europe." Economic Policy19.38 (2004): 6-62. 
- Hatton, Timothy J. "Should we have a WTO for international migration?." Economic Policy 22.50 (2007): 340-383. 
- Hatton, Timothy J. "The rise and fall of asylum: What happened and why?." The Economic Journal 119.535 (2009): F183-
F213. 
- Hatton, Timothy J. (2004), “Seeking Asylum in Europe”, Economic Policy, 19 (38), 5-62. 
- Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. Refugees, asylum seekers, and policy in Europe. Springer, 2006. 249-284. 
- Havinga, Tetty, and Anita Böcker. "Country of asylum by decision making or by chance: Asylum‐seekers in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25.1 (1999): 43-61. 
- Hayek, Friedrich August. "The use of knowledge in society." The American Economic Review 35.4 (1945): 519-530. 
- Heath, A., and Richards, L. (2016) Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents: Topline Results from Round 7 of 
the European Social Survey. London: European Social Survey ERIC. 
- Hein, Jeremy. "Refugees, immigrants, and the state." Annual Review of Sociology 19.1 (1993): 43-59.  
- Heinisch, Reinhard. "Right-wing populism in Austria: A case for comparison." Problems of Post-Communism 55.3 (2008): 
40-56. 
- Helfer, Laurence R. "Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the 
European human rights regime." European Journal of International Law 19.1 (2008): 125-159.  
- Helton, Arthur C., and Eliana Jacobs. "What is Forced Migration." Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 13 (1998): 521. 
- Henderson, Conway W. "Population pressures and political repression." Social Science Quarterly 74.2 (1993): 322-33. 
- Henkin, Louis. "International law: politics and values." Developments in International Law 18 (1995). 
- Heringa, Aalt Willem, and Philipp Kiiver. "Constitutions compared. An introduction to comparative constitutional law." Ius 
Commune Europaeum 104 (2012). 
- Heyns, Christof H., and Frans Viljoen. The impact of the United Nations human rights treaties on the domestic level. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2002. 
- Higgins, Rosalyn. "Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some Thoughts Upon Parting." European Human Rights 
Law Review (1996): 570-582. 
- Hirsch, Boris, and Elke J. Jahn. "Is there monopsonistic discrimination against immigrants?." ILR Review 68.3 (2015): 501-
528. 
- Hoekman, Bernard, and Aaditya Mattoo. "Liberalizing trade in services: lessons from regional and WTO 
negotiations." International Negotiation 18.1 (2013): 131-151. 
- Holborn, Louise Wilhelmine. The international refugee organization, A specialized agency of the United Nations: Its history 
and work, 1946-1952. Oxford University Press, 1956. 
- Holmes, Stephen, and Cass R. Sunstein. The cost of rights: why liberty depends on taxes. WW Norton & Company, 2000. 
- Holzer T, Schneider G and Widmer T (2000) The impact of legislative deterrence measures  
- Holzer, Thomas, Gerald Schneider, and Thomas Widmer. "Discriminating Decentralization Federalism and the Handling of 
Asylum Applications in Switzerland, 1988-1996." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44.2 (2000): 250-276. 
- Holzer, Thomas, Gerald Schneider, and Thomas Widmer. "The impact of legislative deterrence measures on the number of 
asylum applications in Switzerland (1986–1995)." International Migration Review 34.4 (2000): 1182-1216. 
 210 
- Hoque, Ashikul, et al. "The Effect of Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the Tourism Industry in China." Asian Journal of 
Multidisciplinary Studies 3.1 (2020). 
- Horgan, John. "From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into 
terrorism." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618.1 (2008): 80-94. 
- House, Freedom. "Nations in Transit 2017-Hungary." Democracy 3.3.75 (2017): 4-00. 
- Howard, Marc Morjé. "The impact of the far right on citizenship policy in Europe: explaining continuity and change." Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36.5 (2010): 735-751. 
- Huang, Yue, and Michael Kvasnicka. "Immigration and Crimes against Natives: The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Germany." 
(2019). 
- Hudec, Robert E. Enforcing international trade law: The evolution of the modern GATT legal system. MICHIE, 1993. 
- Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current 
policy. Peterson Institute, 1990. 
- Hugo, Graeme J. "Villae-community ties, village nirms and ethnic networks: a review of evidence from the Third 
world." Migration decision making: Multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing 
countries. (1981): 186-224. 
- Hulshof, M. E., Lia de Ridder, and P. J. Krooneman. Asielzoekers in Nederland. Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, 1992. 
- Human Rights Watch, 2001. International Catholic Migration Committee and the World Council of Churches, NGO 
Background Paper on the Refugee and Migration Interface.  
- Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war." American 
Journal of Political Science 52.2 (2008): 436-455. 
- Hunt, J. (1992). ‘The impact of the 1962 repatriates from Algeria on the French labor market’, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 45, 556–72. 
- Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, 1996. 
- Hurwitz, Agnes, and Agnès G. Hurwitz. The collective responsibility of states to protect refugees. Oxford University Press 
on Demand, 2009. 
- Hyman, David N. Public finance: A contemporary application of theory to policy. Cengage Learning, 2014. 
 
I 
- International Association for the study of Forced Migration, Mission of the IASFM, available on-line http://iasfm.org 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- International Monetary Fund. 2016. The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges.  
- International Organization for Migration, World Migration, 2003: Managing Migration: Challenges and Responses for 
People on the Move. IOM, 2003. 
- International Rescue Committee. 2020. COVID-19 threatens refugee camps, available on-line:  
https://www.rescue.org/covid-19-threatens-refugee-camps accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- IOM (2015) How the world views migration. Paris: International Organization for Migration. 
- Ipsos, M. O. R. I. "Global views on immigration and the refugee crisis." London: Ipsos MORI (2016).  
- Irwin, Douglas A. "The GATT in historical perspective." The American economic review 85.2 (1995): 323-328. 
- Izrailev, Mikhail. "A New Normative Approach for the Grant of Asylum in Cases of Non-State Actor Persecution." Cardozo 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 19 (2011): 171.  
 
J 
- Jackson, Ivor C. "1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis for Protection, The." International 
Journal of Refugee Law 3 (1991): 403. 
- Jackson, Ivor C. The refugee concept in group situations. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999. 
- Jacobsen, Karen. "Can refugees benefit the state? Refugee resources and African statebuilding." The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 40.4 (2002): 577-596. 
- Jacobsen, Karen. "Factors influencing the policy responses of host governments to mass refugee influxes." International 
Migration Review (1996): 655-678. 
- Jaeger, Gilbert. "On the history of the international protection of refugees." International Review of the Red Cross 83.843 
(2001): 727-738. 
- Jaeger, Gilbert. "Refugee Asylum: Policy and Legislative Developments." International Migration Review 15.1-2 (1981): 
52-68. 
- Jastram, Kate. "The Kids Before Khadr: Haitian Refugee Children on Guantanamo: A comment on Richard J. Wilson's Omar 
Khadr: Domestic and International Litigation Strategies for a Child in Armed Conflict Held at Guantanamo." Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 11 (2012): 81. 
- Jenkins, Rob. The UN Peace-building Commission and the Dissemination of International Norms. Crisis States Research 
Centre, 2008. 
- Jennissen, Roel, and Leo van Wissen. "The distribution of asylum seekers over Northern and Western European countries, 
1985-2005." Genus 71.1 (2015). 
- Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the security dilemma." World politics 30.2 (1978): 167-214. 
- Johansson, Ruhe. "The refugee experience in Europe after World War II: some theoretical and empirical considerations." The 
Uprooted: Forced migration as international problem in the post-war era (1990): 227-269. 
- Joly, Danièle, Lynette Kelly, and Clive Nettleton. Refugees in Europe: The hostile new agenda. No. 5. Minority Rights 
Group, 1997. 
 211 
- Jordan, Richard, et al. "One discipline or many? TRIP survey of international relations faculty in ten countries." The College 
of William and Mary, 2009. 
- Juma, Monica Kathina. Asylum and the Politics of Humanitarian Assistance in East Africa. Cambridge University Press, 
2000. 
- Juss, Satvinder Singh. "Terrorism and the Exclusion of Refugee Status in the UK." Journal of Conflict & Security Law 17.3 
(2012): 465-499. 
- Just, Richard E., and Sinaia Netanyahu. Conflict and cooperation on trans-boundary water resources. Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2012. 
 
K 
- Kaddoura, Yousef. "Crime, Refugees and Politics In Sweden." (2019). 
- Kailitz, Steffen. Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft. Springer-Verlag, 2008. 
- Kamminga, Menno T. "State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties." European Journal of International Law 7 
(1996): 469-484.  
- Kancs, d'Artis, and Patrizio Lecca. "Long‐term social, economic and fiscal effects of immigration into the EU: The role of 
the integration policy." The World Economy 41.10 (2018): 2599-2630. 
- Kaushal, Asha, and Catherine Dauvergne. "The growing culture of exclusion: Trends in Canadian refugee 
exclusions." International Journal of Refugee Law 23.1 (2011): 54-92. 
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. "Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics." 
International Social Science Journal 51.159 (1999): 89-101. 
- Keefer, Philip, and Norman Loayza. Terrorism, economic development, and political openness. Cambridge University Press, 
2008. 
- Keith, Linda Camp. "The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it make a difference in 
human rights behavior?." Journal of Peace Research 36.1 (1999): 95-118. 
- Keller, Stephen L. Uprooting and social change: The role of refugees in development. Manohar Book Service, 1975. 
- Kelley, Judith G., and Jon CW Pevehouse. "An opportunity cost theory of US treaty behavior." International Studies 
Quarterly 59.3 (2015): 531-543. 
- Kelsen, Hans. Pure theory of law. Univ of California Press, 1967. 
- Kennan, John, and James R. Walker. "Wages, welfare benefits and migration." Journal of Econometrics 156.1 (2010): 229-
238. 
- Kennedy, Paul. The rise and fall of the great powers. Vintage, 2010. 
- Kesten, Onur. "School choice with consent." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125.3 (2010): 1297-1348. 
- Khashan, Hilal. "Collective Palestinian frustration and suicide bombings." Third World Quarterly 24.6 (2003): 1049-1067. 
- Kirchhof, Pail. Gemeinwohl und Wettbewerb. C.F. Müller, 2005. 
- Kirchhof, Paul. "Freiheitlicher Wettbewerb und staatliche Autonomie-Solidarität." ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 56 (2005): 39-45. 
- Kirmayer, Laurence J., et al. "Common mental health problems in immigrants and refugees: general approach in primary 
care." Cmaj 183.12 (2011): E959-E967. 
- Kirshner, Jonathan. "The microfoundations of economic sanctions." Security Studies 6.3 (1997): 32-64. 
- Kissinger, Henry, and Vera Wellings. American foreign policy. Royal Victorian Institute for the Blind Tertiary Resource 
Service, 1977. 
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J. McGann. The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. University of 
Michigan Press, 1997. 
- Klemme, Marvin. The inside story of UNRRA: an experience in internationalism; a first hand report on the displaced people 
of Europe. Lifetime Editions, 1949. 
- Klinthäll, Martin. Immigration, integration and return migration. International symposium on international migration and 
development. United Nations Secretariat, 2006. 
- Kneebone, Susan. Refugees, asylum seekers and the rule of law: Comparative perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
- Koch, Michael T., and Skyler Cranmer. "Testing the “Dick Cheney” hypothesis: do governments of the left attract more 
terrorism than governments of the right?." Conflict Management and Peace Science 24.4 (2007): 311-326. 
- Koeppinghoff, Georg. "Why Dublin Fails: The Prisoner's Dilemma in Europe's Responsibility-Allocation for 
Refugees." Available at SSRN 3229767 (2018). 
- Koh, Harold Hongju. "The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. By Chayes Abram and 
Chayes Antonia Handler. Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1995." American Journal of International Law 
91.2 (1997): 389-391. 
- Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. "Illicit Return Practices of Irregular Migrants from Greece to Turkey." International 
Journal of Law and Political Sciences 14.1: 45-51. 
- Koka, Enkelejda, and Denard Veshi. "Irregular Migration by Sea: Interception and Rescue Interventions in Light of 
International Law and the EU Sea Borders Regulation." European Journal of Migration and Law 21.1 (2019): 26-52. 
- Koremenos, Barbara, International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation (November 2009). IBEI 
Working Papers 2009/27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1511746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1511746. 
- Koremenos, Barbara. "Contracting around international uncertainty." American Political Science Review 99.4 (2005): 549-
565.  
- Koremenos, Barbara. "Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility." International 
organization 55.2 (2001): 289-325. 
 212 
- Koser and Pinkerton. The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum. 
Home Office, 2002. 
- Koser, Khalid. "Asylum policies, trafficking, and vulnerability." International Migration 38.3 (2000): 91-111. 
- Koser, Khalid. "Out of the frying pan and into the fire: a case study of illegality amongst asylum seekers." The New Migration 
in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.  
- Koser, Khalid. "Social networks and the asylum cycle: The case of Iranians in the Netherlands." International Migration 
Review 31.3 (1997): 591-611. 
- Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. "Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern anxieties." Leiden Journal of 
International Law 15.3 (2002): 553-579. 
- Koskenniemi, Martti. Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of 
international law: report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission. Erik Castren Institute, 2007. 
- Krahn, Harvey, et al. "Educated and underemployed: Refugee integration into the Canadian labour market." Journal of 
International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale 1.1 (2000): 59-84. 
- Kremer, Michael, Ryan Bubb, and David Levine. "The Economics of International Refugee Law." Journal of Legal Studies 
40.2 (2011). 
- Krieger, Tim, and Daniel Meierrieks. "What causes terrorism?." Public Choice 147.1-2 (2011): 3-27. 
- Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Malečková. "Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 17.4 (2003): 119-144.  
- Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: is there a causal connection?. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002.  
- Krueger, Alan, and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, ‘‘A Statistical Analysis of Crime against Foreigners in Unified Germany,’’ Journal 
of Human Resources 32:1 (1997), 182–209.  
- Krugman, Paul. "Competitiveness: a dangerous obsession." Foreign Affairs (1994): 28-44. 
- Kunz, Egon F. "Part II: The Analytic Framework: Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory." International Migration Review 
15.1-2 (1981): 42-51.  
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Mogens K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen. "The political economy of freedom, democracy and 
transnational terrorism." Public Choice 128.1-2 (2006): 289-315. 
 
L 
- La Porta, Rafael, and Andrei Shleifer. "Informality and development." Journal of Economic Perspectives 28.3 (2014): 109-
2 
- La Violette, Nicole. "‘UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’: a 
Critical Commentary." International Journal of Refugee Law 22.2 (2010): 173-208. 
- Lacy, Dean, and Emerson MS Niou. "A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: The roles of preferences, 
information, and threats." The Journal of Politics 66.1 (2004): 25-42. 
- Lai, Brian. "“Draining the Swamp”: An Empirical Examination of the Production of International Terrorism, 1968—
1998." Conflict Management and Peace Science 24.4 (2007): 297-310. 
- Lambert, Hélène. "The conceptualisation of persecution by the House of Lords: Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department." International Journal of Refugee Law 13.1-2 (2001): 16. 
- Lauterpacht, Elihu and Daniel Bethlehe. The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion. Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
- Lavenex, Sandra. "The Europeanization of refugee policies: Normative challenges and institutional legacies." JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 39.5 (2001): 851-874. 
- Law, Ian, et al. "The effect of ethnicity on claiming benefits: evidence from Chinese and Bangladeshi communities." Benefits 
9 (1994): 7-11. 
- Lee, Eric Yong-Joong. "National and International Legal Concerns regarding Recent North Korean Escapees." International 
Journal of Refugee Law 13.1-2 (2001): 142. 
- Leebron, David W. Lying down with Procrustes: An analysis of harmonization claims. Center for Law and Economic Studies, 
1995. 
- Legomsky, Stephen H. "Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State." University California Los Angeles Law Review 42 
(1994): 1453. 
- Leise, Eric. "Germany to Regularize ‘Tolerated’Asylum Seekers." Migration Information Source 5 (2007). 
- Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. "An institutional theory of sanctions onset and success." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution51.6 (2007): 848-871. 
- Lenaerts, Koen, and Patrick van Ypersele. "Le principe de subsidiarité et son contexte: étude de l'article 3B du Traité 
CE." Cahiers de Droit Européen 30.1 (1994): 3-85. 
- Letsas, George. "Strasbourg's interpretive ethic: lessons for the international lawyer." European Journal of International Law 
21.3 (2010): 509-541. 
- Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. "Economic globalization and transnational terrorism: A pooled time-series analysis." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 48.2 (2004): 230-258. 
- Li, Quan. "Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents?." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49.2 (2005): 
278-297. 
- Lianos, Theodore P., Alexander H. Sarris, and Louka T. Katseli. "Illegal immigration and local labour markets: The case of 
Northern Greece." International Migration 34.3 (1996): 449-484. 
- Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. Dangerous sanctuaries: refugee camps, civil war, and the dilemmas of humanitarian aid. Cornell 
University Press, 2015. 
 213 
- Loescher, Gil, Alexander Betts, and James Milner Seymour, Claudia. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the Twenty-first Century. Routledge,  2008. 
- Loescher, Gil, Alexander Betts, and James Milner. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The 
politics and practice of refugee protection into the 21st century. Routledge, 2008. 
- Long, Andrew G. "Defense pacts and international trade." Journal of Peace Research 40.5 (2003): 537-552.  
- Lucas, Robert EB. Internal migration in developing countries: handbook of population and family economics. Boston 
University, 1994. 
- Lundborg, Per, and Per Skedinger. "Employer attitudes towards refugee immigrants: Findings from a Swedish survey." 
International Labour Review 155.2 (2016): 315-337. 
- Lundborg, Per, and Per Skedinger. "Minimum wages and the integration of refugee immigrants." (2014). 
- Lusztig, Michael. The limits of protectionism: Building coalitions for free trade. University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2004. 
- Lutz, P., Kaufmann, D., Stünzi, A., & Egli, S. (2016). Gefangen im Dublin-Dilemma: Wie kann die europäische Asylpolitik 
reformiert werden? (Diskussionspapier NR.32/November 2016).  
 
M 
- MacDonald, R. St J., Franz Matscher, and Herbert Petzold, eds. The European system for the protection of human rights. 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1993. 
- Mackaay, Ejan, and Violette Leblanc. «The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract» prepared for the 
conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Nancy, France, 18-20 September 2003. 
- MacRae, Duncan, and James A. Wilde. Policy analysis for public decisions. Brooks/Cole, 1979, p. 13 
- Maheswaran, Durairaj. "Country of origin as a stereotype: Effects of consumer expertise and attribute strength on product 
evaluations." Journal of consumer research 21.2 (1994): 354-365. 
- Maiani, Francesco. The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation. Parlement européen, 2016;  
- Majone, Giandomenico. Deregulation or re-regulation?: regulatory reform in Europe and the United States. Burns & 
Oates, 1990. 
- Mammone, Andrea. "The eternal return? Faux populism and contemporarization of neo-fascism across Britain, France and 
Italy." Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17.2 (2009): 171-192. 
- Manning, Alan, and Sanchari Roy. "Culture clash or culture club? National identity in Britain." (2010): F72-F100. 
- Marbach, Moritz, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner. "The long-term impact of employment bans on the economic 
integration of refugees." Science advances 4.9 (2018): eaap9519. 
- Marceau, Gabrielle. "A Call for Coherence in International Law—Praises for the Prohibition Against" Clinical Isolation" in 
WTO Dispute Settlement." Journal of World Trade 33.5 (1999): 87-152. 
- Marcus, David. "Famine crimes in international law." American Journal of International Law 97.2 (2003): 245-281. 
- Martens, Kerstin. "An appraisal of Amnesty International's work at the United Nations: Established areas of activities and 
shifting priorities since the 1990s." Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 1050. 
- Martin, David A., ed. The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s: The Ninth Sokol Colloquium on International 
Law. Vol. 10. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988. 
- Martin, Susan F. Global migration trends and asylum. UNHCR, 2001 
- Martin, Susan F. New Issues in Refugee Research. No. 41. Working paper, 2001. 
- Massa, Isabella. Untangling the data–Assessing the accuracy of official refugee-related costs in Europe. Overseas 
Development Institute, 2016. 
- Massey, D. "1990: Social structure, household strategies, and the cumulative causation of migration. Population Index 56, 
3-26." (1990). 
- Massey, Douglas S. "Do undocumented migrants earn lower wages than legal immigrants? New evidence from Mexico." 
International Migration Review 21.2 (1987): 236-274. 
- Massey, Douglas S. "The social and economic origins of immigration." The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 510.1 (1990): 60-72. 
- Massey, Douglas S., and Felipe García España. "The social process of international migration." Science 237.4816 (1987): 
733-738. 
- Massey, Douglas S., and Rene M. Zenteno. "The dynamics of mass migration." Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 96.9 (1999): 5328-5335. 
- Massey, Douglas S., et al. "Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal." Population and Development 
Review 19.3 (1993): 431-466. 
- Massey, Douglas S., et al. "Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal." Population and development 
review(1993): 431-466.  
- Massey, Douglas S., et al. "Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal." Population and development 
review(1993): 431-466. 
- Masterson, Daniel, and Vasil Yasenov. "Does Halting Refugee Resettlement Reduce Crime? Evidence from the United States 
Refugee Ban." (2018). 
- Mastrobuoni, Giovanni and Pinotti, Paolo, Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment (July 21, 2011). FEEM Working Paper No. 53.2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1891689 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1891689 
- Mattei, Ugo. "Efficiency in legal transplants: An essay in comparative law and economics." International Review of Law and 
Economics 14.1 (1994): 3-19. 
- Mattei, Ugo. Comparative law and economics. University of Michigan Press, 1997. 
 214 
- Mattiacci, Giuseppe Dari, and Francesco Parisi. "The cost of delegated control: vicarious liability, secondary liability and 
mandatory insurance." International Review of Law and Economics 23.4 (2003): 453-475. 
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?." European 
Economic Review 49.6 (2005): 1393-1430. 
- Maystadt, Jean-François, and Philip Verwimp. "Winners and losers among a refugee-hosting population." Economic 
development and cultural change 62.4 (2014): 769-809.  
- McDermid, Eric J., and David F. Manlove. "Keeping partners together: algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem 
with couples." Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 19.3 (2010): 279-303. 
- McHugh, Lois B., et al. "Kosovo: Refugee Assistance and Temporary Resettlement." Congressional Research Service, The 
Library of Congress, 1999. 
- McLaughlin, K., and J. Kilner. "Danish aid workers stay away from Muslim ceremony." Reuters. (2006): 1968-2008. 
- Menjívar, Cecilia. "History, economy and politics: Macro and micro-level factors in recent Salvadorean migration to the 
US." Journal of Refugee Studies 6.4 (1993): 350-371.  
- Merrills, John Graham, and Arthur Henry Robertson. Human rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Manchester University Press, 2001. 
- Mertus, Julie. "The state and the post-Cold War refugee regime: new models, new questions." International Journal of 
Refugee Law 10.3 (1998): 321-348. 
- Milner, Helen V. Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations. Princeton University 
Press, 1997. 
- Milner, James. Sharing the security burden: Towards the convergence of refugee protection and state security. Refugee 
Study Center, 2000. 
- Milton, Daniel, Megan Spencer, and Michael Findley. "Radicalism of the hopeless: Refugee flows and transnational 
terrorism." International Interactions 39.5 (2013): 621-645. 
- Mirza, Daniel, and Thierry Verdier. "International trade, security and transnational terrorism: Theory and a survey of 
empirics." Journal of Comparative Economics 36.2 (2008): 179-194. 
- Mócsy, István I. The Uprooted: Hungarian Refugees and Their Impact on Hungary's Domestic Politics, 1918-1921. East 
European Monographs, 1983. 
- Moe, Terry M. "The new economics of organization." American Journal of Political Science (1984): 739-777. 
- Mogire, Edward. "Refugee realities: Refugee rights versus state security in Kenya and Tanzania." Transformation 26.1 
(2009): 15-29. 
- Mogire, Edward. "Refugee realities: Refugee rights versus state security in Kenya and Tanzania." Transformation 26.1 
(2009): 15- 
- Monheim-Helstroffer, Jenny, and Marie Obidzinski. "Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking." International Review of 
Law and Economics 30.1 (2010): 86-97. 
- Monheim, Jenny. "Human trafficking and the effectiveness of asylum policies." German Working Papers in Law and 
Economics 2008.1 (2008): 3. 
- Moore, David H. "A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance." Northwestern University Law Review 97 (2002): 879. 
- Moore, Will H., and Stephen M. Shellman. "Fear of Persecution Forced Migration, 1952-1995." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48.5 (2004): 723-745. 
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe." International 
Organization 54.2 (2000): 217-252. 
- Morawska, Ewa. "The sociology and historiography of immigration/Virginia Yans–McLaughlin, Immigration Reconsidered: 
History, Sociology, and Politics." (1990): 187-240. 
- Moret, Joëlle. The path of somali refugees into exile: a comparative analysis of secondary movements and policy responses. 
SFM, 2006. 
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and Anne C. Miers. "When threats succeed: A formal model of the threat and use of economic 
sanctions." Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA. Vol. 264. 1999. 
- Morrison, John, Executive Director, and Beth Crosland. The trafficking and smuggling of refugees: the end game in 
European asylum policy?. UNHCR, 2000. 
- Muller, A. Sam, et al. The International Court of Justice: its future role after fifty years. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997.  
- Musalo, Karen, and Stephen Knight. "Steps forward and steps back: Uneven progress in the law of social group and gender-
based claims in the United States." International Journal of Refugee Law 13.1-2 (2001): 51. 
- Muus, Ph J., Philip J. Muus, and Elsbeth W. van Dam. Comparative research on international migration and international 
migration policy: migration from the Maghreb and Turkey to the European Union, and from Mexico, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador to the United States. Office for official publications of the European communities, 1998. 
- Myron, Weiner. The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights. HarperCollins College Publishers, 
1995. 
 
N 
- Nadig, Aninia. "Human smuggling, national security, and refugee protection." Journal of Refugee Studies 15.1 (2002): 1-25. 
- Nathwani, Niraj. Rethinking refugee law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003.  
- Neuman, Gerald L. Strangers to the Constitution: immigrants, borders, and fundamental law. Princeton University Press, 
2010. 
- Neumayer, Eric. "Asylum destination choice: what makes some West European countries more attractive than 
others?." European Union Politics 5.2 (2004): 155-180. 
 215 
- Neumayer, Eric. "Asylum destination choice: what makes some West European countries more attractive than others?." 
European Union Politics 5.2 (2004): 155-180. 
- Neumayer, Eric. "Asylum recognition rates in Western Europe: Their determinants, variation, and lack of convergence." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49.1 (2005): 43-66. 
- Neumayer, Eric. "Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe." International Studies 
Quarterly 49.3 (2005): 389-410. 
- Neumayer, Eric. "Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe." International Studies 
Quarterly 49.3 (2005): 389-410.  
- Neumayer, Eric. "Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?." Journal of conflict 
resolution 49.6 (2005): 925-953. 
- NHCR. 1998. Implementation of the Dublin Convention: Some UNHCR Observations. 
- Nitsch, Volker, and Dieter Schumacher. "Terrorism and international trade: an empirical investigation." European Journal 
of Political Economy 20.2 (2004): 423-433. 
- Noll, Gregor. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Fortress Europe: On the Prospects for Equitable Burden-Sharing in the European 
Union." German Year Book International Law 40 (1997): 405. 
- Noll, Gregor. "Seeking asylum at embassies: a right to entry under international law?." International Journal of Refugee Law 
17.3 (2005): 542-573. 
- Noll, Gregor. "The non-admission and return of protection seekers in Germany." International Journal of Refugee Law 9.3 
(1997): 415-452. 
- Noll, Gregor. Negotiating asylum: the EU acquis, extraterritorial protection and the common market of deflection. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000. 
- Nyinah, Michiael Kingsley. "Exclusion Under Article 1F: Some Reflections on Context, Principles and 
Practice." International Journal of Refugee Law 12 (2000): 295. 
 
O 
- O’Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. "What determines attitudes towards protection? Some cross-country 
evidence." Brookings Trade Forum. Vol. 2001. 2001. 
- Oates, Wallace E. "An essay on fiscal federalism." Journal of Economic Literature 37.3 (1999): 1120-1149. 
- OECD, Migration Policy Debates, 2017, available on-line: https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- OECD. 2007. Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators – 2006 Edition.  
- OECD. 2011. OECD Factbook 2011–2012: Economic, environmental and social statistics. Paris. 
- OECD. 2017. Migration Policy Debates, available on-line https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf 
accessed on April 30th, 2020.  
- OECD. 2020. Interim Economic Assessment Coronavirus: The world economy at risk https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/7969896b-
n.pdf?expires=1587161779&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=520E2A11ABFDEB27BA7CE084FAF38B8E accessed 
on April 30th, 2020. 
- OECD. 2020. Trade in goods and services, available on-line: https://data.oecd.org/trade/trade-in-goods-and-services.htm, 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- OECD. International migration outlook. OECD publishing, 2018. 
- Ogus, Anthony. "Competition between national legal systems: a contribution of economic analysis to comparative 
law." International & Comparative Law Quarterly 48.2 (1999): 405-418. 
- Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. "An economic theory of alliances." The review of Economics and 
Statistics (1966): 266-279. 
- Olson, Mancur. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, second printing with new preface and 
appendix. Harvard Economic Studies, 1971. 
- Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. 
Norton, 2001. 
- Østergaard‐Nielsen, Eva. "Counting the costs: Denmark's changing migration policies." International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 27.2 (2003): 448-454. 
- Ottaviano, Gianmarco IP, and Giovanni Peri. "Rethinking the effect of immigration on wages." Journal of the European 
economic association 10.1 (2012): 152-197. 
- Ours, Jan C., and Milan Vodopivec. Shortening the potential duration of unemployment benefits does not affect the quality 
of post-unemployment jobs: evidence from a natural experiment. Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, 2006. 
- Oxford Economics. 2020. World GDP to fall 2.8% in 2020, exceeding financial crisis toll, available on-line: 
http://resources.oxfordeconomics.com/world-gdp-to-fall-2.8-in-2020-exceeding-financial-crisis-
toll?oe_most_recent_content_download_id=0000021&interests_trending_topics=coronavirus accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Ozili, Peterson K., and Thankom Arun. "Spillover of COVID-19: impact on the Global Economy." Available at SSRN 
3562570(2020). 
 
P 
- Papadopoulou, Aspasia. "Smuggling into Europe: transit migrants in Greece." Journal of Refugee Studies 17.2 (2004): 167-
184. 
- Pape, Robert A. "Why economic sanctions do not work." International Security 22.2 (1997): 90-136. 
 216 
- Parisi, Francesco, and Larry Ribstein. "Choice of law." The new Palgrave dictionary of economics and the law 1 (1998): 
236-24. 
- Pauwelyn, Joost. "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we go?." American Journal of International 
Law 95.3 (2001): 535-578. 
- Peksen, Dursun. "Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights." Journal of Peace Research 46.1 
(2009): 59-77. 
- Pelkmans, Jacques. "Regulation and the single market: An economic perspective." The completion of the single market, 
Mohr: Tuebingen (1990). 
- Peri, Giovanni, and Vasil Yasenov. The labor market effects of a refugee wave: Applying the synthetic control method to the 
Mariel boatlift. No. w21801. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. 
- Peters, Anne. "The competition between legal orders." International Law Research 3.1 (2014). 
- Petras, Elizabeth McLean. "3: The Global Labor Market in the Modern World-Economy." International Migration 
Review15.1_suppl (1981): 44-63. 
- Piazza, James A. "Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?." International Studies 
Quarterly 52.3 (2008): 469-488. 
- Piazza, James A. "Rooted in poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages." Terrorism and 
Political Violence 18.1 (2006): 159-177.  
- Pinotti, Paolo. "Clicking on heaven's door: The effect of immigrant legalization on crime." American Economic Review 
107.1 (2017): 138-68. 
- Piore, Michael J. Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies. Cambridge University Press, 1980 
- Piore, Michael J. Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies. Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
- Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, and Johannes Velling. "Employment effects of immigration to Germany: an analysis based on local 
labor markets." Review of Economics and Statistics 79.4 (1997): 594-604. 
- Plümper, Thomas, and Eric Neumayer. "The friend of my enemy is my enemy: International alliances and international 
terrorism." European Journal of Political Research 49.1 (2010): 75-96. 
- Polachek, Solomon William. "Conflict and trade." Journal of Conflict resolution 24.1 (1980): 55-78. 
- Polinsky, A. Mitchell. An introduction to law and economics. Aspen Publishers, 1989. 
- Portes, Alejandro, and Jözsef Böröcz. "Contemporary immigration: Theoretical perspectives on its determinants and modes 
of incorporation." International migration review 23.3 (1989): 606-630. 
- Portuese, Aurélian. "The principle of subsidiarity as a principle of economic efficiency." Columbia Journal of European 
Law  17 (2010): 231. 
- Posner, Eric A., and John C. Yoo. "Judicial independence in international tribunals." California Law Review (2005): 1-74. 
- Posner, Richard A. "Creating a legal framework for economic development." The World Bank Research Observer 13.1 
(1998): 1-11.  
- Posner, Richard A. Economic analysis of law. Wolters kluwer law & business, 2014. 
- Powers, Mary G., William Seltzer, and Jing Shi. "Gender differences in the occupational status of undocumented immigrants 
in the United States: Experience before and after legalization." International Migration Review 32.4 (1998): 1015-1046. 
- Poynder, Nick. "Recent Implementation of the Refugee Convention in Australia and the Law of Accommodation to 
International Human Rights Treaties'." Australian Journal of Human Rights 2.1 (1995): 75-90. 
- ProAsyl. 2016. Reform der Dublin- Verordnung (Dublin-IV, COM (2016) 270), available on-line: 
https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Stellungnahme_Dublin-IV-PRO- ASYL.pdf, accessed on April 30th, 
2020.  
- Procaccia, Uriel. "Crafting a corporate code from scratch." Cardozo Law Review 17 (1995): 629. 
- Proudfoot, Malcolm Jarvis. European refugees: 1939-52: a study in forced population movement. Northwestern University 
Press, 1956. 
- Prunier, Gérard. Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe. Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
- Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." International organization 42.3 (1988): 
427-460. 
 
R 
- Ramakers, J. "Migranten en Ontwikkeling: Enkele elementen uit de discussie tussen eigenbelang en humanitaire principes." 
Bared 15 (1995): 16-18. 
- Randahl, David. "Refugees and Terrorism." PAX et Bellum Journal 3.1 (2016): 46-56.  
- Raudla, Ringa. "The Thickness of the Veil of Uncertainty and Its Effects on Constitution-Making in Post-communist 
Transition: The 1992 Constitution of Estonia." Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. Springer International Publishing, 2015. 203-
221 
- Ravenstein, Ernst Georg. "The laws of migration." Journal of the statistical society of London 48.2 (1885): 167-235. 
- Rawls, John. A theory of justice. Harvard university press, 2009. 
- Rehman, Faiz Ur. Essays on the Law and Economics of Terrorism in Pakistan. Diss. alma, 2015 
- Reich, Norbert. "Competition between legal orders: A new paradigm of EC law." Common Market Law Review 29 (1992): 
861. 
- Reitz, Jeffrey G., and Sherrilyn M. Sklar. "Culture, race, and the economic assimilation of immigrants." Sociological Forum. 
Vol. 12. No. 2. Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1997. 
- Ress, Georg. The interpretation of the Charter. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 
 217 
- Reuter. 2015. Factbox: Benefits offered to asylum seekers in European countries, available on-line: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-benefits-factbox/factbox-benefits-offered-to-asylum-seekers-in-
european-countries-idUSKCN0RG1MJ20150916 accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Revesz, Richard L. "Rehabilitating interstate competition: Rethinking the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal 
environmental regulation." New York University Law Review 67 (1992): 1210. 
- Ribstein, Larry E., and Bruce H. Kobayashi. "The economics of federalism." U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper 
No. LE06-001 (2006): 06-15. 
- Richmond, Anthony H. "Reactive migration: Sociological perspectives on refugee movements." Journal of Refugee Studies 
6.1 (1993): 7-24. 
- Richmond, Anthony H., and Kathleen Valtonen. "Global apartheid: Refugees, racism, and the new world order." Refuge: 
Canada's Journal on Refugees 14.6 (1994). 
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, et al. The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change. Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.  
- Ritchey, P. Neal. "Explanations of migration." Annual Review of Sociology 2.1 (1976): 363-404. 
- Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. "English language proficiency and the economic progress of immigrants." Economics Letters 34.3 
(1990): 295-300. 
- Roberts, Anthea. "Righting wrongs or wronging rights? The United States and human rights post-September 11." European 
Journal of International Law 15.4 (2004): 721-749. 
- Robinson, Jacob. "The Status of Refugees in International Law. Volume II: Asylum, Entry and Sojourn. By Atle Grahl-
Madsen.” American Journal of International Law 67.4 (1973): 823-823. 
- Robinson, Vaughan, and Jeremy Segrott. Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers. Home Office, 2002.  
- Rodrik, D. ‘Final Remarks’ in Boeri, Tito, Gordon Hanson, and Barry McCormick. Immigration policy and the welfare 
system: a report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti. Oxford University Press, 2002. 
- Rogge, Kersten. The" victim" requirement in article 25 of the European Convention on human rights. 1988. 
- Root, Hilton L. Alliance curse: How America lost the third world. Brookings Institution Press, 2009 
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Rethinking the progressive agenda. Simon and Schuster, 1993. 
- Rosenberger, Sieglinde, and Alexandra König. "Welcoming the unwelcome: The politics of minimum reception standards 
for asylum seekers in Austria." Journal of Refugee Studies 25.4 (2012): 537-554. 
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. "The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and 
escape." International Organization 55.4 (2001): 829-857. 
- Rosenne, Shabtai. Developments in the Law of Treaties, 1945-1986. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
- Rosholm, Michael, and Rune Vejlin. "Reducing income transfers to refugee immigrants: Does start-help help you start?." 
Labour Economics 17.1 (2010): 258-275. 
- Rotte, Ralph, Michael Vogler, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Asylum migration and Policy coordination in Europe. 
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1996. 
- Royal Geographical Society https://www.rgs.org/schools/teaching-resources/the-geography-of-conflict/conflict-today/  
- Ruiter, Dick WP. "Is transaction cost economics applicable to public governance?." European Journal of Law and Economics 
20.3 (2005): 287-303. 
- Ruiz Estrada, Mario Arturo. "Economic Waves: The Effect of the Wuhan COVID-19 On the World Economy (2019-2020)." 
Available at SSRN 3545758 (2020). 
- Russell, Charles, and Bowman Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist in Perspectives on Terrorism." Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly 
Resources Inc (1983): 45-60. 
- Ruta, Michele. "Economic theories of political (dis) integration." Journal of Economic Surveys 19.1 (2005): 1-21. 
- Rydgren, Jens. "France: The Front national, ethnonationalism and populism." Twenty-first century populism. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008.  
- Rydgren, Jens. "Meso-level reasons for racism and xenophobia: Some converging and diverging effects of radical right 
populism in France and Sweden." European Journal of Social Theory 6.1 (2003): 45-68. 
 
S 
- Saleh, B. "Economic Conditions as a Determinant of Political Violence in the Palestinian Territories." World Institute for 
Development Economic Research (WIDER) Conference, Helsinki, Finland. 2004. This paper also focusing on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is not focusing only on suicide incidents.  
- Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Refugees and the spread of civil war." International Organization 60.2 
(2006): 335-366. 
- Salehyan, Idean. "The externalities of civil strife: Refugees as a source of international conflict." American Journal of 
Political Science 52.4 (2008): 787-801. 
- Salehyan, Idean. "Transnational rebels: Neighboring states as sanctuary for rebel groups." World Politics 59.2 (2007): 217-
242. 
- Salt, John. "Trafficking and human smuggling: A European perspective." International Migration 38.3 (2000): 31-56. 
- Salzberger, Eli M., and Stefan Voigt. "On the delegation of powers: with special emphasis on Central and Eastern 
Europe." Constitutional Political Economy 13.1 (2002): 25-52. 
- Samuel, T. John. "Economic adaptation of Indochinese refugees in Canada." Uprooting, loss, and adaptation: The 
resettlement of Indochinese refugees in Canada (1987): 65-75. 
- Sandler, Todd, and Harvey E. Lapan. "The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets." Synthese 76.2 
(1988): 245-261. 
 218 
- Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. "Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action." Journal of Economic 
Literature 39.3 (2001): 869-896. 
- Sandler, Todd. "Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism." Policy Challenges and Political Responses. Springer, 
2005. 
- Sands, Philippe. "Treaty, custom and the cross-fertilization of international law." Yale Human Rights and Development Law 
Journal 1 (1998): 85. 
- Sarris, Alexander H., and Stavros Zografakis. "A computable general equilibrium assessment of the impact of illegal 
immigration on the Greek economy." Journal of Population Economics 12.1 (1999): 155-182. 
- Sarvimäki, Matti, Uusitalo, Roope, Jäntti, Markus (2009): Long-term effects of forced migration, IZA Discussion Papers, 
No. 4003, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, available on-line: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-
20090304306, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Sassen, Saskia. The mobility of labor and capital: A study in international investment and labor flow. Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
- Saville, John. "Sleeping Partnership And Limited Liability, 1850–18561." The Economic History Review 8.3 (1956): 418-
433. 
- Schachter, Oscar. "The quasi-judicial role of the Security Council and the General Assembly." American Journal of 
International Law 58.4 (1964): 960-965. 
- Schaefer, Anja. "Consumer knowledge and country of origin effects." European Journal of Marketing (1997). 
- Schaeffer, Peter. "Refugees: on the economics of political migration." International Migration 48.1 (2010): 1-22. 
- Schmeidl, Susanne. "Exploring the causes of forced migration: A pooled time-series analysis, 1971-1990." Social Science 
Quarterly (1997): 284-308. 
- Schmeidl, Susanne. "Exploring the causes of forced migration: A pooled time-series analysis, 1971-1990." Social Science 
Quarterly (1997): 284-308. 
- Schmidt, H. "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of Regulatory Competence in the European Communities" in R.M. 
Buxbaum, G. Hertig, A. Hirsch and K.J. Hopt (eds.), European Bvsincss Law. Legal and Economic Anulyses on Infegralion 
and Harmonizalion(Berlin 1991) 
- Schneider, Gerald, and Thomas Holzer. Asylpolitik auf Abwegen: nationalstaatliche und europäische Reaktionen auf die 
Globalisierung der Flüchtlingsströme. Leske and Budrich, 2002.  
- Schokkenbroek, Jeroen. "Francis A. Jacobs and Robin CA White, The European Convention on Human Rights Oxford." 
Common Market Law Review 36.4 (1999): 852-855. 
- Schokkenbroek, Jeroen. Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford. 2006.  
- Schuck, Peter H. "Refugee burden-sharing: a modest proposal." Yale Journal of International Law 22 (1997): 243. 
- Schulte, Constanze. Compliance with decisions of the International Court of Justice. Oxford University Press, 2004.  
- Schweitzer, Robert, et al. "Attitudes towards refugees: The dark side of prejudice in Australia." Australian Journal of 
Psychology 57.3 (2005): 170-179.  
- Scully, Gerald W. Constitutional environments and economic growth. Princeton University Press, 2014. 
- Sears, David O., et al. "Self-interest vs. symbolic politics in policy attitudes and presidential voting." American Political 
Science Review 74.3 (1980): 670-684.  
- Shain, Yossi, and Aharon Barth. "Diasporas and international relations theory." International Organization 57.03 (2003): 
449-479. 
- Siebert, Horst, and Michael J. Koop. "Institutional competition versus centralization: quo vadis Europe?." Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 9.1 (1993): 15-30. 
- Silos, Pedro. "Housing, portfolio decision making and the macroeconomy." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31.8 
(2007): 2774-2801. 
- Simmons, Beth A. "International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary 
affairs." American Political Science Review 94.4 (2000): 819-835. 
- Simmons, Beth A. Mobilizing for Human Rights: international law in domestic politics. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
- Simon, Herbert A. "A behavioral model of rational decision making." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69.1 (1955): 99-
118. 
- Simon, Julian Lincoln, Sanford J. Ungar, and Stephen Moore. The economic consequences of immigration. University of 
Michigan press, 1999. 
- Sinclair, Ian. "Some Reflections on the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties." Essays in Honour 
of Erik Castrén 149 (1979): 153. 
- Singh, Sameera. "Will Acceptance of a Universally Approved Definition of Terrorism Make Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention More Effective in Excluding Terrorists." Journal Migration & Refugee Issues 2.3 (2006): 91. 
- Sinn, Hans-Werner. The new systems competition. John Wiley & Sons, 2008. 
- Siverson, Randolph M., and Joel King. "Attributes of national alliance membership and war participation, 1815-
1965." American Journal of Political Science (1980): 1-15. 
- Sjaastad, Larry A. "The costs and returns of human migration." Journal of political Economy 70.5, Part 2 (1962): 80-93. 
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "Governing the global economy through government networks." The role of law in international 
politics: essays in international relations and international law 177 (2000): 181-204. 
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "International law in a world of liberal states." European Journal of International Law 6.1 (1995): 
503-538. 
- Smith, Alastair. "The success and use of economic sanctions." International Interactions 21.3 (1995): 229-245. 
- Smith, Edwin M. "Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements." Southern California Law Review 64 
(1990): 1549. 
 219 
- Smith, James P. "Immigrants and the labor market." Journal of Labor Economics 24.2 (2006): 203-233. 
- Smith, Jeffrey A., and James J. Heckman. The Pre-Program Earnings Dip and the Determinants of Participation in a Social 
Program: Implications for Simple Program Evaluation Strategies. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999. 
- Smits, Jan M. "How to Predict the Differences in Uniformity between Different Areas of a Future European Private Law? 
An Evolutionary Approach." The Economics of Harmonizing European Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002. 
- Snell, Jukha, and Mads Andenas. "Exploring the Outer Limits—Restrictions on the Free Movement of Goods and 
Services’(1999)." European Business Law Review 10: 252-256. 
- Snell, Jukka. "True proportionality and free movement of goods and services." European Business Law Review  11 (2000): 
50. 
- Snyder, Susanna. Asylum-seeking, migration and church. Routledge, 2016. 
- Spenkuch, Jörg L. "Understanding the impact of immigration on crime." American Law and Economics Review 16.1 (2013): 
177-219. 
- Spijkerboer, Thomas. Gender and refugee status. Routledge, 2017. 
- Spinks, Harriet. Destination Anywhere?: Factors Affecting Asylum Seekers' Choice of Destination Country. Parliamentary 
Library, 2013. 
- Stark, Oded, and David E. Bloom. "The new economics of labor migration." The american Economic review 75.2 (1985): 
173-178. 
- Stark, Oded. "On the economics of refugee flows." Review of Development Economics 8.2 (2004): 325-329. 
- Stave, Svein Erik, and Solveig Hillesund. Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market. Geneva: ILO, 2015. 
- Steinbock, Daniel J. "Interpreting the refugee definition." University California Los Angeles Law Review 45 (1997): 733. 
- Stewart, Richard B. "Pyramids of sacrifice? Problems of federalism in mandating state implementation of national 
environmental policy." The Yale Law Journal 86.6 (1977): 1196-1272. 
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. Norton, 2002. 
- Stone, Randall W. "The use and abuse of game theory in international relations: The theory of moves." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 45.2 (2001): 216-244. 
- Storey, Hugo, and Rebecca Wallace. "War and peace in refugee law jurisprudence." American Journal of International Law 
95.2 (2001): 349-366.  
- Strauß, Agnes. "Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice: Evidence from the German 
Grundgesetz." Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. Springer International Publishing, 2015. 135-153. 
- Stuyck, Jules, and Peter Wytinck. "Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 
Judgment of 13 November 1990 (Sixth chamber)." Common Market Law Review 28.1 (1991): 205-223. 
- Subramanian, Arvind, and Shang-Jin Wei. "The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly." Journal of international 
Economics72.1 (2007): 151-175. 
- Sugden, Robert. "On the economics of philanthropy." The Economic Journal 92.366 (1982): 341-350. 
- Suhrke, Astri. "Burden-sharing during refugee emergencies: The logic of collective versus national action." Journal of 
Refugee Studies 11.4 (1998): 396-415. 
- Suriyakumaran, Anjali, and Yuji Tamura. "Asylum provision: A review of economic theories." International Migration 54.4 
(2016): 18-30. 
- Swan, Neil. Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration: A Research Report Prepared for the Economic Council of 
Canada. Canadian Government Pub Centre, 1991. 
- Sztucki, Jerzy. "The conclusions on the international protection of refugees adopted by the executive committee of the unhcr 
programme." International Journal of Refugee Law 1.3 (1989): 285-318. 
 
T 
- Tapinos, Georges. "Illegal immigrants and the labour market." Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
The OECD Observer 219 (1999): 35. 
- Taran, Patrick A., and Eduardo Geronimi. Globalization, labour and migration: Protection is paramount. International 
Labour Office, 2003. 
- Tavares, Jose. "The open society assesses its enemies: shocks, disasters, and terrorist attacks." Journal of Monetary 
Economics51.5 (2004): 1039-1070. 
- Taylor, J. Edward. "Differential migration, networks, information and risk." Migration, human capital and development 4 
(1986): 147-171. 
- TENT (2016) Public perceptions of the refugee crisis. New York: TENT Foundation. 
- The Guardian. 2017. Where did the money go? How Greece fumbled the refugee crisis, available on-line: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/how-greece-fumbled-refugee-crisis accessed on  April 30th, 2020. 
- Thielemann, Eiko R., Does Policy Matter? On Governments' Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration (November 2003). 
IIIS Discussion Paper No. 9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=495631 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.495631 
- Thielemann, Eiko. "Why Refugee Burden‐Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, Free‐Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in 
the EU." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 56.1 (2018): 63-82. 
- Thouez, Colleen. Towards a common European migration and asylum policy?. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2000. 
- Tiebout, Charles M. "A pure theory of local expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64.5 (1956): 416-424. 
- Todaro, Michael P., and Lydia Maruszko. "Illegal migration and US immigration reform: A conceptual 
framework." Population and development review (1987): 101-114. 
- Tonry, Michael. Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives, University of Chicago 
Press, 1997. 
 220 
- Tordaro, Michal P. "Economic development in the third world." (1989). 
- Toshkov, Dimiter Doychinov. "The dynamic relationship between asylum applications and recognition rates in Europe 
(1987–2010)." European Union Politics 15.2 (2014): 192-214. 
- Trebilcock, Michael J. "The law and economics of immigration policy." American Law and Economics Review 5.2 (2003): 
271-317. 
- Trends, Selected Highlights from Transatlantic. "Transatlantic trends: Mobility, migration and integration." Key Findings 
From 2014 and Selected Highlights From Transatlantic Trends and Transantantic Trends: Immıgraiton 2008 13 (2014). 
- Trends, Transatlantic. "Transatlantic trends: immigration–2011 partners." (2011). 
- Trends, Transatlantic. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, Key Findings 2011. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of 
the USA, 2011. 
- Tridimas, George. "Constitutional Convulsions in Modern Greece." Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. Springer International 
Publishing, 2015. 169-185. 
- Tuitt, Patricia. False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee. Pluto Press, 1996. 
 
U 
- Udbrandsen, Frøy. "Partisan influence on immigration: The case of Norway." Scandinavian Political Studies 33.3 (2010): 
248-270. 
- UN. 1997. the Declaration on Territorial Asylum. 
- UN. 2016. New York Declaration. available on-line: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration accessed on April 30th, 
2020. 
- UNHCR, High Commissioner Schnyder to Mr Stavropoulos, Memorandum by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees on the Report of the Colloquium on Legal Aspects of Refugee Problems held in April 1965 in Bellagio (Como), 
Italy, 6 Aug. 1965, Folio 136, 16/1/3 AMEND, Series 1, Fonds 11. 
- UNHCR. 1979. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
- UNHCR. 1981. Executive Committee Conclusion on protection of asylum-seekers in situations of large-scale influx No. 22 
(XXXII); UNHCR. 1981.  
- UNHCR. 1990. Executive Committee, Note on International Protection.  
- UNHCR. 1990. The Refugee Convention, 1951, The Travaux Preparatoires analysed with a Commentary by Dr Paul Weis 
- UNHCR. 1992. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
- UNHCR. 1993. Executive Committee, General Conclusion on International Protection; UNHCR. 1998. Executive 
Committee, Conclusion on International Protection. 
- UNHCR. 1996. Considerations on the ‘Safe Third Country’ Concept;  
- UNHCR. 1996. Report on International Protection, UN Doc. A/AC.96/527. 
- UNHCR. 2000. The State of the World’s Refugees 2000FFifty Years of Humanitarian Action.  
- UNHCR. 2001. Global Consultations on International Protection/Third Track: Asylum Processes. 
- UNHCR. 2003. Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: ‘Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative’ Within the Context 
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
- UNHCR. 2004. EXCOM Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx 
No. 100 (LV). 
- UNHCR. 2004. EXCOM General Conclusion No. 90 (LV).  
- UNHCR. 2004. Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
- UNHCR. 2004. Protracted Refugee Situations, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing 
Committee 30th Meeting. 
- UNHCR. 2005. Convention plus core group on addressing irregular secondary movements of refugees and asylum seekers: 
joint statement by the co-chairs, UNHCR High Commissioner’s Forum. 
- UNHCR. 2007. Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 
- UNHCR. 2008. UNHCR Income and Expenditure Trend 1990-2005.  
- UNHCR. 2011. Reservations and Declarations to the 1951 Refugee Convention.   
- UNHCR. 2018. Global Trends, available on-line https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- UNHCR. 2019. Statistics Database, Statistical Yearbook, available online: unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html, 
accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
 
V 
- Vagts, Detlev F. "State succession: the codifiers' view." Virginia Journal of International Law 33 (1992): 275. 
- Van den Bergh, Roger, and Louis Visscher. "The Principles of European Tort Law: The Right Path to 
Harmonisation?." German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006.1 (2006): 8. 
- Van den Bergh, Roger. "Subsidiarity as an economic demarcation principle and the emergence of European private 
law." Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 5.2 (1998): 129-152. 
- Van den Bergh, Roger. "Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe." Kyklos 53.4 
(2000): 435-466. 
 221 
- Van Gerven, Walter. "Bridging the unbridgeable: community and national tort laws after Francovich and 
Brasserie." International & Comparative Law Quarterly 45.3 (1996): 507-544. 
- Van Kersbergen, Kees, and Frans Van Waarden. "Shifts in governance: Problems of legitimacy and accountability." Shifts 
in governance: problems of legitimacy and accountability. NWO Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, 2001. 
- Van Kesteren, John. "Assessing the risk and prevalence of hate crime victimization in Western Europe." International review 
of victimology 22.2 (2016): 139-160). 
- Van Liempt, Ilse, and Jeroen Doomernik. "Migrant's agency in the smuggling process: The perspectives of smuggled 
migrants in the Netherlands." International Migration 44.4 (2006): 165-190. 
- van Ours, Jan C. and Vodopivec, Milan, Shortening the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits Does Not Affect the 
Quality of Post-Unemployment Jobs: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (June 2006). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2171 
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-56. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=915361.  
- Vanheule, Dirk. Europe and refugees. Kluwer Law International, 1997 
- Venturini, Alessandra, and Claudia Villosio. "Labour market effects of immigration into Italy: An empirical 
analysis." International Labour Review 145.1‐2 (2006): 91-118. 
- Venturini, Alessandra. "Do immigrants working illegally reduce the natives' legal employment? Evidence from 
Italy." Journal of population economics 12.1 (1999): 135-154. 
- Verlegh, Peeter WJ. Country-of-origin effects on consumer product evaluations. 2001; Al‐Sulaiti, Khalid I., and Michael J. 
Baker. "Country of origin effects: a literature review." Marketing Intelligence & Planning (1998). 
- Victor, David G., Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff. The implementation and effectiveness of international 
environmental commitments: Theory and practice. MIT press, 1998. 
- Vihanto, Martti. "Competition between local governments as a discovery procedure." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1992): 411-436. 
- Villiers, Janice D. "Closed borders, closed ports: The plight of Haitians seeking political asylum in the United States." 
Brooklyn Law Review 60 (1994): 841. 
- Vink, M. (2001), The limited Europeanization of Domestic Asylum Policy: EU Governments and Two-Level Games, Paper 
presented at the first YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation, Workshop IV ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Policies’, 2-
3 November 2001, Siena, on file with the author.  
- Vink, Maarten. "The limited Europeanization of Domestic Asylum Policy: EU Governments and Two-Level Games." first 
YEN Research Meeting on Europeanisation, Workshop IV ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Policies. 2001. 
- Vogler, Michael, and Ralph Rotte. "The effects of development on migration: Theoretical issues and new empirical 
evidence." Journal of Population Economics 13.3 (2000): 485-508. 
- Voigt, Stefan, and Eli M. Salzberger. "Choosing not to choose: When politicians choose to delegate powers." Kyklos 55.2 
(2002): 289-310. 
- Voigt, Stefan. "Veilonomics: on the use and utility of veils in constitutional political economy." Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. 
Springer International Publishing, 2015. 9-33. 
- Von Bogdandy, Armin. "European Union as a Human Rights Organization-Human Rights and the Core of the European 
Union, The." Common Market Law Review 37 (2000): 1307. 
- Von Bogdandy, Armin. "Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic 
constitutional law." International Journal of Constitutional Law 6.3-4 (2008): 397-413.  
- Von Staden, Andreas. Shaping human rights policy in liberal democracies: Assessing and explaining compliance with the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Princeton University, 2009. 
- Von Stein, Jana. "The international law and politics of climate change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol." Journal of Conflict Resolution 52.2 (2008): 243-268. 
 
W 
- Wagner, Gerhard. "The economics of harmonisation: The case of contract law." ERA Forum. Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
- Waldman, Michael. The fight to vote. Simon and Schuster, 2016. 
- Walton, John. Labor, class and the international system. Academic, 1981. 
- Watson, Alan. "The Evolution of Law (1985)." Law and History Review 2 (1984). 
- Weber, Max. Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Abriss der universalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Duncker & Humblot, 1923.  
- Weimer, David L., and Aidan R. Vining. Policy analysis: Concepts and practice. Taylor & Francis, 2017. 
- Weiner, Myron. "Security, stability, and international migration." International Security 17.3 (1992): 91-126. 
- Weis, Paul. "The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed, with a Commentary by Dr Paul 
Weis." The Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, 1995. 
- Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold K. Jacobson. Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Accords. 
MIT Press, 1998. 
- Whitaker, E. "Changing opportunities: refugees and host communities in western Tanzania (Working Paper No. 11),(pp. 1–
17). UNHCR." (1999). 
- Wike, Richard, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons. "Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer 
jobs." Pew Research Center 11 (2016): 2016. 
- Williams, John HP, and Lester A. Zeager. "Macedonian border closings in the Kosovo refugee crisis: A game-theoretic 
perspective." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21.4 (2004): 233-254. 
- Williamson, Edwin D., and John E. Osborn. "A US Perspectives on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the 
Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia." Virginia Journal of International Law 33 (1992): 261.  
- Williamson, Jeffrey G., and Timothy J. Hatton. Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Policy in Europe. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2004. 
 222 
- Williamson, Oliver E. "The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach." American journal of sociology 87.3 
(1981): 548-577.  
- Wilson, Bruce. "Compliance by WTO members with adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings: the record to date." Journal 
of International Economic Law 10.2 (2007): 397-403. 
- Wittman, Donald. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J." Political Economy 1395 (1989): 1407-08. 
- Woessmann, L. "Ifo economist Woessmann calls for systematic registration of education levels of refugees." Munich: Ifo 
institute. Retrieved April 20 (2015): 2019. 
- Wolf, Charles. "A theory of non-market failures." The Public Interest 55 (1979): 114. 
- Wood, Reed M. "“A hand upon the throat of the nation”: economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–2001." International 
Studies Quarterly 52.3 (2008): 489-513. 
- Wooden, Mark. "The experience of refugees in the Australian labor market." International Migration Review 25.3 (1991): 
514-535. 
- Woolcock, Stephen. The single European market: centralization or competition among national rules?. Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994. 
- World Bank. (2018). Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets. Policy Research Report. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
- World Bank. 2020. Refugee population by country or territory of asylum - OECD members, available on-line: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?locations=OE, accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Wotipka, Christine Min, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. "Global human rights and state sovereignty: state ratification of international 
human rights treaties, 1965–2001." Sociological Forum 23.4: 724-754. 
- Wouters, Cornelis Wolfram. International legal standards for the protection from refoulement: A legal analysis of the 
prohibitions on refoulement contained in the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. Intersentia, 2009. 
- Yigit, Ismail Hakki, and Andrew Tatch. "Syrian refugees and Americans: Perceptions, attitudes and insights." American 
Journal of Qualitative Research 1.1 (2017): 13-31.  
- Zaun, Natascha. "States as Gatekeepers in EU Asylum Politics: Explaining the Non‐adoption of a Refugee Quota 
System." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 56.1 (2018): 44-62. 
- Zeager, Lester A. "Negotiations for refugee repatriation or local settlement: A game-theoretic analysis." International Studies 
Quarterly 42.2 (1998): 367-384. 
- Zeager, Lester A., and Johnathan B. Bascom. "Strategic behavior in refugee repatriation: A game-theoretic analysis." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 40.3 (1996): 460-485. 
- Zemanek, Karl. Die Wiener Konvention über die Staatennachfolge in Verträge. Springer, 1980. 
- Zerbe Jr, Richard O., and Howard E. McCurdy. "The failure of market failure." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management: 
The Journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 18.4 (1999): 558-578. 
- Zetter, Roger, et al. An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in Europe, 1990-2000. Home Office Online Report 17.03 
(2003). 
- Zetter, Roger, Griffiths, David, Ferretti, Silva, Pearl, Martyn (2003), “An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in 
Europe, 1990-2000”, Home Office Research Series 259, available on-line: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/horspubs1.html accessed on April 30th, 2020. 
- Zimmermann, Andreas, Jonas Dörschner, and Felix Machts. The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 
1967 protocol: A commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011. 
- Zimmermann, Susan. "Why seek asylum? The roles of integration and financial support." International Migration 48.1 
(2010): 199-231. 
- Zolberg, Aristide R., and Peter M. Benda. Global migrants, global refugees: problems and solutions. Berghahn Books, 2001. 
- Zweigert, Konrad, et al. Introduction to comparative law. Clarendon Press, 1998. 
- Zywicki, Todd J. "The rise and fall of efficiency in the common law: A supply-side analysis." Northwestern University 
Law Review 97 (2002): 1551. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 223 
Case Law 
 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission) 
- Opinion No. 10, 4 July 1992, reproduced in 31 ILM (1992) 1488 at 1526.  
 
Australia 
- Applicant A and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another (1996) 190 CLR 225 (Kirby J). 
- Chen Shi Hai (2000) 201 Commonwealth Law Reports (Australia) 293.  
- Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293 at 308 (Kirby J) (‘Chen Shi Hai’).  
- Marius Bubenas v. Attorney General, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal 1209185.  
- MMM v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 324.  
 
Belgium 
- Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, 31 March 2010, X tegen de Commissaris-generaal voor de vluchtelingen en de 
staatlozen  
 
Canada 
- Cheung [1993] 2 FC 314; 153 NR 145; 19 Imm LR (2d) 81 (FCA), at 325. 
- PYM (Re), No. U98-01933 [1999] Convention Refugee Determination Division (Canada) (CRDD) No. 163, 3 June 1999. 
- Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCCDJ 8052.  
- The Queen v. Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, Amnesty International and John Doe 
(Canadian Council for Refugees).  
- 0amirez v. Canada (Minister of Emplovnent and Immigration), [ 1992] 2 F.C. 306), 317&428 
- OPK (Re), No. U95-04575 [1996] CRDD No 88, 24 May 1996 
- HDO (Re), T98-17677 [1999] CRDD No. 116, 26 May 1999;  
- NWX (Re), T99-01434 [1999] CRDD No. 183, 25 August 1999.  
- Federal Court of Canada, decision of 29 November 2007, Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, 
Amnesty International and John Doe v. Her Majesty the Queen, on which see S. J. Glen (2007–2008: 587 ff.).  
- Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, Amnesty International and John Doe V. Canada (Challenge 
To The Canada-Usa Safe Third Country Agreement)(2007 FC 1262). 
 
European Court of Human Rights  
- application no 13378/05. 
- application no 5029/71. 
- application no 9035/06. 
- application no. 13229/03. 
- application no. 16483/12. 
- application no. 16643/09. 
- application no. 17550/90 
- application no. 17825/91.  
- application no. 25389/05. 
- application no. 25904/07. 
- application no. 27725/10. 
- application no. 27765/09. 
- application no. 29217/12. 
- application no. 2947/06. 
- application no. 30696/09. 
- application no. 32621/06. 
- application no. 3394/03. 
- application no. 37201/06. 
- application no. 41872/10. 
- application no. 43517/09. 
- application no. 43611/11. 
- application no. 43844/98. 
- application no. 55721/07. 
- application no. 59166/12. 
- application no. 71386/10. 
- application no. 7974/11. 
- application no. 8687/08. 
- applications no. 55762/00.  
- applications no. 55974/00. 
- applications nos. 13163-7/87. 
 224 
 
European Court of Justice 
- C-11/95. 
- C-103/88. 
- C-125/88. 
- C-152/84. 
- C-208/00. 
- C-212/97. 
- C-233/94.  
- C-380/03. 
- C-415/93. 
- C-50/76. 
- C-53/80. 
- C-643/15. 
- C-647/15. 
- T-29/92. 
- T-52/53. 
 
France 
- Constitutional Council, Decision no. 92-307 DC of 25 February 1992. 
- The Christian Federation of Jehova’s Witnesses in France v France (unreported 6 November 2001). 
 
Germany 
- Administrative Court of Munich, 17 July 2019, M 11 S 19.50722, M 11 S 19.50759. 
 
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
- Advisory Opinion No. OC-1/82, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 September 1982). 
 
International Court of Justice 
- Namibia (Legal Consequences) Advisory Opinion (1971) ICJ Rep 31 (‘Namibia Case’). 
- Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1995] ICJ Rep 
6 at 21. 
- Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6 at 21.  
- Judgment of 20 November 1950 (Colombia v. Peru).  
- judgment of 27 June 1986, ‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua’  
- judgment of 26 February 2007, ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’).  
 
Ireland 
- High Court of Ireland of 17 December 2010, Artur Abramov v. Minister of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Abramov). 
 
Japan 
- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc AB-1996-2 (1996) s. D (Report of the Appellate Body). 
 
Netherlands 
- Council of State, 17 July 2019, 201902302/1/V3. 
 
New Zealand 
- Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 22 July 2003. 
- Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand, decision of 7 July 2004, Refugee Appeal No. 74665. 
- Re R, Refugee Appeal No. 59/91, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 19 May 1992. 
- Refugee Appeal No. 71193/98, RSAA, 9 September 1999.  
- Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, RSAA, 7 July 2004. 
 
Spain 
- Tribunal Supremo, decision of 6 October 2005, Recurso No. 2098/2002.  
 
UK 
 225 
- Applicant A and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
- Golchin Immigration Appeal Tribunal (7623) (1991,unreported)). 
- Golder v. United Kingdom (1975) ECtHR (ser A). 
- Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR 205 (Ward LJ). 
- Hoxha [2005] 4 All ER 580  
- R on the Application of Altin Vallaj v. A Special Adjudicator [2001] INLR 455. 
- R v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport; ex parte European Roma Rights Centre (European Roma Rights Centre). 
- R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929, [1997] 4 All ER 210, [1997] 1 WLR 
1162, [1997] Imm AR 568. 
- Sepet [2001] EWCA Civ 681. 
- Sepet [2003] 3 All ER 304  
- Shah [1998] 4 All ER 30, [1998] 1 WLR 74, [1997] Imm AR 584 at 152.  
- UK Court of Appeal in Amare v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] All ER (D) 300 at para. 27. 
- Vraciu Immigration Appeal Tribunal (11559) (1994, unreported)). 
 
USA 
- Haitian Legal Center v. Smith, 676 F 2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).  
- Lleshanaku v. Ashcroft, 100 Fed. Appx. 546, 549 (7th Cir. 2004) 
- RIC Query - Burma [Myanmar] (26 February 2004) 
- Siddiqui Mahmood v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (2000) Federal Court IMM-5050-98  
- United States, Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) (Report of 
the Appellate Body).  
- US Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, decision of 26 September 2011, Rasa Jonaitiene  
- US Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, decision of 20 November 2009, N-A-M v. Attorney General.  
- US Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, decision of 8 February 1995, Nader Ghloum Al-Salehi v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. 
- US Supreme Court, decision of 21 June 1993, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (Sale), in United States Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 227 
Acknowledgment  
I would like to thank all those people who made this thesis possible and an unforgettable experience 
for me. First of all, I would like to express my deepest sense of gratitude to all my supervisors for the 
continuous support of my research, for their motivation, patience, encouragement, and immense 
knowledge. Their guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this monograph.  
 I would like to show my honest appreciation to the comments and the suggestions given by 
my supervisors, Prof. Eli M. Salzberger and Prof. Michael G. Faure. In addition, I am grateful for the 
comments and suggestions of the three members of the in inner committee: Prof. Thomas Eger, Prof. 
Paolo Vanin, and Prof. Louis Visscher. Moreover, I would like to thank the board of the European 
Doctorate in Law & Economics (EDLE), in particular Prof. Luigi A. Franzoni (Erasmus Mundus 
Coordinator and Bologna Director) and Prof. Stefan Voigt (Hamburg Director) in addition to my 
supervisor Michael G. Faure (Managing Director of the Programme and Rotterdam Director) for their 
hospitality during the first three semesters spent in Bologna, in Hamburg, and in Rotterdam. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Michal Ben Gal (Research coordinator) who provided me with 
an opportunity to join the Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions at University 
of Haifa for the last three semesters of my doctoral studies. 
 I thank my colleagues for the stimulating discussions we have had in the last years as well as 
all the reviewers of the published papers based on this thesis and the commentators of the different 
seminars, workshops, and international conferences that I have participated during these years. Also, 
I thank my friends and colleagues who I met in the different visiting fellowships that I did during 
these years. Moreover, I would like to express my acknowledgment for Erasmus+ Jean Monnet 
Activities for supporting me to teach Refugee Law and for being the Chair of the Jean Monnet EU 
Centre of Excellence at UNYT. 
 Last but not least, I would like to thank my family: my parents and my brother for supporting 
me spiritually throughout writing this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 228 
 
 
 
 
English Version 
 
Refugee Flow: a Law and Economics Approach 
This research aims to analyse refugee flow through a law and economics lens. This study offers a 
short historical overview of the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by 
examining some of these events utilizing law and economics methods. In addition, a law and 
economics model is applied, based on the idea that refugees, as well as national states, might aim to 
maximize their net benefits. Some of the most important variables that impact the refugee decision-
making process are then explored as well as the most important “push” factors that impact 
lawmakers in enacting and modifying refugee laws (e.g. protection of national security and the 
safeguarding of the national job market). Afterwards, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees is discussed, delving into the main factors for its ratification and compliance by 
national parliaments by reflecting upon the historical context surrounding its ratification, the 
importance of the construction of a state based on democratic values, and the fact that this 
international treaty is considered a non-consequential treaty which also incorporates some of the 
flexible clauses, such as reservation, denunciation and escape clauses. Then brought forth is a study 
of the economic advantages and disadvantages of a centralized supernational asylum law (acquis 
communautaire) that may result in the elimination of competition between legal orders in refugee 
law and the removal of negative externalities caused by “asylum shopping”. To reach the goal 
established in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, the need for harmonization of asylum 
standards is examined through the application of an economic approach. Specifically, the economic 
methodology is used to investigate the application of the subsidiarity principle by considering some 
of the most important economic criteria for both centralisation and decentralisation and by applying 
the findings to the asylum law. In particular, this proposal looks at the Tiebout model, the problem 
of the “race to the bottom”, the reduction of transaction costs, and the importance of the protection 
of refugee human rights. These theories are commonly used in cases with a transboundary nature, 
which produces [negative] international externalities. To sum up, international refugee law will be 
critically analysed through a multidisciplinary approach. The principal goal is to explore the 
“demand” and “supply” of the “refugee law market” through the lens of the law and economics 
approach but with the context of human rights. After explaining the evolution of the human rights 
approach by incorporating law and economics insights, this scientific work elaborates on the main 
“push” factors that impact on the refugee choice – demand side – and on the public policy – supply 
side. In the conclusion, some policy suggestions are proposed that considers the national 
preferences of destination countries and the protection of refugee rights. 
 
 
 
Dutch Version 
 
Vluchtelingenstroom: een rechtseconomische benadering 
Deze thesis beoogt de vluchtelingenstroom te analyseren door een rechtseconomische lens. Er 
wordt een kort historisch overzicht gegeven betreffende de instelling van de Hoge Commissaris 
voor de Vluchtelingen van de Verenigde Naties door het onderzoeken van enkele van deze 
gebeurtenissen met behulp van rechtseconomische methoden. Daarnaast wordt een 
rechtseconomisch model toegepast, gebaseerd op het idee dat vluchtelingen, evenals nationale 
Staten, ernaar zouden kunnen streven om hun netto voordelen te maximaliseren. Vervolgens 
worden een paar van de belangrijkste variabelen die van invloed zijn op het vluchtelingen-
besluitvormingsproces onderzocht, evenals de belangrijkste “pushfactoren” die de wetgever 
beïnvloeden bij de vaststelling en aanpassing van de asielwetgeving (bijv. bescherming van de 
nationale veiligheid en bescherming van de nationale arbeidsmarkt). Vervolgens wordt het 
Verdrag betreffende de status van vluchtelingen van 1951 besproken, waarbij wordt ingegaan op 
de belangrijkste criteria voor zijn ratificatie en naleving door nationale parlementen door een 
beschrijving van de historische context betreffende zijn ratificatie, het belang van de constructie 
van een Staat gebaseerd op democratische waarden, en het feit dat dit internationale verdrag wordt 
aangemerkt als een verdrag zonder rechtstreekse werking waarin ook enkele flexibele artikelen 
zijn opgenomen zoals voorbehouds-, opzeggings- en ontsnappingsclausules. Vervolgens wordt 
nader ingegaan op de economische voor- en nadelen van een centrale super-nationale 
asielwetgeving [binnen het acquis communautaire] die kan resulteren in het schrappen van 
concurrentie tussen rechtsordes betreffende de asielwetgeving en het opheffen van negatieve 
effecten veroorzaakt door “asielshopping.” Om het in artikel 5 van het Verdrag betreffende de 
Europese Unie vastgestelde doel te bereiken, wordt de noodzaak van harmonisatie van asielnormen 
onderzocht via de toepassing van een economische benadering. De economische methoden worden 
met name gebruikt om de toepassing te onderzoeken van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel door afweging 
van enkele van de belangrijkste economische criteria voor zowel centralisatie als decentralisatie 
en door toepassing van de bevindingen op de asielwetgeving. Deze thesis kijkt vooral naar het 
Tiebout-model, het probleem van de “race naar de bodem,” de verlaging van transactiekosten en 
het belang van de bescherming van de mensenrechten van vluchtelingen. Deze theorieën worden 
doorgaans gebruikt in gevallen met een grensoverschrijdend karakter, leidend tot (negatieve) 
externe effecten. Samenvattend, de internationale vluchtelingenwetgeving wordt in wezen 
geanalyseerd door middel van een multidisciplinaire benadering. De belangrijkste doelstelling is 
het onderzoeken van “vraag” en “aanbod” van de “vluchtelingenwetgevingsmarkt” door de lens 
van de rechtseconomische benadering maar binnen de context van de mensenrechten. Na een 
toelichting op de evolutie van de mensenrechtenbenadering door integratie van juridische en 
economische inzichten, geeft dit wetenschappelijk werk een uiteenzetting betreffende de 
belangrijkste “pushfactoren” die van invloed zijn op de “keuze” van vluchtelingen – de vraagzijde 
– en op het overheidsbeleid – de aanbodzijde. In de conclusie worden enkele beleidssuggesties 
gedaan, waarbij rekening wordt gehouden met de nationale voorkeuren van de landen van 
bestemming en de bescherming van vluchtelingenrechten. 
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 טפשמל תילכלכה השיגה לש טבמה תדוקנ :םיטילפ לושחנ
 
 הריקס תעצומ ,הליחת .טפשמל תילכלכה השיגה תשדעל דעבמ םיטילפ ילושחנ חותינ איה רוביחה תרטמ
 תרזעב ,םייטנבלר םיעוריא לש םתניחב בגא ,םיטילפל ם"ואה תוביצנ תמקהל רשאב הרצק תירוטסיה
 סיסב לע ילכלכ חותינ לש לדומב שומיש רוביחב השענ ,ךכ לע ףסונ .טפשמה לש ילכלכ חותינל תוטיש
 םינתשמ םינחבנ ,ךכל ךשמהב .םהלש תולעותה תאשהל ףואשל םייושע תונידמ ןהו םיטילפ ןהש ןויערה
 םיעיפשמה םיירקיעה הפיחדה ימרוג םג ומכ ,םיטילפ לש תוטלחהה תלבק ךילהת לע םיעיפשמה םייזכרמ
 הקוסעתה קוש לע וא הנידמה ןוחטיב לע הנגה :המגודל( טלקמ יקוח ןקתל וא קקוחל םאובב םיקקוחמ לע
  .)ימוקמה
 םימרוגב דקמתמ הז קלח .1951 תנשמ םיטילפ לש םדמעמ רבדב הנמאה רוביחב הנודנ ,ןכמ רחאל
 ינדא לע הנידמ תתתשה תובישחב ,היתושירדב הדימעהו םייתנידמה םיטנמלרפב הנמאה רורשאל םייזכרמה
 תוארוה רפסמ הליכמ רשא תיתאצות הניאש הנמאכ וז תימואל-ןיב הנמא לש חותינבו ,םייטרקומד םיכרע
  .)escape clauses( טולימ יפיעסו )denunciation( יוניג ,)reservation( תוגייתסה ןוגכ ,תושימג
 םיימואל-לע םיטילפ יניד לש םהיתונורסחו םהיתונורתי תודוא רקחמ אבה קלחב גצומ ,הנומתה תמלשהל
 םויסל איבהל םייושע רשא ,acquis Communautaire] -המ קלחכ[ יפוריאה טפשמה תרגסמב םייזוכיר
 תרירב ידי לע תומרגנש תוילילש תונצחה לש ןתרסהלו טלקמה יניד םוחתב טפשמ תוטיש ןיב תורחתה
 העבקנש תילכתה תא םישגהל ידכ טלקמה טרדנטס לש היצזינומרהב ךרוצה .)asylum shopping( טלקמ
 תוטישב שומיש השענ ,טרפב .תילכלכ השיג םושיי תועצמאב ןחבנ יפוריאה דוחיאה תנמאל 5 ףיעסב
 הדימ תומא תניחב תועצמאב )subsidiarity( תורידססבוסה ןורקע םושיי רקחל תדרל ידכ תוילכלכ
 תדקמתמ הזיתה .טלקמה יניד םוחתב םיאצממה םושיי תועצמאבו רוזיב תמועל זוכירל תויזכרמ תוילכלכ
 לש םדאה תויוכז לע הנגהה תובישחבו הקסעה תויולע תתחפהב ,"תיתחתל ץורימה" תייעבב ,וּביט לדומב
-ןיב תונצחה םירצוי רשא ,תולובג-הצוח יפוא ילעב םירקמב וידחי תושמשמ הלא תוירואית .םיטילפ
  .תוילילש תוימואל
 ותרטמ .תימוחת-בר השיג תרזעב םיימואל-ןיבה םיטילפה יניד לש תיתרוקיב הניחב תכרענ רוביחב ,םוכיסל
 תשדעל דעבמ "םיטילפה יניד קוש" לש "שוקיבה"ו "עציהה" רקח איה הז יתרוקיב חותינ לש תיזכרמה
 םדאה תויוכז תשיג לש התוחתפתה רבסה רחאל .םדא תויוכז לש רשקהב ךא טפשמל תילכלכה השיגה
 םיירקיעה הפיחדה ימרוג לע הביחרמ וז רקחמ תדובע ,טפשמה לש ילכלכה חותינה םוחתמ תונבות תועצמאב
 קרפב .עציהה דצ ירק – תירוביצ תוינידמ לע ןכו ,שוקיבה דצ ונייהד – םיטילפה תריחב לע םיעיפשמה
 לע הנגההו דעיה תונידמ רבדב תופדעהה תליקש לע תוססובמה תוינידמ תוצלמה רפסמ תוגצומ םוכיסה
 .םיטילפה תויוכז
 
 
 
 
 
German Version 
 
Flüchtlingsströme aus rechtlicher und ökonomischer Sicht 
In diesem Forschungsbeitrag werden Flüchtlingsströme aus rechtlicher und ökonomischer 
Perspektive analysiert. Die Untersuchung bietet zunächst einen kurzen historischen Überblick 
bezüglich der Einsetzung des UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Dabei 
werden einige der damaligen Vorgänge mittels rechtlicher und ökonomischer Methodik betrachtet. 
Der Verwendung rechtlicher und ökonomischer Modelle liegt die Annahme zu Grunde, dass 
Flüchtlinge, ähnlich wie Nationalstaaten, in ihrem Handeln möglicherweise eine Strategie der 
Nutzenmaximierung verfolgen. Im Folgenden werden einige der wichtigsten Faktoren untersucht, 
welche die Entscheidungsfindung von Flüchtlingen leiten, sowie die wichtigsten „Push-Faktoren“, 
welche die jeweiligen Gesetzgeber beeinflussen hinsichtlich der Erlassung und Änderung von 
Gesetzen zur Flüchtlingspolitik (bspw. Fragen der inneren Sicherheit oder des heimischen 
Arbeitsmarktes). In Anschluss an diese Betrachtungen wird die Flüchtlingskonvention von 1951 
erörtert, insbesondere bezüglich ihrer Ratifizierung sowie ihrer Implementierung und Einhaltung 
durch die jeweiligen nationalen Parlamente. Im Zuge dessen werden der historische Kontext ihrer 
Ratifizierung betrachtet, die allgemeine Bedeutung eines auf demokratischen Werten basierenden 
Staatswesens sowie die Tatsache, dass diese Konvention aufgrund von enthaltenen Vorbehalts-, 
Kündigungs- und Befreiungsklauseln als nicht- bindende Vereinbarung erachtet wird. Daran 
anschließend folgt eine Untersuchung der ökonomischen Vor- und Nachteile eines zentralen, 
supranationalen Asylrechts (acquis communautaire), welches zu einer Auflösung des Wettstreits 
bestehender gesetzlicher Bestimmungen zur Flüchtlingspolitik führen könnte sowie zur 
Eliminierung negativer Externalitäten, die durch das „Asyl-Shopping“ verursacht werden. 
Hinsichtlich des Artikels 5 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union wird der Bedarf nach einer 
Harmonisierung der Asylgesetzgebung mittels einer ökonomischen Herangehensweise beleuchtet. 
Mit dieser Methodik wird auch die Anwendung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips untersucht, etwa im 
Hinblick auf die wirtschaftlichen Argumente die für bzw. gegen eine Zentralisierung sprechen. Die 
Ergebnisse dieser Betrachtung werden im Anschluss auf die Frage der Asylgesetzgebung 
angewendet. Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich insbesondere dem Tiebout- Modell, dem Problem 
des „race to the bottom“, der Reduzierung der Transaktionskosten sowie der Bedeutung des 
Schutzes der Menschenrechte der Flüchtlinge. Diese Theorien finden gemeinhin Anwendung in 
Fällen grenzüberschreitender Art, was zu [negativen] internationalen Externalitäten führt. 
Zusammenfassend gesagt, wird die internationale Flüchtlingsgesetzgebung mittels einer 
multidisziplinären Herangehensweise kritisch analysiert. Das hauptsächliche Ziel ist dabei, 
 
„Angebot“ und „Nachfrage“ auf dem „Markt der Flüchtlingsgesetzgebung“ aus rechtlicher und 
ökonomischer Perspektive zu untersuchen, ohne den Aspekt der Menschenrechte dabei außer Acht 
zu lassen. Im Anschluss an eine Darstellung der Entstehungsgeschichte der am Prinzip der 
Menschenrechte ausgerichteten Herangehensweise, die durchaus rechtliche und ökonomische 
Aspekte beinhaltet, wird die vorliegende Arbeit zum einen die „Push-Faktoren“ untersuchen, 
welche die Entscheidungsfindung von Flüchtlingen beeinflussen – die Nachfrageseite also –, zum 
anderen die konkrete Gesetzgebung – die Angebotsseite. In den Schlussfolgerungen werde einige 
Vorschläge zur Gesetzgebung unterbreitet, die sowohl die Präferenzen der Zielstaaten der 
Flüchtlingsströme berücksichtigen als auch den Schutz der Rechte der Flüchtlinge. 
Italian Version 
 
Il Flusso dei Rifugiati: un approccio economico-giuridico 
Questa ricerca ha lo scopo di analizzare il flusso dei rifugiati attraverso un approccio economico- 
giuridico. Lo studio offre una breve panoramica storica della creazione dell'Alto commissario delle 
Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati esaminando alcuni di questi eventi utilizzando metodi legali ed 
economici. Inoltre, viene applicato un modello economico-giuridico, basato sull'idea che i rifugiati, 
così come gli Stati, potrebbero mirare a massimizzare i loro benefici netti. Vengono quindi 
esplorate alcune delle variabili più importanti che incidono sul processo decisionale dei rifugiati, 
nonché i più importanti fattori di "spinta" che incidono sui legislatori nell'emanazione e nella 
modifica delle leggi sui rifugiati (ad esempio la protezione della sicurezza nazionale e la tutela del 
mercato del lavoro nazionale). Successivamente, viene discussa la Convenzione relativa allo Status 
dei Rifugiati del 1951, approfondendo i principali fattori per la sua ratifica e conformità da parte 
dei parlamenti nazionali riflettendo sul contesto storico che circonda la sua ratifica, l'importanza 
della costruzione di uno stato basato su valori democratici, e il fatto che questa convenzione 
internazionale sia considerato un trattato non consequenziale che incorpora anche alcune delle 
clausole flessibili, come le clausole di riserva, di denuncia e di fuga. Viene quindi presentato uno 
studio dei vantaggi e degli svantaggi economici di una legge centralizzata in materia di asilo (acquis 
comunitario) che può comportare l'eliminazione della concorrenza tra sistemi giuridici nel diritto dei 
rifugiati e la rimozione di esternalità negative causate da “asylum shopping”. Per raggiungere 
l'obiettivo stabilito dall'articolo 5 del Trattato sull'Unione Europea, la necessità di armonizzare le 
norme in materia di asilo viene esaminata attraverso l'applicazione di un approccio economico. In 
particolare, il metodo economico viene utilizzato per studiare l'applicazione del principio di 
sussidiarietà prendendo in considerazione alcuni dei criteri economici più importanti sia per la 
centralizzazione che per il decentramento e applicando i risultati al diritto dei rifugiati. In 
particolare, questa tesi esamina il modello di Tiebout, il problema della “race to the bottom”, la 
riduzione dei costi di transazione e l'importanza della protezione dei diritti umani dei rifugiati. 
Queste teorie sono comunemente usate in casi di studio di problemi di natura transfrontaliera, che 
producono esternalità internazionali [negative]. Riassumendo, il diritto internazionale dei rifugiati 
è analizzato attraverso un approccio multidisciplinare. L'obiettivo principale è quello di esplorare 
la "domanda" e "offerta" del "mercato dei rifugiati" attraverso un metodo economico-giuridico, ma 
nel contesto dei diritti umani. Dopo aver spiegato l'evoluzione dei diritti dei rifugiati, incorporando 
approfondimenti di diritto ed economia, questo lavoro scientifico elabora i principali fattori di 
"spinta" che incidono sulla scelta dei rifugiati, sul lato della domanda, e sul lato delle politiche 
pubbliche, sul lato dell'offerta. In conclusione, vengono proposti alcuni suggerimenti politici che 
tengono conto delle preferenze nazionali dei paesi di destinazione e della protezione dei diritti dei 
rifugiati. 
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